Knowledge that Transforms

We propose an estimation methodology tailored for large unbalanced panels of individual stock returns to study the factor structure and expected returns in international stock markets. We show that the local market is necessary to capture the factor structure in both developed and emerging markets. Neither the presence of multiple world or regional risk factors, systematic currency risk factors, nor a country-specific currency subsumes the importance of the local market factor. All factors, including the local market, carry significant risk premia across a large proportion of countries. The contribution of pricing errors to total expected returns is large and time-varying.

The telegraph was introduced to China in the late 19th century, a time when China also saw the rise of modern banks. Based on this historical context, this paper documents the importance of information technology in banking development. We construct a data set on the distributions of telegraph stations and banks across 287 prefectures between 1881 and 1936. The results show that the telegraph significantly expanded banks’ branch networks in terms of both number and geographic scope. The effect of the telegraph remains robust when we instrument it using proximity to the early military telegraph trunk.

In a standard stock loan, the borrower reimburses the lender any dividends paid while the loan is outstanding. Since these substitute dividends may be taxed differently than dividend payments themselves, some investors have incentives to either remove their shares from lendable supply–if they pay high taxes on substitute dividends–or lend out their shares to arbitrageurs–if they pay high taxes on dividends. Consistent with these incentives, we find a significant tightening of the equity lending market on dividend record days driven by both a contraction of supply and an expansion of demand–although the demand effect appears to dominate. We then exploit the plausibly exogenous nature of these shifts to causally link tightness in the lending market to wider effective spreads in the stock market.

We show that high-cost debt exacerbates financial constraints by affecting lenders’ perception of credit risk. Using data from a high-cost lender in the UK, we show that high-cost credit reduces applicants’ credit score and future bank credit even though it does not affect future debt repayment. These effects are not present among borrowers who are already tagged as high risk at application, consistent with high-cost credit affecting lenders’ beliefs about borrowers’ creditworthiness. The results highlight a novel channel through which high-cost credit can harm consumers’ financial health: a self-reinforcing stigma of high risk.

We use the advent of new credit default swap (CDS) trading conventions in April 2009—the CDS Big Bang—to study how a shock to funding liquidity impacts market liquidity. After the Big Bang, traders are required to pay upfront fees to execute CDS transactions, with the size of the fees depending on the level of CDS spreads. While CDS bid-ask spreads decline in aggregate after the Big Bang, they do so less for contracts that require larger fees. Furthermore, the funding effect is stronger for smaller and riskier firms and for noncentrally cleared contracts. The effect also becomes stronger after Deutsche Bank's exit.

We study the cross-section of returns on FX options sorting currencies based on implied volatilities (IVs). Long straddle positions in currencies with low (high) IVs perform well (poorly). A long low IV-short high IV strategy produces large average returns after transaction costs. Total volatility matters rather than any component or transformation of volatility. The returns are distinct from those in the literature on foreign exchange returns or equity option returns and cannot be explained convincingly by standard risk factors. We argue cross-sectional differences in hedging demand combined with limits to arbitrage contribute to mispricing in FX options.

We examine the within-firm resource allocation and restructuring outcomes at firms violating debt covenants. Using establishment-level data from the US Census Bureau, we find that covenant violations are followed by reductions in employment, investment, and more frequent establishment closures among violating firms’ noncore business lines and less productive establishments. These changes are concentrated among establishments at which manager-shareholder agency costs are pronounced and when key lenders have industry experience. Our findings suggest that enhanced creditor control reduces managerial agency costs and encourages a more efficient allocation of resources within the boundaries of firms in technical default.

We investigate the importance of client relationships in the financial advisory industry. We exploit firm-level variation in adoption of the Broker Protocol, which enabled clients to follow their advisers to member firms without fear of litigation. We show that advisers’ ability to maintain client relationships is a significant predictor of their employment decisions; that about 40% of client assets follow advisers when they move; and that once clients are “unlocked,” firms become less willing to fire advisers for misconduct. Firms that unlock their clients subsequently experience higher levels of misconduct and increase their fees, calling into question whether clients are better off.

Identifying the factors that drive the cross-section of expected returns is challenging for at least three reasons. First, the choice of testing approach (time series versus cross-sectional) will deliver different sets of factors. Second, varying test portfolio sorts changes the importance of candidate factors. Finally, given the hundreds of factors that have been proposed, test multiplicity must be dealt with. We propose a new method that makes measured progress in addressing these key challenges. We apply our method in a panel regression setting and shed some light on the puzzling empirical result that the market factor drives the bulk of the variance of stock returns, but is often knocked out in cross-sectional tests. In our setup, the market factor is not eliminated. Further, we bypass arbitrary portfolio sorts and instead execute our tests on individual stocks with no loss in power. Finally, our bootstrap implementation, which allows us to impose the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional explanatory power, naturally controls for the multiple testing problem.

We argue that the pervasive practice of evaluating portfolio managers relative to a benchmark has real effects. Benchmarking generates additional, inelastic demand for assets inside the benchmark. This leads to a “benchmark inclusion subsidy:” a firm inside the benchmark values an investment project more than the one outside. The same wedge arises for valuing M&A, spinoffs, and IPOs. This overturns the proposition that an investment’s value is independent of the entity considering it. We describe the characteristics that determine the subsidy, quantify its size (which could be large), and identify empirical work supporting our model’s predictions.