Knowledge that Transforms

We study the relation between the ownership structure of financial assets and non-fundamental risk. We define an asset to be fragile if it is susceptible to non-fundamental shifts in demand. An asset can be fragile because of concentrated ownership, or because its owners face correlated or volatile liquidity shocks, i.e., they must buy or sell at the same time. We formalize this idea and apply it to mutual fund ownership of US stocks. Consistent with our predictions, fragility strongly predicts price volatility. We then extend the logic of fragility to investigate two natural extensions: (1) the forecast of stock return comovement and (2) the potentially destabilizing impact of arbitrageurs on stock prices.

Building on the pioneering study by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2006), this study examines the effects of media ownership and concentration on corruption in bank lending using a unique World Bank data set covering more than 5,000 firms across 59 countries. We find strong evidence that state ownership of media is associated with higher levels of bank corruption. We also find that media concentration increases corruption both directly and indirectly through its interaction with media state ownership. In addition, we find that media state ownership and media concentration both accentuate the positive link between official supervisory power and lending corruption and attenuate the negative link between the regulations that empower private monitoring and corruption in lending. Media state ownership or media concentration also accentuates the positive link between banking concentration and corruption in lending. Furthermore, the links between media structure and corruption are more pronounced when the borrowing firm is privately owned.

The returns of hedge fund investors depend not only on the returns of the funds they hold but also on the timing and magnitude of their capital flows in and out of these funds. We use dollar-weighted returns (a form of Internal Rate of Return (IRR)) to assess the properties of actual investor returns on hedge funds and compare them to buy-and-hold fund returns. Our main finding is that annualized dollar-weighted returns are on the magnitude of 3% to 7% lower than corresponding buy-and-hold fund returns. Using factor models of risk and the estimated dollar-weighted performance gap, we find that the real alpha of hedge fund investors is close to zero. In absolute terms, dollar-weighted returns are reliably lower than the return on the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 index, and are only marginally higher than the risk-free rate as of the end of 2008. The combined impression from these results is that the return experience of hedge fund investors is much worse than previously thought.

Unconditional alphas are biased when conditional beta covaries with the market risk premium (market timing) or volatility (volatility timing). We demonstrate an additional bias (overconditioning) that can occur any time an empiricist estimates risk using information, such as a realized beta, that is not available to investors ex ante. Calibrating to U.S. equity returns, volatility timing and overconditioning can plausibly impact alphas more than market timing, which has been the focus of prior literature. To correct market- and volatility-timing biases without overconditioning, we show that incorporating realized betas into instrumental variables estimators is effective. Empirically, instrumentation reduces momentum alphas by 20–40%. Overconditioned alphas overstate performance by up to 2.5 times. We explain the sources of both the volatility-timing and overconditioning biases in momentum portfolios.

Liquidity dried up during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. Banks that relied more heavily on core deposit and equity capital financing, which are stable sources of financing, continued to lend relative to other banks. Banks that held more illiquid assets on their balance sheets, in contrast, increased asset liquidity and reduced lending. Off-balance sheet liquidity risk materialized on the balance sheet and constrained new credit origination as increased takedown demand displaced lending capacity. We conclude that efforts to manage the liquidity crisis by banks led to a decline in credit supply.

We investigate whether bank performance during the recent credit crisis is related to chief executive officer (CEO) incentives before the crisis. We find some evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the interests of shareholders performed worse and no evidence that they performed better. Banks with higher option compensation and a larger fraction of compensation in cash bonuses for their CEOs did not perform worse during the crisis. Bank CEOs did not reduce their holdings of shares in anticipation of the crisis or during the crisis. Consequently, they suffered extremely large wealth losses in the wake of the crisis.

The returns and stock holdings of institutional investors from 1980 to 2007 provide little evidence of stock-picking skill. Institutions as a whole closely mimic the market portfolio, with pre-cost returns that have nearly perfect correlation with the value-weighted index and an insignificant CAPM alpha of 0.08% quarterly. Institutions also show little tendency to bet on any of the main characteristics known to predict stock returns, such as book-to-market, momentum, or accruals. While particular groups of institutions have modest stock-picking skill relative to the CAPM, their performance is almost entirely explained by the book-to-market and momentum effects in returns. Further, no group holds a portfolio that deviates efficiently from the market portfolio.

Using a data set of 839 French deals, we look at the change in corporate behavior following a leveraged buyout (LBO) relative to an adequately chosen control group. In the 3 years following a leveraged buyout, targets become more profitable, grow much faster than their peer group, issue additional debt, and increase capital expenditures. We then provide evidence consistent with the idea that in our sample, private equity funds create value by relaxing credit constraints, allowing LBO targets to take advantage of hitherto unexploited growth opportunities. First, post-buyout growth is concentrated among private-to-private transactions, i.e., deals where the seller is an individual, as opposed to divisional buyouts or public-to-private LBOs where the seller is a private or a public firm. Second, the observed post-buyout growth in size and post-buyout increase in debt and capital expenditures are stronger when the targets operate in an industry that is relatively more dependent on external finance. These results contrast with existing evidence that LBO targets invest less or downsize.

We observe less efficient capital allocation in countries whose banking systems are more thoroughly controlled by tycoons or families. The magnitude of this effect is similar to that of state control over banking. Unlike state control, tycoon or family control also correlates with slower economic and productivity growth, greater financial instability, and worse income inequality. These findings are consistent with theories that elite-capture of a country’s financial system can embed “crony capitalism.”

This paper investigates the empirical relation between spot and forward implied volatility in foreign exchange. We formulate and test the forward volatility unbiasedness hypothesis, which may be viewed as the volatility analogue to the extensively researched hypothesis of unbiasedness in forward exchange rates. Using a new dataset of spot implied volatility quoted on over-the-counter currency options, we compute the forward implied volatility that corresponds to the delivery price of a forward contract on future spot implied volatility. This contract is known as a forward volatility agreement. We find strong evidence that forward implied volatility is a systematically biased predictor that overestimates movements in future spot implied volatility. This bias in forward volatility generates high economic value to an investor exploiting predictability in the returns to volatility speculation and indicates the presence of predictable volatility term premiums in foreign exchange.