Knowledge that Transforms

We develop a model in which asset commonality and short-term debt of banks interact to generate excessive systemic risk. Banks swap assets to diversify their individual risk. Two asset structures arise. In a clustered structure, groups of banks hold common asset portfolios and default together. In an unclustered structure, defaults are more dispersed. Portfolio quality of individual banks is opaque but can be inferred by creditors from aggregate signals about bank solvency. When bank debt is short-term, creditors do not roll over in response to adverse signals and all banks are inefficiently liquidated. This information contagion is more likely under clustered asset structures. In contrast, when bank debt is long-term, welfare is the same under both asset structures.

In contrast to the widely held belief that targets capture the lion's share of merger gains, I show that the average dollar gains to targets are only modestly more than the dollar gains to acquirers. To help explain the variation in merger outcomes, I present empirical evidence in support of a new hypothesis that a target's relative scarcity (proxied by its market power) and product market dependence (proxied by customer–supplier relations) help to explain its share of the total merger gains. These results provide new evidence for an unexplored role of product markets on bargaining outcomes in mergers.

We examine a vertical integration decision within the commercial banking industry. During the last quarter of the 20th century, some community banks reduced their traditional reliance on correspondent banks for upstream products and services by joining bankers' banks, a form of business cooperative. Research on vertical integration focuses primarily on firm-specific investment, market power, and government regulation. However, this case is difficult to explain in terms of these standard vertical integration motives. Our evidence suggests that bankers' banks are a response to technological change and deregulation that results in increased costs faced by community banks in dealing with correspondent banks as both suppliers and potential competitors. For instance, loan participations require sharing proprietary information about major loan customers, something a community bank would not want to provide to a potential competitor.

We exploit a novel setting in which the same piece of information affects two sets of firms: one set of firms requires straightforward processing to update prices, while the other set requires more complicated analyses to incorporate the same piece of information into prices. We document substantial return predictability from the set of easy-to-analyze firms to their more complicated peers. Specifically, a simple portfolio strategy that takes advantage of this straightforward vs. complicated information processing classification yields returns of 118 basis points per month before transaction costs. Consistent with processing complexity driving the return relation, we further show that the more complicated the firm, the more pronounced the return predictability. In addition, we find that sell-side analysts are subject to these same information processing constraints, as their forecast revisions of easy-to-analyze firms predict their future revisions of more complicated firms.

This study examines the effect of locally informed investors on market efficiency and stock prices using large power outages, which are exogenous events that constrain trading. Turnover in stocks headquartered in an outage area with 0.5% of U.S. electrical customers drops by 3–7% on the first full day of the outage, and bid–ask spreads narrow by 2.5%. Firm-specific price volatility is 2.3% lower on blackout dates. This effect is larger for smaller, lesser-known stocks and in higher income areas. Consistent with a valuation discount and higher expected returns for stocks with more informed traders, firms with a one-standard-deviation higher local trading propensity have market-to-book values that are 5% lower, Tobin's Q that is 6% lower, annualized four-factor alphas that are 1.2% higher, and average spreads that are 6.5% higher. Together, the evidence suggests that informed investors contribute disproportionately to both liquidity and price discovery, and that these contributions are reflected in valuations and expected returns.

This paper presents a parsimonious, structural model that isolates primary economic determinants of the level and dispersion of managerial ownership, firm scale, and performance and the empirical associations among them. In particular, variation across firms and through time of estimated productivity parameters for physical assets and managerial input and corresponding variation in optimal compensation contract and firm size combine to deliver the well-known hump-shaped relation between Tobin's Q and managerial ownership. To assess the effectiveness of standard econometric approaches to the endogeneity problem, we apply those remedies to panel data generated from the model. The unfortunate conclusion is that, at least in the ownership–performance context, proxy variables, fixed effects, and instrumental variables do not generally provide reliable solutions to simultaneity bias.

Using novel data on investors' bond portfolios, we study the contagion of the crisis from securitized bonds to corporate bonds. When securitized bonds became “toxic” in August 2007, mutual funds retained the now illiquid securitized bonds and sold corporate bonds. Funds with negative flows or high liquidity needs liquidated more than others. Yield spreads increased more for corporate bonds whose pre-crisis bondholders were more heavily exposed to securitized bonds, compared to same-issuer bonds held by unexposed investors. The findings suggest that liquidity-constrained investors with exposure to securitized bonds played a role in propagating the crisis from securitized to corporate bonds.

This paper examines how well alternate time-changed Lévy processes capture stochastic volatility and the substantial outliers observed in U.S. stock market returns over the past 85 years. The autocorrelation of daily stock market returns varies substantially over time, necessitating an additional state variable when analyzing historical data. I estimate various one- and two-factor stochastic volatility/Lévy models with time-varying autocorrelation via extensions of the Bates (2006) methodology that provide filtered daily estimates of volatility and autocorrelation. The paper explores option pricing implications, including for the Volatility Index (VIX) during the recent financial crisis.

This paper studies the relationship between firm leverage and supplier market structure. We find that firm leverage decreases with the degree of competition between suppliers. Specifically, leverage decreases with the elasticity of substitution between suppliers. Leverage also decreases with the number of suppliers when the elasticity of substitution is high, and increases with the number of suppliers when the elasticity is low. We also provide empirical evidence that is consistent with the model predictions.

This paper examines the impact of financial deregulation on entrepreneurship. We assess the impact of credit card deregulation on transitions into self-employment using state-level removal of credit card interest rate ceilings following the US Supreme Court's 1978 Marquette decision as a quasi-natural experiment. We find that credit card deregulation increases the probability of entrepreneurial entry, with a particularly strong effect for black entrepreneurs. We demonstrate that these effects are magnified in states with a history of racial discrimination and link the results to discrimination-based barriers to entry.