Theory suggests that increasing idiosyncratic, uninsurable labor income risk may cause individuals to reduce the risk in their financial assets. This relationship is confounded empirically by the tendency of risk tolerant people to choose riskier careers and hold riskier portfolios, leading to an upward-biased estimate of the effect of earnings risk on risky assets holdings. We overcome this identification problem by exploiting a discontinuity built into the Danish national university admissions system, which provides quasi-random assignment of similar applicants to programs with different earnings volatility profiles. Our methodology allows us to measure the causal impact of enrolling in a high-volatility program, holding fixed the average program earnings and human capital betas. We show that entering a program whose enrollees subsequently experience volatile earnings causes students to have more volatile earnings and, ceteris paribus, to hold fewer risky assets and be less likely to participate in the stock market. We calibrate our empirical results to a portfolio choice model with risky labor income that fits our empirical findings well with modest participation costs, myopic behavior, and reasonable levels of risk aversion.

We isolate the information channel of peer effects in consumption in a setting that excludes a role for common shocks or social pressure—a spending panel paired with crowdsourced information about anonymous “peers” elicited at different times. Consumers converge to peers’ spending, and more so when peer signals are more informative. Convergence is asymmetric: within 12 months of information provision, overspenders close 17% and underspenders 5% of their gap relative to peers. We exploit the quasi-random assignment to peer groups in an instrumental-variable strategy and implement an experiment for external validity. Our results are consistent with information-based theories of overconsumption.

Why did shareholder liability disappear? We address this question by looking at its use by British insurance companies until its complete disappearance. We explore three possible explanations for its demise: (1) regulation and government-provided policyholder protection meant that it was no longer required; (2) it had become de facto limited; and (3) shareholders saw an opportunity to expunge something they disliked when insurance companies grew in size. Using hand-collected archival data, our findings suggest investors attached a risk premium to companies with shareholder liability, and it was phased out as insurance companies expanded, which meant that they were better able to pool risks.