This paper examines the supply chain effects of the most damaging cyberattack in history so far. The attack propagated from the directly hit firms to their customers, causing a four-fold amplification of the initial drop in profits. These losses were larger for affected customers with fewer alternative suppliers. Internal liquidity buffers and increased borrowing, mainly through bank credit lines, helped firms navigate the shock. Nonetheless, the cyberattack led to persistent adjustments to the supply chain network, with affected customers terminating trading relations with directly hit firms and forming new ones with alternative suppliers with a stronger cybersecurity posture

We consider a market where large investors do not only trade on information about asset fundamentals. When they trade more aggressively, the price becomes less informative. Other investors who learn from prices, in turn, are less concerned about adverse selection and provide more liquidity, causing large investors to trade even more aggressively. This trading complementarity can engender three unconventional results: i) increased competition among large investors makes all investors worse off, ii) more precise private information reduces price informativeness, creating complementarities in information acquisition, and iii) multiple equilibria emerge. Our results have implications for competition and transparency policies in financial markets.

In 2017, “The Big Three” institutional investors launched campaigns to increase gender diversity on corporate boards. We estimate that their campaigns led American corporations to add at least 2.5 times as many female directors in 2019 as they had in 2016. Firms increased diversity by identifying candidates beyond managers’ existing networks and by placing less emphasis on candidates’ executive experience. Firms also promoted more female directors to key board positions, indicating firms’ responses went beyond tokenism. Our results highlight index investors’ ability to effectuate broad-based governance changes and the impact of investor buy-in in increasing corporate-leadership diversity.

This paper develops a multi-firm equilibrium model of information acquisition based on differences in firms’ characteristics. The model shows that heightened economic uncertainty amplifies stock price reactions to earnings announcements via increased investor attention, which varies by firm characteristics. Firms with higher systematic risk or more informative announcements attract more attention and exhibit stronger reactions to earnings announcements. Moreover, heightened investor attention caused by high economic uncertainty leads to a steeper CAPM relation and higher betas for announcing firms. Empirical analyses using firm-level attention measures and CAPM tests on high- versus low-attention days support the model’s predictions

We survey directors and investors on the objectives, constraints, and determinants of CEO pay. We find that directors face constraints beyond participation and incentives, and that pay matters not to finance consumption but to address CEOs’ fairness concerns. 67% of directors would sacrifice shareholder value to avoid controversy, leading to lower levels and one-size-fits-all structures. Shareholders are the main source of constraints, suggesting directors and investors disagree on how to maximize value. Intrinsic motivation and reputation are seen as stronger motivators than incentive pay. Even with strong portfolio incentives, flow pay responds to performance to fairly recognize the CEO's contribution.

We study insurance and portfolio decisions, two opposite risk retention tradeoffs. Using household level data, we identify the first joint determinants (e.g. subjective expectations, risk attitude) and frictions (e.g. liquidity constraints , financial literacy) in the literature. We also find key differences between the two decisions. Notably, contrary to economic intuition, risky asset holding and insurance coverage both increase with wealth . We show that this apparent puzzle is driven in part by a specific behavioral pattern (the poor invest too conservatively, while the rich over-insure), and can be explained by two factors: regret avoidance and nonperformance risk.

We use slow and fast time-series momentum to characterize four stock market cycles—Bull, Correction, Bear, and Rebound. The steep market declines of Bears concentrate in high-risk states, yet predict negative expected returns, which is difficult to rationalize by most models of time-varying risk premia. Using a model to analyze slow and fast momentum strategies, we estimate both relatively high mean persistence and realization noise in U.S. stock market returns. Intermediate-speed momentum portfolios, formed by blending slow and fast momentum strategies, translate predictive information in market cycles into positive unconditional alpha, for which we propose a novel decomposition.

I model and structurally estimate the equilibrium rates and volume in the Triparty repo market to study imperfect competition in wholesale funding. Even in this systemically important market, where seemingly homogeneous repos trade, I document persistent rate differences paid by dealers. I characterize the Triparty market as cash-lenders allocating their portfolios among differentiated dealers who set repo rates. I find that cash-lenders’ aversion to portfolio concentration and preference for stable lending grant dealers substantial market power: between 2011 and 2017, dealers borrowed at rates that were 26 bps lower than their marginal value from intermediating the borrowed repo funds. Dealers’ market power makes the observed wholesale repo rate understate the financing rate available to market participants who rely on repo funding, and offers a novel explanation for funding spreads such as the Treasury cash-futures basis and the Treasury swap spread.

Debt-repayment flexibility should help temporarily liquidity-constrained households but not necessarily households struggling to save. In a natural experiment in which households can apply for free mortgage-repayment flexibility, I find that two-thirds of liquidity-constrained applicants with high-cost debt voluntarily restrict flexibility and forgo, on average, 4,070 EUR of low-cost liquidity. An overconsumption tendency reflecting self-control problems can explain the voluntary liquidity restrictions as well as the persistent liquidity constraints, the consumption drop at the predictable end of flexibility, and saving in other illiquid assets. Self-imposed liquidity constraints reflect characteristics instead of circumstances and reduce the potency of debt-forbearance offers in recessions.

We test the conditional consumption-CAPM using asset holders’ consumption and find that the time variation in the prices of asset holders’ consumption risk is procyclical. This puzzling time variation is at odds with the implication of existing consumption-based equilibrium asset pricing models. We show that our finding is a salient feature of the data observed in multiple asset classes (aggregate equity market, equity portfolios, bond portfolios, and commodities portfolios), using different measures of consumption (household survey data and high-frequency retail shopping data) and alternative empirical methodologies.