Knowledge that Transforms

I study how the colonial mita forced labor system (1573–1812) impacted Peruvian firms’ formalization, investment, and performance measured by the 2008 business census. Regression discontinuity models with granular geospatial controls reveal lower sales and fixed assets, less likely use of a commercial name, and less likely tax ID registration for firms within mita boundaries. Firms with banking relationships in mita regions struggle more financially. Evidence on centuries-long disadvantageous taxation in mita regions suggests a persistent channel of distrust. Individuals in mita regions surveyed today show lower levels of trust in the tax authority and more informality at their workplace.

This paper documents that complex financial innovations like collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) enabled informed parties in the commercial mortgage-backed securitization pipeline to reduce their skin-in-the-game in a way not observable to other market participants. This reduction in first-loss security retention significantly impacted the probability that more senior tranches ultimately defaulted. We show that this performance is entirely driven by the amount of first-loss sold to (affiliated) CDOs within 12 months of the commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) deal. Our result is robust to using the differential access of first-loss investors to CDO funding as an instrument to identify exogenous variations in the retention of first-loss securities.

Measuring the value of labor-market hires for stock prices, be it underwriters when firms go public (IPOs) or chief executive officers (CEOs), is difficult due to selection. Opaque firms with higher costs of capital benefit more from prestigious underwriters, while productive firms benefit more from talented CEOs. Using assignment models, we show that the importance of talent (or agent heterogeneity) relative to selection (or firm heterogeneity) is measured by wage increases across agents of different compensation ranks divided by changes in output across their firms. The median of this ratio is 0.5% for underwriters and 2% for CEOs.

We examine the extent to which institutional investors herd in the U.S. corporate bond market and the price impact of their herding behavior. We find that the level of institutional herding in corporate bonds is substantially higher than what is documented for equities, and that sell herding is much stronger and more persistent than buy herding. The price impact of herding is also highly asymmetric. While buy herding facilitates price discovery, sell herding causes transitory yet large price distortions. Such price destabilizing effect of sell herding is particularly pronounced for speculative-grade, small, and illiquid bonds, and during the financial crisis.

We examine the rise in student loan defaults in the Great Recession by linking administrative student loan data at the individual borrower level to student loan borrowers’ individual tax records. A Blinder-Oaxaca style decomposition shows that shifts in the composition of student loan borrowers and the massive collapse in home prices during the Great Recession can each account for approximately 30% of the rise in student loan defaults. Falling home prices affect student loan defaults by impairing individuals’ labor earnings, especially for low income jobs. By contrast, when comparing the default sensitivities of homeowners and renters, we find no evidence that falling home prices affect student loan defaults through a home equity-based liquidity channel. The Income Based Repayment (IBR) program introduced by the federal government in the wake of the Great Recession reduced both student loan defaults and their sensitivity to home price fluctuations, thus providing student loan borrowers with valuable insurance against negative shocks.

We provide new evidence that a disruption in credit supply played a quantitatively significant role in the unprecedented contraction of employment during the Great Depression using a novel, hand-collected dataset of large industrial firms. Our identification strategy exploits preexisting variation in the need to raise external funds at a time when public bond markets essentially froze. Local bank failures inhibited firms’ ability to substitute public debt for private debt, which exacerbated financial constraints. We estimate a large and negative causal effect of financing frictions on firm employment. We find that the lack of access to credit likely accounted for a substantial fraction of the aggregate decline in employment of large firms between 1928 and 1933.

In contrast to cash holdings, credit lines give firms financial flexibility by providing liquidity contingent on realized funding needs, but they are often limited by collateral and covenants. We embed this trade-off into an estimated dynamic model of financing and investment. Our model highlights the relevance of drawing down credit lines to fund investment options in an effective way and quantitatively matches well the levels and dynamics of cash, credit lines, and leverage. In the cross-section, modeling credit lines as contingent liquidity provides novel empirical predictions and rationalizes several stylized facts regarding credit line usage, covenant violations, and cash holdings.

I extend the consumption capital asset pricing model to incorporate expanding product variety over time and states of nature. In the model, consumers have a love of variety, and consumption consists of different components: product groups and brands. By raising future marginal utility, growth in product groups increases the incentive to save and reduces the risk-free rate. By making marginal utility more volatile, variation in brand and quality growth magnifies consumption risk and raises the equity premium. Embedding new goods in a long-run risk setting has similar implications.

Hedge funds managed by listed firms significantly under-perform funds managed by unlisted firms. The under-performance is more severe for funds with low manager deltas, poor governance, and no manager co-investment, or those managed by firms whose prices are sensitive to earnings news. Notwithstanding the under-performance, listed asset management firms raise more capital, by growing existing funds and launching new funds post listing, and harvest greater fee revenues than do comparable unlisted firms. The results are consistent with the view that, for asset management firms, going public weakens the alignment between ownership, control, and investment capital, thereby engendering conflicts of interest.

Exploiting Nasdaq order book data and difference-in-differences methodology, we identify the distinct effects of trading pause mechanisms introduced on US stock exchanges after May 2010. We show that the mere existence of such a regulation makes market participants behave differently in anticipation of a pause. Pauses enhance price discovery during the break but have adverse effects on price stability and liquidity after the pause. We find that pauses ultimately do not “cool off” markets but cause extra volatility. This implies a regulatory trade-off between the protective role of trading pauses and their adverse effects on market quality.