Knowledge that Transforms

Using several large data sets of mortgage loans originated between 2004 and 2007, we find that in the prime mortgage market, banks generally sold low-default-risk loans into the secondary market while retaining higher-default-risk loans in their portfolios. In contrast, these lenders retained loans with lower prepayment risk relative to loans they sold. Securitization strategy of lenders changed dramatically in 2007 as the crisis set in with most unwilling to retain higher-default-risk loans in return for lower prepayment risk. Contrary to the prime market, the subprime market does not exhibit any clear pattern of adverse selection.

Firms experiencing increases in import competition significantly reduce their leverage ratios by issuing equity and selling assets to repay debt. Using import tariffs and foreign exchange rates as instrumental variables for import penetration, I show that these results are not manifestations of endogenous relations between import competition and leverage. The results are consistent with traditional trade-off models of capital structure that predict a positive relation between book leverage and expected future profitability. Further evidence suggests that import competition affects leverage through changes in the trade-off between the tax benefits of debt and the costs of financial distress.

Clearinghouses support financial trades by keeping records of transactions and by providing liquidity through short-term credit that participants clear periodically. We study efficient clearing arrangements for exchanges, where traders must clear with a clearinghouse, and for over-the-counter (OTC) markets, where traders can clear bilaterally. When clearing is costly, it can be efficient to subsidize OTC clearing by charging a higher clearing price for transactions conducted on exchanges. The clearinghouse then operates across both markets. Since clearinghouses offer credit, intertemporal incentives are needed to ensure settlement. When liquidity costs increase, concerns about default lead to a tightening of liquidity provision.

We revisit the apparent historical success of technical trading rules on daily prices of the Dow Jones Industrial Average index from 1897 to 2011, and we use the false discovery rate (FDR) as a new approach to data snooping. The advantage of the FDR over existing methods is that it selects more outperforming rules, which allows diversifying against model uncertainty. Persistence tests show that, even with the more powerful FDR technique, an investor would never have been able to select ex ante the future best-performing rules. Moreover, even in-sample, the performance is completely offset by the introduction of low transaction costs. Overall, our results seriously call into question the economic value of technical trading rules that has been reported for early periods.

In the four regions (North America, Europe, Japan, and Asia Pacific) we examine, there are value premiums in average stock returns that, except for Japan, decrease with size. Except for Japan, there is return momentum everywhere, and spreads in average momentum returns also decrease from smaller to bigger stocks. We test whether empirical asset pricing models capture the value and momentum patterns in international average returns and whether asset pricing seems to be integrated across the four regions. Integrated pricing across regions does not get strong support in our tests. For three regions (North America, Europe, and Japan), local models that use local explanatory returns provide passable descriptions of local average returns for portfolios formed on size and value versus growth. Even local models are less successful in tests on portfolios formed on size and momentum.

We present a simple model in which rational but uninformed traders occasionally chase noise as if it were information, thereby amplifying sentiment shocks and moving prices away from fundamental values. In the model, noise traders can have an impact on market equilibrium disproportionate to their size in the market. The model offers a partial explanation for the surprisingly low market price of financial risk in the spring of 2007.

This paper examines whether a party to a strategic alliance or joint venture suffers from spillover effects when the other partner files for bankruptcy. We find that the non-bankrupt strategic alliance partners, on average, experience a negative stock price reaction around their partner firm's bankruptcy filing announcement. This negative effect is strongest for longer partnerships and those with higher returns at the announcement of the initial alliance formation. Furthermore, horizontal alliance firms in declining industries have lower returns, indicating that industry conditions can exacerbate expected problems for the non-bankrupt firm. Non-bankrupt partners also experience drops in profit margins and investment levels in the subsequent two years with the worst performance concentrated among the longer-term agreements. There is very little impact on the returns or performance for joint venture partners, which suggests that these agreements are more insulating for the partner firm.

We build a new class of discrete-time models that are relatively easy to estimate using returns and/or options. The distribution of returns is driven by two factors: dynamic volatility and dynamic jump intensity. Each factor has its own risk premium. The models significantly outperform standard models without jumps when estimated on S&P500 returns. We find very strong support for time-varying jump intensities. Compared to the risk premium on dynamic volatility, the risk premium on the dynamic jump intensity has a much larger impact on option prices. We confirm these findings using joint estimation on returns and large option samples.

We estimate buy- and sell-order illiquidity measures (lambdas) for a comprehensive sample of NYSE stocks. We show that sell-order liquidity is priced more strongly than buy-order liquidity in the cross-section of equity returns. Indeed, our analysis indicates that the liquidity premium in equities emanates predominantly from the sell-order side. We also find that the average difference between sell and buy lambdas is generally positive throughout our sample period. Both buy and sell lambdas are significantly positively correlated with measures of funding liquidity such as the TED spread as well option implied volatility.

Can any multifactor model be interpreted as a variant of the Intertemporal CAPM (ICAPM)? The ICAPM places restrictions on time-series and cross-sectional behavior of state variables and factors. If a state variable forecasts positive (negative) changes in investment opportunities in time-series regressions, its innovation should earn a positive (negative) risk price in the cross-sectional test of the respective multifactor model. Second, the market (covariance) price of risk must be economically plausible as an estimate of the coefficient of relative risk aversion (RRA). We apply our ICAPM criteria to eight popular multifactor models and the results show that most models do not satisfy the ICAPM restrictions. Specifically, the “hedging” risk prices have the wrong sign and the estimates of RRA are not economically plausible. Overall, the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) models perform the best in consistently meeting the ICAPM restrictions. The remaining models, which represent some of the most relevant examples presented in the empirical asset pricing literature, can still empirically explain the size, value, and momentum anomalies, but they are generally inconsistent with the ICAPM.