We investigate the reputational impact of financial fraud for outside directors based on a sample of firms facing shareholder class action lawsuits. Following a financial fraud lawsuit, outside directors do not face abnormal turnover on the board of the sued firm but experience a significant decline in other board seats held. This decline in other directorships is greater for more severe allegations of fraud and when the outside director bears greater responsibility for monitoring fraud. Interlocked firms that share directors with the sued firm also exhibit valuation declines at the lawsuit filing. Fraud-affiliated directors are more likely to lose directorships at firms with stronger corporate governance and their departure is associated with valuation increases for these firms.

SEC Rule10b5-1 plans are intended to limit the ability of insiders to trade opportunistically. We study insider stock sales by CEOs both under and outside of these plans. While both groups exhibit opportunism, this behavior is more limited in plan sales and non-plan sales in well-governed firms. Furthermore, opportunism in plan sales is greater for transactions representing a larger fraction of the CEO's firm-related wealth. CEOs can circumvent the intent of Rule 10b5-1 by exercising their discretion over financial reporting and real earnings management and appear to benefit from material nonpublic information by selectively cancelling plans or using limit orders.

Studies of institutional monitoring focus on the fraction of the firm held by institutions. We focus on the fraction of the institution׳s portfolio represented by the firm. In the context of acquisitions, we hypothesize that institutional monitoring will be greatest when the target firm represents a significant allocation of funds in the institution׳s portfolio. We show that this measure is important in reconciling mixed findings for total institutional ownership in the prior literature. The results indicate that our measure of institutional holdings leads to greater bid completion rates, higher premiums, and lower acquirer returns. This empirical evidence provides support for theories predicting a beneficial effect of blockholders in monitoring the firm in general and in enhancing the gains to takeover targets in particular.

Unscheduled stock options to target chief executive officers (CEOs) are a nontrivial phenomenon during private merger negotiations. In 920 acquisition bids during 1999–2007, over 13% of targets grant them. These options substitute for golden parachutes and compensate target CEOs for the benefits they forfeit because of the merger. Targets granting unscheduled options are more likely to be acquired but they earn lower premiums. Consequently, deal value drops by $62 for every dollar target CEOs receive from unscheduled options. Conversely, acquirers of targets offering these awards experience higher returns. Therefore, deals involving unscheduled grants exhibit a transfer of wealth from target shareholders to bidder shareholders.

Using transactions generally overlooked in the compensation literature—joint ventures, strategic alliances, seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), and spin-offs—we find that, beyond compensation for increases in firm size or complexity, chief executive officers (CEOs) are rewarded for their deal-making activities. Boards pay CEOs for the core motivation of the deal, as well as for deal volume. We find that compensating for volume instead of core value creation occurs under weak board monitoring and that in deal-making firms, neither CEO turnover nor pay-for-performance responds to underperformance. We introduce an input monitoring explanation for these results: boards compensate for deal volume because of their inability to perfectly monitor outputs.