Knowledge that Transforms

This paper empirically shows that the cost of bank debt is systematically higher for firms that operate in competitive product markets. Using various proxies for product market competition, and reductions of import tariff rates to capture exogenous changes to a firm's competitive environment, I find that competition has a significantly positive effect on the cost of bank debt. Moreover, the analysis reveals that the effect of competition is greater in industries in which small firms face financially strong rivals, in industries with intense strategic interactions between firms, and in illiquid industries. Overall, these findings suggest that banks price financial contracts by taking into account the risk that arises from product market competition.

We examine how commonality in liquidity varies across countries and over time in ways related to supply determinants (funding liquidity of financial intermediaries) and demand determinants (correlated trading behavior of international and institutional investors, incentives to trade individual securities, and investor sentiment) of liquidity. Commonality in liquidity is greater in countries with and during times of high market volatility (especially, large market declines), greater presence of international investors, and more correlated trading activity. Our evidence is more reliably consistent with demand-side explanations and challenges the ability of the funding liquidity hypothesis to help us understand important aspects of financial market liquidity around the world, even during the recent financial crisis.

We develop and test a model that investigates how controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives affect firm values during crisis and subsequent recovery periods. Consistent with the prediction of our model, we find that, during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Asian firms with weaker corporate governance experience a larger drop in their share values but, during the post-crisis recovery period, such firms experience a larger rebound in their share values. We also find consistent evidence for Latin American firms during the 2001 Argentine economic crisis. Our results support the view that controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value.

Counterparty credit risk has become one of the highest-profile risks facing participants in the financial markets. Despite this, relatively little is known about how counterparty credit risk is actually priced. We examine this issue using an extensive proprietary data set of contemporaneous CDS transaction prices and quotes by 14 different CDS dealers selling credit protection on the same underlying firm. This unique cross-sectional data set allows us to identify directly how dealers' credit risk affects the prices of these controversial credit derivatives. We find that counterparty credit risk is priced in the CDS market. The magnitude of the effect, however, is vanishingly small and is consistent with a market structure in which participants require collateralization of swap liabilities by counterparties.

We use a detailed panel data set of Swedish households to investigate the relation between their labor income risk and financial investment decisions. In particular, we relate changes in wage volatility to changes in the portfolio holdings for households that switched industries between 1999 and 2002. We find that households do adjust their portfolio holdings when switching jobs, which is consistent with the idea that households hedge their human capital risk in the stock market. The results are statistically and economically significant. A household going from an industry with low wage volatility to one with high volatility ceteris paribus decreases its portfolio share of risky assets by up to 35%, or $15,575.

Over the last couple of decades unprecedented increases in life expectancy have raised important concerns for retirement savings. We solve a life-cycle model with longevity risk, which can be hedged through endogenous saving and retirement decisions. We investigate the benefits of financial assets designed to hedge the shocks to survival probabilities. When longevity risk is calibrated to match forward-looking projections, those benefits are substantial. This lends support to the idea that such hedging should be pursued by defined benefit pension plans on behalf of their beneficiaries. Finally, we draw implications for optimal security design.

Prior work has established that entrenched managers make value-decreasing acquisitions. In this study, we determine how they destroy that value. Overall, we find that value destruction by entrenched managers comes from a combination of factors. First, they disproportionately avoid private targets, which have been shown to be generally associated with value creation. Second, when they do buy private targets or public targets with blockholders, they tend not to use all-equity offers, which has the effect of avoiding the transfer of a valuable blockholder to the bidder. We further test whether entrenched managers simply overpay for good targets or choose targets with lower synergies. We find that while they overpay, they also choose low synergy targets in the first place, as shown by combined announcement returns and post-merger operating performance.

Economists have traditionally viewed futures prices as fully informative about future economic activity and asset prices. We argue that open interest could be more informative than futures prices in the presence of hedging demand and limited risk absorption capacity in futures markets. We find that movements in open interest are highly pro-cyclical, correlated with both macroeconomic activity and movements in asset prices. Movements in commodity market interest predict commodity returns, bond returns, and movements in the short rate even after controlling for other known predictors. To a lesser degree, movements in open interest predict returns in currency, bond, and stock markets.

This paper investigates the extent to which market risk, residual risk, and tail risk explain the cross-sectional dispersion in hedge fund returns. The paper introduces a comprehensive measure of systematic risk (SR) for individual hedge funds by breaking up total risk into systematic and fund-specific or residual risk components. Contrary to the popular understanding that hedge funds are market neutral, we find that systematic risk is a highly significant factor explaining the dispersion of cross-sectional returns while at the same time measures of residual risk and tail risk seem to have little explanatory power. Funds in the highest SR quintile generate 6% more average annual returns compared with funds in the lowest SR quintile. After controlling for a large set of fund characteristics and risk factors, systematic risk remains positive and highly significant, whereas the relation between residual risk and future fund returns continues to be insignificant. Hence, systematic risk is a powerful determinant of the cross-sectional differences in hedge fund returns.

This paper mathematically transforms unobservable rational expectation equilibrium model parameters (information precision and supply uncertainty) into a single variable that is correlated with expected returns and that can be estimated with recently observed data. Our variable can be used to explain the cross section of returns in theoretical, numerical, and empirical analyses. Using Center for Research in Security Prices data, we show that a −1σ to +1σ change in our variable is associated with a 0.31% difference in average returns the following month (equaling 3.78% per annum). The results are statistically significant at the 1% level. Our results remain economically and statistically significant after controlling for stocks' market capitalizations, book-to-market ratios, liquidities, and the probabilities of information-based trading.