Knowledge that Transforms

Each time a stock gets added to or dropped from an index, we ask: “How much money would have to be tracking that index to explain the huge spike in rebalancing volume we observe on reconstitution day?” While index funds held 16% of the US stock market in 2021, we put the overall passive ownership share at 33.5%. Our headline number is twice as large because it reflects index funds as well as other kinds of passive investors, such as institutional investors with internally managed index portfolios and active managers who are closet indexing.

Regulatory independence forms a foundation for modern financial systems. The institutions’ value is illuminated by a Progressive Era policy experiment when independent state-bank regulators came under governors’ supervision. Afterwards, bank resolution rates declined during gubernatorial election campaigns for banks supervised by state but not national authorities. This gubernatorial-campaign effect diminished by two orders of magnitude, but did not disappear, after the FDIC became the independent resolver for all insured banks in 1935. In addition, during the Progressive Era, declines in bank resolutions led to declines in business bankruptcy rates, an effect that is not observed in the FDIC era. Our findings indicate regulatory independence can dramatically reduce but may not eliminate politics’ impact on banks and the economy.

We study a financial inclusion policy targeting Brazilian cities with low bank branch coverage using data on the universe of employees from 2000–2014. The policy leads to bank entry and to similar increases in both deposits and lending. It also fosters entrepreneurship, employment, and wage growth, especially for cities initially in banking deserts. These gains are not shared equally and instead increase with workers’ education, implying a substantial increase in wage inequality. The changes in inequality are concentrated in cities where the initial supply of skilled workers is low, indicating that talent scarcity can drive how financial development affects inequality.

For many firms, voluntarily delisting from a stock exchange can be optimal. We model an entrepreneur's incentives to voluntarily delist the firm as a trade-off between consumption of private benefits when listed and expected improvements in the firm's performance after delisting. Our model allows for heterogeneity across firms and countries, and various micro and macro shocks affect the delisting decision. Such a model makes novel predictions regarding the delisting patterns around the world. We empirically confirm these predictions using manually collected delisting data from 26 countries. Increasing policy and regulatory uncertainties can partially explain the greater popularity of voluntary delistings.

We characterize the structure and origins of missingness for 159 cross-sectional return predictors and study missing value handling for portfolios constructed using machine learning. Simply imputing with cross-sectional means performs well compared to rigorous expectation-maximization methods. This stems from three facts about predictor data: (1) missingness occurs in large blocks organized by time, (2) cross-sectional correlations are small, and (3) missingness tends to occur in blocks organized by the underlying data source. As a result, observed data provide little information about missing data. Sophisticated imputations introduce estimation noise that can lead to underperformance if machine learning is not carefully applied.

Compliance-driven investments in technology—or “RegTech”—are growing rapidly. To understand the effects on the financial sector, we study firms’ responses to new internal control requirements. Affected firms make significant investments in ERP and hardware. These expenditures then enable complementary investments that are leveraged for noncompliance purposes, leading to modest savings from avoided customer complaints and misconduct. IT budgets rise and profits fall, especially at small firms, and acquisition activity and market concentration increase. Our results illustrate how regulation can directly and indirectly affect technology adoption, which in turn affects noncompliance functions and market structure.

An important strand of research in macro-finance investigates which factors impede enterprise investment, and what is their aggregate economic cost. In this paper, we make two contributions to this literature. The first contribution is methodological: we introduce a novel framework to calibrate macroeconomic models with firm-level distortions using enterprise survey micro-data. The core of our innovation is to explicitly model the firms' decisions to report in the survey the distortions they face. Our second contribution is to apply our method across seven countries to characterize the distribution of these distortions and estimate the gross domestic product (GDP) loss induced by distortionary red tape. Our estimates are based on a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms whose capital investment decisions are distorted by red tape. We find that the aggregate cost of red tape varies widely across the countries in our dataset, with an average cost of 0.8% of annual GDP. Our framework opens up a new range of applications for enterprise surveys in macro-financial modeling and policy analysis.

The average total compensation of directors in U.S.-listed companies was $342,030 in 2020, 5.06 times the median household income. Directors set their own pay, giving rise to potential self-dealing. We argue and document that in the presence of self-dealing, external mechanisms such as legal standards act as effective means of governance. Following a landmark Delaware court ruling that subjected director pay to a more stringent legal standard, Delaware-incorporated firms reduced director compensation relative to non-Delaware firms and experienced positive and non-transient stock price reactions. Our results indicate that proper governance of director compensation enhances firm value.

We present an analytical solution for a pure exchange economy featuring a continuum of agents with disagreement, time-varying information quality, and reference-dependent preferences. Our general equilibrium model exhibits stationary dynamics. By examining the implications of the model, we find that the commonly studied asset pricing channels of disagreement have limited quantitative significance. On the other hand, variations in information quality, which affect disagreement levels, lead to substantial excess stock price volatility. This finding contributes significantly to explaining the equity premium and sheds light on empirical relationships between forecast dispersion and asset prices, the upward sloping real yield curve, and long-term yield movements.

This paper provides novel evidence that female politicians increase the proportion of US government procurement contracts allocated to women-owned firms. For identification, we use a regression discontinuity design on a sample of mixed-gender elections in the US House of Representatives. The effect grows over a female representative's tenure and concentrates in female representatives who are on powerful congressional committees. Changes in the pool of and behavior by government contractors cannot explain the result. The more gender-balanced representation in government contracting is not associated with economic costs.