Knowledge that Transforms

We solve a portfolio choice problem when expected returns, covariances, and trading costs follow a regime-switching model. The optimal policy trades towards an aim portfolio given by a weighted-average of the conditional mean-variance-efficient portfolios in all future states. The trading speed is higher in more persistent, riskier, and higher-liquidity states. It can be optimal to overweight low Sharpe-ratio assets such as Treasury bonds because they remain liquid even in crisis states. We illustrate our methodology by constructing an optimal US equity market timing portfolio based on an estimated regime-switching model and on trading costs estimated using a large-order institutional trading data set.

This paper studies the effects of financial distress on workers’ productivity, using detailed data from the public school system in Texas. We show that the student passing rate in the median-sized grade decreases by 1.2 percentage points following a declaration of bankruptcy by one teacher in the grade. The effect of financial distress increases with the complexity of the task. Overall, our results suggest a potential feedback effect of worker financial distress on local economic conditions and thus contribute to the understanding of the propagation, and potential amplification, of shocks through a local economy.

We revisit Feldhütter and Schaefer (FS, 2018), who report evidence of a “credit spread puzzle” for high-yield but not investment-grade bonds. We show their results are reversed when their model is calibrated to market values of debt (as required by theory) rather than book values. We then demonstrate that using credit spreads rather than historical default rates to identify the default boundary provides the statistical power necessary to reject their assumption that firm dynamics follow geometric Brownian motion. A large market price of jump risk is required to match historical default rates, which generates a credit spread puzzle for investment-grade but not high-yield bonds.

We show that in the limited-commitment framework of Donaldson et al. (2019), firm value always increases in the fraction of cash flows that can be pledged as collateral. That is, pledgeability increases investment efficiency and relaxes a firm’s financing constraint. We derive this conclusion using the same contracts considered by the authors and generalize the result to an arbitrary number of states. We also show that the first best can always be implemented by a nonstate-contingent secured debt contract, which differs from the ones they consider.

Using a comprehensive set of 103 equity strategies, we analyze the value of volatility-managed portfolios for real-time investors. Volatility-managed portfolios do not systematically outperform their corresponding unmanaged portfolios in direct comparisons. Consistent with Moreira and Muir (2017), volatility-managed portfolios tend to exhibit significantly positive alphas in spanning regressions. However, the trading strategies implied by these regressions are not implementable in real time, and reasonable out-of-sample versions generally earn lower certainty equivalent returns and Sharpe ratios than do simple investments in the original, unmanaged portfolios. This poor out-of-sample performance for volatility-managed portfolios stems primarily from structural instability in the underlying spanning regressions.

Using a comprehensive list of terrorist attacks over three decades, we find that aggregate investor risk aversion inversely relates to terrorist activity in the United States. A one standard deviation increase in the number of attacks each month leads to a 75.09 million drop in aggregate flows to equity funds and a 56.81 million increase to government bond funds. Tests on alternative channels further suggest that the shift in aggregate risk aversion is driven mainly by an emotional shock rather than changes in wealth or the outside environment. We also investigate possible alternate explanations for reduced flows to risky assets. Our evidence is consistent with a fear-induced increase in aggregate risk aversion.

The total effects of a regulatory change consist of direct effects and indirect effects (spillovers), but the standard difference-in-difference approach mostly ignores potential indirect effects. During the 2007 full repeal of the uptick rule, short-sellers become much more aggressive across the board, even in control stocks where the uptick rule is already suspended. This finding is consistent with positive and significant indirect effects on control stocks, likely driven by aggressive broad list-based shorting. In contract, the indirect effect coefficients on shorting aggressiveness are negative for the 2005 partial uptick repeal, possibly due to substitutions between control and treatment stocks.

I examine how the labor market in which firms operate affects their capital structure decisions. Based on US Census Bureau data and information on companies’ decisions to locate their new operations, I use a large plant opening as an abrupt increase in the size of a local labor market. I find that a new plant opening leads to an increase of 2.5–3.9 percentage points in the debt-to-capital ratio of existing firms in the “winner” county relative to the “runner-up” choice. This result is consistent with the argument that larger labor markets make job loss less costly, which in turn reduces the indirect costs of financial distress. Notably, this spillover effect is larger for firms that employ the same type of workers as the new plant in the affected county.

Historically, a key advantage of being a public firm was broader access to capital, from a disperse group of shareholders. In recent years, such capital has increasingly become available to private firms as well. We document a dramatic increase over the past twenty years in the number of mutual funds participating in private markets and in the dollar value of these private firm investments. We evaluate several factors that potentially contribute to this trend: firms seeking extra capital to postpone public listing, mutual funds seeking higher risk-adjusted returns and initial public offering (IPO) allocations, and venture capitalists (VCs) seeking new investors to substantiate higher valuations. Results indicate that the first two factors play a significant role.

Counties more likely to be affected by climate change pay more in underwriting fees and initial yields to issue long-term municipal bonds compared to counties unlikely to be affected by climate change. This difference disappears when comparing short-term municipal bonds, implying the market prices climate change risks for long-term securities only. Higher issuance costs for climate risk counties are driven by bonds with lower credit ratings. Investor attention is a driving factor, as the difference in issuance costs on bonds issued by climate and nonclimate affected counties increases after the release of the 2006 Stern Review on climate change.