Knowledge that Transforms

We study a dynamic corporate investment problem where decisions have to be made collectively by a group of agents holding heterogeneous beliefs and adhering to a “utilitarian” governance mechanism in which each agent has a given influence in the decision. In this setting we show that: (i) group decisions are typically dynamically inconsistent, (ii) dynamic inconsistency leads to inefficient underinvestment, and (iii) the ability to trade securities among insiders or with outsiders may restore efficient investment decisions but it may, in some cases, lead to inefficient overinvestment. Our theory can help explain the empirical evidence on the effect of diversity of groups, such as corporate boards, on firms’ outcomes and, more generally, on the difference between group and individual behavior.

We propose a novel approach to measuring firm-level risk exposures and costs of equity. Using a simple consumption-based asset pricing model that explains nearly two-thirds of the variation in average returns across 55 anomaly portfolios, we map the relation between exposures to consumption risk and portfolio-level characteristics. We use this relation to calculate exposures to consumption risk at the firm level and show that the calculated consumption risk exposures yield portfolios with large differences in average returns and ex post consumption risk exposures consistent with those predicted by our calculated betas. Further, industry betas and risk premia implied by our procedure display economically intuitive variation over time. Finally, Fama-MacBeth regressions suggest that risk exposures calculated using our procedure dominate those from alternative factor models at explaining cross-sectional variation in returns.

This paper empirically investigates the effect of leverage on strategic preemption. Using new data on entry plans and incumbent investments from the American casino industry, I find that high leverage prevents incumbents from responding to entry threats. Facing the same set of entry plans, low-leverage incumbents expand physical capacity (by 30%), whereas high-leverage incumbents do not. This difference in investment matters because capacity installations preempt eventual entry. Stock market reactions to withdrawn plans imply that effective preemption increases incumbent firm value by 5%. My findings suggest that leverage matters for industry composition, not just firm-level investment.

General partners (GPs) in private equity (PE) report the performance of an existing fund while raising capital for a follow-on fund. Interim performance has large effects on fundraising outcomes. The impact is greatest when backed by exits and for low reputation GPs. Faced with these incentives, GPs time their fundraising to coincide with periods of peak performance through two strategies: (1) exit and fundraise and (2) net asset value (NAV) management. Consistent with the former, performance peaks are greatest for funds with high realization rates. Consistent with the latter, low reputation GPs with low realization rates experience performance peaks and erosions in performance after fundraising.

Corporate inversion, the process of redomiciling for tax purposes, reduces corporate income taxes, but it imposes a personal tax cost that is shareholder-specific. We develop a model, incorporating the corporate tax benefits and personal tax costs, to quantify the return to inversion for different shareholders. Foreign and tax-exempt investors, along with the chief executive officer, disproportionately benefit. We show that an inversion simultaneously reduces the wealth of many taxable shareholders. The model illustrates an agency conflict in which heterogeneity in personal taxes generates a wealth transfer between shareholders. Furthermore, personal taxes offset the loss in government revenue by 39%.

Cohen and Wang (2013) (CW2013) provide evidence consistent with market participants perceiving staggered boards to be value reducing. Amihud and Stoyanov (2016) (AS2016) contests these findings, reporting some specifications under which the results are not statistically significant. We show that the results retain their significance under a wide array of robustness tests that address the concerns expressed by AS2016. Our empirical findings reinforce the conclusions of CW2013.

From 2007 to June 2013, a small group of fee-paying, high-speed traders receive the Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment two seconds before its broader release. Within this early peek window, we find highly concentrated trading and a fast price discovery of less than 200 milliseconds. Outside this narrow window, general investors trade at fully adjusted prices. We further establish a causal relationship between the early peek mechanism and the fast price discovery by isolating the impact of the early peek arrangement along two dimensions. In cross section, we use other news releases without the early peek (as controls); in time series, we use the sudden suspension of the early peek arrangement in July 2013 (as the treatment). Our difference-in-difference tests directly connect the early peek arrangement to more efficient price discovery — it results in faster price discovery, lower volatility, and faster resolution of uncertainty. These results show that contrary to the common perception, tiered information release may help to reduce, rather than enhance, the informational advantage of faster traders and improve the efficiency of the price discovery process in financial markets.

Between 1996 and 2014, it was costless on average to hedge news about future variance at horizons ranging from 1 quarter to 14 years. Only unexpected, transitory realized variance was significantly priced. These results present a challenge to many structural models of the variance risk premium, such as the intertemporal CAPM and recent models with Epstein–Zin preferences and long-run risks. The results are also difficult to reconcile with macro models in which volatility affects investment decisions. At the same time, the data allows us to distinguish between different disaster models; a model in which the stock market has a time-varying exposure to disasters and investors have power utility fits the major features of the variance term structure.

We provide a theory of trading through intermediaries in over-the-counter markets. The role of intermediaries is to sustain trade. In our model, traders are connected through an informational network. Agents observe their neighbors’ actions and can trade with their counterparty in a given period through a path of intermediaries in the network. Nevertheless, agents can renege on their obligations. We show that trading through an informational network is essential to support trade when agents infrequently meet the same counteparty. However, intermediaries must receive fees to implement trades. Concentrated intermediation, as represented by a star network, is both constrained efficient and stable when agents incur linking costs. The center agent in a star can receive higher fees as well.

The unit banking structure of the United States produced a uniquely important interbank correspondent network. During the National Banking Era, this network normally provided banks with access to money markets, facilitated payment processing, and helped banks meet legal reserve requirements. In crises, network connections could be a source of liquidity risk. That risk became evident during the Panic of 1893, when New York suspended convertibility. Banks with high two-sided liquidity risk (those holding more of their liquid assets with their correspondents and funded to a greater extent by deposits of other banks) were particularly exposed and more likely to close.