We find inherited family firms more important in postwar Japan than generally realized, and also performing well on average. Non-consanguineous heir-run firms outperform blood heirs' firms, and roughly match founder-run listed firms, while blood heirs surpass professional managers at running family firms. Further, succession events suggest that adopted heirs “cause” elevated performance. We suggest that heir-run firms do well because non-consanguineous heirs displace the least talented blood heirs, the non-consanguineous heir “job” motivates professional managers, and the threat of displacement encourages blood heirs' effort and human capital accumulation, mitigating the “Carnegie conjecture” that inherited wealth deadens talent.

Dynastic-controlled firms are led by founding-family CEOs while the family owns an insignificant share of equity (defined as less than 5%). They represent 7.4% of listed firms in post-war Japan, include well-known firms such as Casio, Suzuki, and Toyota, and are often grouped with widely held firms in the literature. These firms differ in key performance measures from both traditional family firms and non-family firms, and evolve from the former as equity-financed growth dilutes family ownership over time. In turn, the transition from dynastic control to non-family status is driven by a diminution of family legacy and talent.