We study hedge funds that imposed discretionary liquidity restrictions (DLRs) on investor shares during the financial crisis. DLRs prolong fund life, but impose liquidity costs on investors, creating a potential conflict of interest. Ostensibly, funds establish DLRs to limit performance-driven withdrawals that could force fire sales of illiquid assets. However, after they restrict investor liquidity, DLR funds do not reduce illiquid stock sales and underperform a control sample of non-DLR funds. Consequently, DLRs appear to negatively impact fund family reputation. After the crisis, funds from DLR families faced difficulties raising capital and were more likely to cut their fees.

We examine a sample of 12,023 acquisitions by public firms from 1980 to 2001. The equally weighted abnormal announcement return is 1.1%, but acquiring-firm shareholders lose $25.2 million on average upon announcement. This disparity suggests the existence of a size effect in acquisition announcement returns. The announcement return for acquiring-firm shareholders is roughly two percentage points higher for small acquirers irrespective of the form of financing and whether the acquired firm is public or private. The size effect is robust to firm and deal characteristics, and it is not reversed over time.

The need to understand and measure the determinants of market maker bid/ask spreads is crucial in evaluating the merits of competing market structures and the fairness of market maker rents. This study develops a simple, parsimonious model for the market maker's spread that accounts for the effects of price discreteness induced by minimum tick size, order-processing costs, inventory-holding costs, adverse selection, and competition. The inventory-holding and adverse selection cost components of spread are modeled as an option with a stochastic time to expiration. This inventory-holding premium embedded in the spread represents compensation for the price risk borne by the market maker while the security is held in inventory. The premium is partitioned in such a way that the inventory-holding and adverse selection cost components, as well as the probability of an informed trade, are identified. The model is tested empirically using Nasdaq stocks in three distinct minimum tick size regimes and is shown to perform well both in an absolute sense and relative to competing specifications.

The liquidity of the market for corporate assets plays an important role in explaining whether a firm divests a business segment, which segment the firm divests, and whether it divests a core segment or an unrelated segment. Firms are more likely to divest segments from industries with a more liquid market for corporate assets, unrelated segments, poorly performing segments, and small segments. Strikingly, the segment with the least liquid market is less likely to be divested than the best-performing segment, while the worst-performing segment is less likely to be divested than the segment with the most liquid market.

The purpose of this paper is to reexamine Reinganum's study which indicates that abnormal returns could not be earned unexpected quarterly earnings information, and to document precisely the response of stock prices to earnings announcements. This study, using a very large sample of stocks and daily returns, represents the most complete and detailed analysis of quarterly earnings reports that has been performed to date. Our results are contrary to those of Reinganum and show that abnormal returns could have been earned almost any time during the 1970's. Our analysis also indicates that risk adjustments matter little in this type of work. Finally, we find that roughly 50% of the adjustment of stock returns to unexpected quarterly earnings occurs over a 90-day period after the earnings are announced.

We create a novel dataset to examine the recent rise in dual-class IPOs. We document that dual-class firms have different types of controlling shareholders and wedges between voting and economic rights, and that the increasing popularity of dual-class structures is driven by founder-controlled firms. We find that founders’ wedge is greater when founders have stronger bargaining power. The increase in founder control over time is due to greater availability of private capital and technological shocks that reduced firms’ needs for external financing. Stronger bargaining power is also associated with a lower likelihood of sunset provisions that terminate dual-class structures.

We examine a sample of connected transactions between Hong Kong listed companies and their controlling shareholders. We address three questions: What types of connected transactions lead to expropriation of minority shareholders? Which firms are more likely to expropriate? Does the market anticipate the expropriation by firms? On average, firms announcing connected transactions earn significant negative excess returns, significantly lower than firms announcing similar arm's length transactions. We find limited evidence that firms undertaking connected transactions trade at discounted valuations prior to the expropriation, suggesting that investors cannot predict expropriation and revalue firms only when expropriation does occur.

Using daily abnormal currency returns for the universe of countries with flexible exchange rates, we show local currency depreciations ahead of unscheduled, public sovereign debt downgrade announcements. Consistent with the private information hypothesis, the effect is stronger in lower institutional quality countries and holds after we control for concurrent public information and for publicly available rumors about the forthcoming downgrades. Our results persist when abnormal currency returns are adjusted for global carry and dollar risk factors, world equity and bond returns, as well as local stock market returns. Finally, the currency depreciations are permanent, providing evidence for a link between fundamentals and currency markets.

The exposition of the quadrature (QUAD) method (Andricopoulos, Widdicks, Duck, and Newton, 2003. Universal option valuation using quadrature methods. Journal of Financial Economics 67, 447–471 (see also Corrigendum, Journal of Financial Economics 73, 603 (2004)) is significantly extended to cover notably more complex and difficult problems in option valuations involving one or more underlyings. Trials comparing several techniques in the literature, adapted from standard lattice, grid and Monte Carlo methods to tackle particular types of problem, show that QUAD offers far greater flexibility, superior convergence, and hence, increased accuracy and considerably reduced computational times. The speed advantage of QUAD means that, even under the curse of dimensionality, it is not necessary to resort to Monte Carlo methods (certainly for options involving up to five underlying assets). Given the universality and flexibility of the method, it should be the method of choice for pricing options involving multiple underlying assets, in the presence of many features, such as early exercise or path dependency.

This paper proposes and develops a novel, simple, widely applicable numerical approach for option pricing based on quadrature methods. Though in some ways similar to lattice or finite-difference schemes, it possesses exceptional accuracy and speed. Discretely monitored options are valued with only one timestep between observations, and nodes can be perfectly placed in relation to discontinuities. Convergence is improved greatly; in the extrapolated scheme, a doubling of points can reduce error by a factor of 256. Complex problems (e.g., fixed-strike lookback discrete barrier options) can be evaluated accurately and orders of magnitude faster than by existing methods.