Knowledge that Transforms

We examine the effect of introducing credit default swaps (CDSs) on firm value. Our model allows for dynamic investment and financing, and bondholders can trade in the CDS market. The model incorporates both negative and positive effects of CDSs. CDS markets lead to more liquidations, but they also reduce the probability of costly debt renegotiation and reduce costly equity financing. After calibrating the model, we find that firm value increases by 2.9% on average with the introduction of a CDS market. Firms also invest more and increase leverage. The effect on firm value is strongest for small, financially constrained, and low productivity firms.

This paper considers the nature of returns to scale in active management following Pástor et al. (2015) who fail to establish diseconomies of scale at the fund level. Using an enhanced empirical strategy, we find a significant negative impact of fund size on performance. This empirical evidence indicates that fund alpha and fund size are not independent entities. Consequently, skill, rather than being measured by the fund alpha, should be measured by the value that a fund extracts from capital markets. We also show that there exist sophisticated investors who correctly exploit positive net present value investment opportunities.

The frequency with which firms adjust output prices helps explain persistent differences in capital structure across firms. Unconditionally, the most flexible-price firms have a 19% higher long-term leverage ratio than the most sticky-price firms, controlling for known determinants of capital structure. Sticky-price firms increased leverage more than flexible-price firms following the staggered implementation of bank deregulation across states and over time, which we use in a difference-in-differences strategy. Firms’ frequency of price adjustment did not change around the deregulation.

We use a US Supreme Court case, Morrison v. National Australia Bank (2010), as a natural experiment to test the legal bonding hypothesis. By decreasing the potential liability of US-listed foreign firms, particularly due to class action lawsuits, Morrison arguably eroded their legal bonding to compliance with disclosure duties. Nevertheless, we find evidence of an increase or insignificant change in share values. Tests of longer-run effects of the legal event indicate that foreign firms’ disclosure quality and likelihood of facing enforcement actions remained stable, as did investors’ revealed preferences for trading on US markets. These results go against the legal bonding hypothesis but are consistent with reputational bonding and with market-based accounts of US cross-listing. Our results may contribute to ongoing debate about civil enforcement of securities laws through class actions.

Differences in accrued gains and investors’ tax-sensitivity induce variation in a capital gains lock-in effect across mutual funds even for the same stock at the same time. Exploiting this variation, we show this effect influences funds’ governance decisions: higher capital gains decrease the likelihood a fund exits prior to contentious votes and increase the likelihood a fund votes against management. Consistent with tax motivation, these findings are concentrated among funds with tax-sensitive investors. Further, high aggregate capital gains across funds holding a stock predict a higher likelihood management loses a vote and a lower likelihood a contentious vote is proposed.

The size premium has been accused of having a weak historical record, being meager relative to other factors, varying significantly over time, weakening after its discovery, being concentrated among microcap stocks, residing predominantly in January, relying on price-based measures, and being weak internationally. We find, however, that these challenges disappear when controlling for the quality, or its inverse, junk, of a firm. A significant size premium emerges, which is stable through time, robust to specification, not concentrated in microcaps, more consistent across seasons, and evident for non-price-based measures of size, and these results hold in 30 different industries and 24 international equity markets. The resurrected size effect is on par with anomalies such as value and momentum in terms of economic significance and gives rise to new tests of, and challenges for, existing asset pricing theories.

I present and estimate a dynamic model of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and effort provision. I find that variation in CEO attributes explains the majority of variation in compensation (equity and total) but little of the variation in firm value. The primary drivers of cross-sectional compensation are risk aversion and influence on the board. Additionally, I estimate the magnitude of CEO agency issues. Removing CEO influence increases shareholder value in the typical firm by 1.74%, making CEOs risk neutral increases shareholder value by 16.12%, and removing all agency frictions increases shareholder value by 28.99%.

We introduce ambiguity in conjunction with risk to study the relation between risk, ambiguity, and expected returns. Distinguishing between ambiguity and attitudes toward ambiguity, we develop an empirical methodology for measuring the degree of ambiguity and for assessing attitudes toward ambiguity from market data. The main findings indicate that ambiguity in the equity market is priced. Introducing ambiguity alongside risk provides stronger evidence on the role of risk in explaining expected returns in the equity markets. The findings also indicate that investors’ level of aversion to or love for ambiguity is contingent on the expected probability of favorable returns.

Mandatory shareholder approval of equity issuances varies across and within countries. When shareholders approve issuances, average announcement returns are positive. When managers issue stock without shareholder approval, returns are negative and 4% lower. The closer the vote is to the issuance or the greater is the required plurality, the higher are the returns for public offers, rights offers, and private placements. When shareholder approval is required, rights offers predominate. When managers may issue stock without shareholder approval, public offers predominate. These findings suggest that agency problems affect equity issuances and challenge existing adverse selection, market timing, and signaling explanations.

Political and regulatory uncertainty is strongly negatively associated with merger and acquisition activity at the macro and firm levels. The strongest effects are for uncertainty regarding taxes, government spending, monetary and fiscal policies, and regulation. Consistent with a real options channel, the effect is exacerbated for less reversible deals and for firms whose product demand or stock returns exhibit greater sensitivity to policy uncertainty, but attenuated for deals that cannot be delayed due to competition and for deals that hedge firm-level risk. Contractual mechanisms (deal premiums, termination fees, MAC clauses) unanimously point to policy uncertainty increasing the target’s negotiating power.