Knowledge that Transforms

A model that includes a factor that captures news related to future Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth along with the market factor can explain the cross-section of equity returns about as well as the Fama-French model can. Furthermore, the Fama-French factors HML and SMB appear to contain mainly news related to future GDP growth. When news related to future GDP growth is present in the asset-pricing model, HML and SMB lose much of their ability to explain the cross-section.

Using a comprehensive database of headlines about individual companies, I examine monthly returns following public news. I compare them to stocks with similar returns, but no identifiable public news. There is a difference between the two sets. I find strong drift after bad news. Investors seem to react slowly to this information. I also find reversal after extreme price movements unaccompanied by public news. The separate patterns appear even after adjustments for risk exposure and other effects. They are, however, mainly seen in smaller, more illiquid stocks. These findings support some integrated theories of investor over- and underreaction.

The maturity of new debt issues predicts excess bond returns. When the share of long-term debt issues in total debt issues is high, future excess bond returns are low. This predictive power comes in two parts. First, inflation, the real short-term rate, and the term spread predict excess bond returns. Second, these same variables explain the long-term share, and together account for much of its own ability to predict excess bond returns. The results are consistent with survey evidence that firms use debt market conditions in an effort to determine the lowest-cost maturity at which to borrow.

The onset of the Asian financial crisis in Malaysia reduced the expected value of government subsidies to politically connected firms, accounting for roughly 9% of the estimated 60 billion loss in their market value from July 1997 to August 1998. Firing the Deputy Prime Minister and imposing capital controls in September 1998 primarily benefited firms with strong ties to Prime Minister Mahathir, accounting for roughly 32% of these firms’ estimated 5 billion gain in market value during September 1998. The evidence suggests Malaysian capital controls provided a screen behind which favored firms could be supported.

We investigate the impact of founding family ownership structure on the agency cost of debt. We find that founding family ownership is common in large, publicly traded firms and is related, both statistically and economically, to a lower cost of debt financing. Our results are consistent with the idea that founding family firms have incentive structures that result in fewer agency conflicts between equity and debt claimants. This suggests that bond holders view founding family ownership as an organizational structure that better protects their interests.

We present a model of mergers and acquisitions based on stock market misvaluations of the combining firms. The key ingredients of the model are the relative valuations of the merging firms and the market's perception of the synergies from the combination. The model explains who acquires whom, the choice of the medium of payment, the valuation consequences of mergers, and merger waves. The model is consistent with available empirical findings about characteristics and returns of merging firms, and yields new predictions as well.

This study examines quotations, order routing, and trade execution costs for seven markets that compete for orders in large-capitalization NYSE-listed stocks. The competitiveness of quote updates from each market varies with measures of the profitability of attracting additional order and with volatility and inventory measures. The probability of a trade executing on each market increases when the market posts competitive quotes. Execution costs for non-NYSE trades when the local market posts competitive (non-competitive) quotes are virtually the same (substantially exceed) costs for matched NYSE trades. Collectively, these results imply a significant degree of quote-based competition for order flow and are consistent with off-NYSE liquidity providers using competitive quotations to signal when they are prepared to give better-than-normal trade executions.

We develop an approximate solution method for the optimal consumption and portfolio choice problem of an infinitely long-lived investor with Epstein–Zin utility who faces a set of asset returns described by a vector autoregression in returns and state variables. Empirical estimates in long-run annual and post-war quarterly U.S. data suggest that the predictability of stock returns greatly increases the optimal demand for stocks. The role of nominal bonds in long-term portfolios depends on the importance of real interest rate risk relative to other sources of risk. Long-term inflation-indexed bonds greatly increase the utility of conservative investors.

This paper provides firm- and industry-level evidence of the effects of capital structure on product market outcomes for a large cross-section of industries over a number of years. The analysis uses shocks to aggregate demand as surrogates for exogenous changes in the product market environment. I find that debt financing has a negative impact on firm (relative-to-industry) sales growth in industries in which rivals are relatively unlevered during recessions, but not during booms. In contrast, no such effects are observed for firms competing in high-debt industries. At the industry level, markups are more countercyclical when industry debt is high. The cyclical dynamics I find for firm sales growth and for industry markups are consistent with Chevalier and Scharfstein's (American Economic Review (1996)) prediction that firms which rely heavily on external financing are more likely to cut their investment in market share building in response to negative shocks to demand and that the competitive outcomes resulting from such actions depend on the financial structures of their industry rivals.

Agency theory implies that asset ownership and decision authority are complements. Using 1998 data from Texas commercial banks, we test whether the likelihood of local ownership of bank offices increases with the importance of granting local managers greater decision authority (for example, due to location or customer base). Our empirical evidence is consistent with this hypothesis. It suggests that complementarities between strategy and organizational structure can foster differentiation among firms in terms of location, customers, and products. It also supports the growing view that small locally-owned banks have a comparative advantage over large banks within specific environments.