Self-imposed risk limits effectively limit dealers' appetite for risks and their capacity to intermediate in Treasury markets in times of market stress. Using granular and high frequency regulatory data on US dealers' Treasury securities trading desk positions and desk-level Value-at-Risk limits, we show that dealers are more inclined to reduce their positions as they get closer to their internal risk limit, consistent with such limit being meaningful and costly for traders to breach. Dealers actively manage their inventories away from their limits by selling longer-term securities and requiring higher compensation to take on additional risks. During the height of the Covid-crisis in 2020, dealer desks that were closer to their VaR limits sold more Treasury securities to the Fed and accepted lower prices in the emergency open market operations. Our findings complement studies that link post-GFC bank regulations to market liquidity by showing that self-imposed risk limits can explain the risk-averse behavior by dealers, and provide a micro-foundation for the link between market volatility and market liquidity in dealer-intermediated OTC markets. In times of crisis, policy prescriptions such as deregulation alone may not be sufficient to induce risk-taking by dealer intermediaries. Moreover, to address market functioning issues, policy actions that address the funding costs of intermediaries would not be as effective as policies that remove risks from intermediary balance sheets directly.

We explore how mutual fund managers and investors react when the tradeoff between a fund's sustainability and performance becomes salient. Following the introduction of Morningstar's sustainability ratings (the “globe” ratings), mutual funds increased their holdings of sustainable stocks to attract flows. Such sustainability-driven trades, however, underperformed, impairing the funds’ overall performance. Consequently, a tradeoff between sustainability and performance emerged. In the new equilibrium, the globe ratings do not affect investor flows and funds no longer trade to improve their globe ratings.

We document a regime change in the Treasury market post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC): dealers switched from net short to net long Treasury bonds. We construct “net-long” and “net-short” curves that account for balance sheet and financing costs, and show that actual yields moved from the net short curve pre-GFC to the net long curve post-GFC. Our theory shows the regime shift caused negative swap spreads and co-movement among swap spreads, dealer positions, and covered-interest-parity violations. Furthermore, the effects of various monetary and regulatory policies are regime-dependent. We highlight Treasury supply as a plausible driver of this regime shift.

We model competition for liquidity provision between high-frequency traders (HFTs) and slower execution algorithms (EAs) designed to minimize investors’ transaction costs. Under continuous pricing, EAs dominate liquidity provision by using aggressive limit orders to stimulate HFTs’ market orders. Under discrete pricing, HFTs dominate liquidity provision if the bid-ask spread is binding at one tick. If the tick size (minimum price variation) is not binding, EAs choose between stimulating HFTs and providing liquidity to non-HFTs. Transaction costs increase with the tick size but can be negatively correlated with the bid-ask spread when all traders can provide liquidity.

To understand the link between financial intermediation activities and the real economy, we build a general equilibrium model in which agency frictions in the financial sector affect the efficiency of capital reallocation across firms and generate aggregate economic fluctuations. We develop a recursive policy iteration approach to fully characterize the nonlinear equilibrium dynamics and the off-steady-state crisis behavior. In our model, adverse shocks to agency frictions exacerbate capital misallocation and manifest themselves as variations in total factor productivity at the aggregate level. Our model endogenously generates countercyclical volatility in the aggregate time series and countercyclical dispersion in the marginal product of capital and asset returns in the cross-section.

The Split-Share Structure Reform granted legitimate trading rights to the state-owned shares of listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs), opening up the gate to China׳s secondary privatization. The expectation of privatization quickly boosted SOE output, profits, and employment, but did not change their operating efficiency and corporate governance. The improvements to SOE performance are positively correlated to government agents’ privatization-led incentive of increasing state-owned share value. In terms of privatization methodology, the reform adopted a market mechanism that played an effective information discovery role in aligning the interests of the government and public investors.

This paper is the first to study the effect of financial restatement on bank loan contracting. Compared with loans initiated before restatement, loans initiated after restatement have significantly higher spreads, shorter maturities, higher likelihood of being secured, and more covenant restrictions. The increase in loan spread is significantly larger for fraudulent restating firms than other restating firms. We also find that after restatement, the number of lenders per loan declines and firms pay higher upfront and annual fees. These results are consistent with banks using tighter loan contract terms to overcome risk and information problems arising from financial restatements.

How does common ownership affect innovation? We study this question using project-level data on pharmaceutical startups and their venture capital (VC) investors. We find that common ownership leads VCs to hold back projects, withhold funding, and redirect innovation at lagging startups. Effects are stronger where R&D costs are larger, consistent with common owners aiming to cut duplicate costs. Effects are also stronger where technological similarity is greater and preexisting competition is lower, consistent with common owners seeking market power for their surviving projects. Overall, common VC ownership appears to generate social benefits , via improved innovation efficiency, but also social costs.

If opportunistic acquirers can buy targets using overvalued shares, then there is an inefficiency in the merger and acquisition (M&A) market: the most overvalued rather than the highest-synergy bidder may buy the target. We quantify this inefficiency using a structural estimation approach. We find that the M&A market allocates resources efficiently on average. Opportunistic bidders crowd out high-synergy bidders in only 7% of transactions, resulting in an average synergy loss equal to 9% of the target’s value in these inefficient deals. The implied average loss across all deals is 0.63%. Although the inefficiency is small on average, it is large for certain deals, and it is larger when misvaluation is more likely. Even when opportunistic bidders lose the contest, they drive up prices, imposing a large negative externality on the winning synergistic bidders.