Recent evidence indicates irrational behavior among retail investors. They hold onto losses and sell winners in a manner consistent with the disposition effect. Market professionals often use the term “discipline” to indicate trading strategies that minimize potential behavioral influences. We investigate the nature of trading discipline and whether professional traders are able to avoid the costly irrational behaviors found in retail populations. The full-time traders in our sample hold onto losses significantly longer than gains, but we find no evidence of costs associated with this behavior. The successful floor futures traders in our sample exhibit trading behavior characterized as rational and disciplined. Moreover, measures of relative trading discipline have predictive power for subsequent trading success.

We show that equity market liberalizations, on average, lead to a 1% increase in annual real economic growth. The effect is robust to alternative definitions of liberalization and does not reflect variation in the world business cycle. The effect also remains intact when an exogenous measure of growth opportunities is included in the regression. We find that capital account liberalization also plays a role in future economic growth, but, importantly, it does not subsume the contribution of equity market liberalizations. Other simultaneous reforms only partially account for the equity market liberalization effect. Finally, the largest growth response occurs in countries with high-quality institutions.

The average level and cross-sectional variability of fund alphas are estimated from a large sample of mutual funds. This information is incorporated, along with the usual regression estimate of alpha, in a (roughly) precision-weighted average measure of individual fund performance. Substantial “learning across funds” is documented, with significant effects on investment decisions. In a Bayesian framework, this form of learning is inconsistent with the assumption, made in the past literature, of prior independence across funds. Independence can be viewed as an extreme scenario in which the true cross-sectional distribution of alphas is presumed to be known a priori.

We investigate the causes and consequences of 737 privately negotiated share repurchases in the years 1984–2001. In contrast to the negative announcement returns and positive repurchase premiums reported by past research, we find positive announcement returns and premiums that are not significantly different from zero. Only when we investigate the 60 greenmail events separately do we find results similar to past research. However, for this subsample, we find long-horizon excess returns that are comparable to the average 18% repurchase premium, challenging the widely accepted opinion that managers overpay in greenmail repurchases. Moreover, we find that our understanding of the event improves when we split the non-greenmail repurchases according to the price paid. Repurchases at a premium can be modeled as signals, while other repurchases are mere wealth transfers between the corporation and the selling stockholders, the extent of which is determined by the relative bargaining power of the seller and the repurchasing firm.

We study the effect of a sovereign credit rating change of one country on the sovereign credit spreads of other countries from 1991 to 2000. We find evidence of spillover effects; that is, a ratings change in one country has a significant effect on sovereign credit spreads of other countries. This effect is asymmetric: positive ratings events abroad have no discernable impact on sovereign spreads, whereas negative ratings events are associated with an increase in spreads. On average, a one-notch downgrade of a sovereign bond is associated with a 12 basis point increase in spreads of sovereign bonds of other countries. The magnitude of the spillover effect following a negative ratings change is amplified by recent ratings changes in other countries. We distinguish between common information and differential components of spillovers. While common information spillovers imply that sovereign spreads move in tandem, differential spillovers are expected to result in opposite effects of ratings events across countries. Despite the predominance of common information spillovers, we also find evidence of differential spillovers among countries with highly negatively correlated capital flows or trade flows vis-á-vis the United States. That is, spreads in these countries generally fall in response to a downgrade of a country with highly negatively correlated capital or trade flows. Variables proxying for cultural or institutional linkages (e.g., common language, formal trade blocs, common law legal systems), physical proximity, and rule of law traditions across countries do not seem to affect estimated spillover effects.

When a homeowner uses an agent to sell his property, he may have less information than his agent and be disadvantaged in price setting and negotiating. This study examines whether the percentage commission structure in real estate brokerage creates agency problems. We investigate whether agents are able to use their information advantage to either sell their own property faster or for a higher price than their clients’ properties. The empirical results confirm our theoretical predictions of agency problems, as we find that agent-owned houses sell no faster than client-owned houses, but they do sell at a price premium of approximately 4.5%.

We investigate a consumption-based present-value relation that is a function of future dividend growth and find that changing forecasts of dividend growth are an important feature of the post-war U.S. stock market, despite the failure of the dividend–price ratio to uncover such variation. In addition, dividend forecasts are found to covary with changing forecasts of excess stock returns over business cycle frequencies. This covariation is important because positively correlated fluctuations in expected dividend growth and expected returns have offsetting effects on the log dividend–price ratio. The market risk premium and expected dividend growth thus vary considerably more than is apparent using the log divided–price ratio alone as a predictive variable.

We examine interactions between flexible financing and investment decisions in a model with stockholder–bondholder conflicts over investment policy. We find that financial flexibility encourages the choice of short-term debt thereby dramatically reducing the agency costs of under- and overinvestment. However, the reduction in agency costs may not encourage the firm to increase leverage, since the firm's initial debt level choice depends on the type of growth options in its investment opportunity set. The model has a number of testable predictions for the joint choice of leverage and maturity, and how these choices interact with a firm's growth opportunities.

We consider how fund managers respond to the conflicting preferences of their investors. We focus on the conflict between the taxable and retirement accounts of international funds, which face different tradeoffs between dividends and capital gains. In principle, managers could resolve this conflict through dividend arbitrage, but a proprietary database of dividend-arbitrage transactions shows that in practice they cannot. Thus, managers must resolve it through their investment policies. We find robust evidence that managers with more retirement money favor the preferences of retirement investors and further evidence for this view in the difference between U.S. and Canadian funds’ portfolio weights.

Theories based on incomplete contracting suggest that small organizations have a comparative advantage in activities that make extensive use of “soft” information. We provide evidence consistent with small banks being better able to collect and act on soft information than large banks. In particular, large banks are less willing to lend to informationally “difficult” credits, such as firms with no financial records. Moreover, after controlling for the endogeneity of bank-firm matching, we find that large banks lend at a greater distance, interact more impersonally with their borrowers, have shorter and less exclusive relationships, and do not alleviate credit constraints as effectively.