This paper examines the impact of the conglomerate form on the scale and novelty of corporate Research and Development (R&D) activity. I exploit a quasi-experiment involving failed mergers to generate exogenous variation in acquisition outcomes of target firms. A difference-in-differences estimation reveals that, relative to failed targets, firms acquired in diversifying mergers produce both a smaller number of innovations and also less-novel innovations, where innovations are measured using patent-based metrics. The treatment effect is amplified if the acquiring conglomerate operates a more active internal capital market and is largely driven by inventors becoming less productive after the merger rather than inventor exits. Concurrently, acquirers move R&D activity outside the boundary of the firm via the use of strategic alliances and joint ventures. There is complementary evidence that conglomerates with more novel R&D tend to operate with decentralized R&D budgets. These findings suggest that conglomerate organizational form affects the allocation and productivity of resources.

We follow a representative panel of millions of consumers in the United States from 2007 to 2017 and document new facts on the long-term effects of the Great Recession. There were about six million foreclosures over this period. Only a quarter of foreclosed households regained homeownership, taking an average four years to do so. This persistent loss of homeownership accounts for most of the decline in the U.S. homeownership rate. Despite massive stimulus and debt relief policies, house prices, consumption, and unemployment remained below precrisis levels in about half of the zip codes in the United States Regions that recovered to precrisis levels took on average four to five years. Regional variation in the extent and speed of recovery is strongly and persistently associated with frictions affecting the pass-through of lower interest rates and debt relief to households.

We examine whether securitization impacts renegotiation decisions of loan servicers, focusing on their decision to foreclose a delinquent loan. Conditional on a loan becoming seriously delinquent, we find a significantly lower foreclosure rate associated with bank-held loans when compared to similar securitized loans: across various specifications and origination vintages, the foreclosure rate of delinquent bank-held loans is 3% to 7% lower in absolute terms (13% to 32% in relative terms). There is a substantial heterogeneity in these effects with large effects among borrowers with better credit quality and small effects among lower quality borrowers. A quasi-experiment that exploits a plausibly exogenous variation in securitization status of a delinquent loan confirms these results.

Statistical default models, widely used to assess default risk, fail to account for a change in the relations between different variables resulting from an underlying change in agent behavior. We demonstrate this phenomenon using data on securitized subprime mortgages issued in the period 1997–2006. As the level of securitization increases, lenders have an incentive to originate loans that rate high based on characteristics that are reported to investors, even if other unreported variables imply a lower borrower quality. Consistent with this behavior, we find that over time lenders set interest rates only on the basis of variables that are reported to investors, ignoring other credit-relevant information. As a result, among borrowers with similar reported characteristics, over time the set that receives loans becomes worse along the unreported information dimension. This change in lender behavior alters the data generating process by transforming the mapping from observables to loan defaults. To illustrate this effect, we show that the interest rate on a loan becomes a worse predictor of default as securitization increases. Moreover, a statistical default model estimated in a low securitization period breaks down in a high securitization period in a systematic manner: it underpredicts defaults among borrowers for whom soft information is more valuable. Regulations that rely on such models to assess default risk could, therefore, be undermined by the actions of market participants.

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We develop a conceptual framework and an empirical methodology to analyze the effect of rising interest rates on the value of U.S. bank assets and bank stability. We mark-to-market the value of banks’ assets due to interest rate increases from Q1 2022 to Q1 2023, revealing an average decline of 10 %, totaling about $2 trillion in aggregate. We present a model illustrating how asset value declines due to higher rates can lead to self-fulfilling solvency runs even when banks’ assets are fully liquid. Banks with high asset losses, low capital, and, critically, high uninsured leverage are most fragile. A case study of the failed Silicon Valley Bank confirms the model insights. Our empirical measures of bank fragility suggest that, in the absence of regulatory intervention, many U.S. banks would have been at risk of self-fulfilling solvency runs.

We investigate the functioning of internal capital markets in Indian Business Groups. We document that intragroup loans are an important means of transferring cash across group firms and are typically used to support financially weaker firms. Evidence suggests that an important reason for providing support may be to avoid default by a group firm and consequent negative spillovers to the rest of the group. Consistent with such spillovers, the first bankruptcy in a group is followed by significant drops in external financing, investments and profits of other firms in the group and an increase in their bankruptcy probability.

We find new facts that relate the evolution of firm scope to the changing frictions in external capital markets over the last three decades. We find that large, diversified publicly traded firms increase their scope during times of high external capital market frictions, such as in the recent Great Recession. Moreover, during these times firms diversify their investment needs and cash flow across industries. We also find similar phenomena outside diversified public firms. Examining the mergers and acquisitions activity of stand-alone and diversified private firms, we uncover similar patterns. In aggregate data, we find that the composition of mergers shifts from focused to diversifying and back with changes in external market conditions. Our evidence is broadly consistent with the notion that firms diversify their scope in response to tightening in external capital markets.

Using a comprehensive sample of credit card data from a leading Chinese bank, we show that government bureaucrats receive 16% higher credit lines than non-bureaucrats with similar income and demographics, but their accounts experience a significantly higher likelihood of delinquency and debt forgiveness. Regions associated with greater credit provision to bureaucrats open more branches and receive more deposits from the local government. After staggered corruption crackdowns of provincial-level political officials, the new credit cards originated to bureaucrats in exposed regions do not enjoy a credit line premium, and bureaucrats’ delinquency and reinstatement rates are similar to those of non-bureaucrats.