The term structure of interest rates is modeled as a random field with conditional volatility. Random field models allow consistency with the current shape of the term structure without the need for recalibration. However, most such models are Gaussian, with no conditional volatility. State-dependent volatility is introduced while a key property of Gaussian random field models is retained. Each forward rate is part of a low-dimensional diffusion process, simplifying estimation and derivatives pricing. The modeling approach also implies that, in general, the set of zero coupon bonds does not complete the market, and term structure derivatives cannot always be priced by arbitrage.

Evidence presented here indicates that the relationship between stock returns and unexpected inflation differs systematically across firms. The differences are shown to be consistent with cross-sectional variation in firms' nominal contracts (monetary claims and depreciation tax shields). The differences are also partially explained by proxies for underlying firm characteristics that could create interaction between unexpected inflation and operating profitability. Finally, much if not most of the differences appear to arise because unexpected inflation is correlated with changes in expected aggregate real activity, the effects of which tend to vary across firms according to their systematic risk.

The traditional analysis of the relative pricing of tax-exempt and taxable debt is a habitat theory of the term structure of interest rates. In the traditional analysis the preferences of investors for particular maturities of debt lead to unique pricing relations at every point on the yield curve which are indicative of investor marginal tax brackets. Recent work by Fama (1977) suggests that banks are potential arbitrageurs across tax-exempt and taxable bond markets which force a particular equilibrium on the pricing of short-term bonds. Miller (1977) suggests that the choice of debt or equity financing by firms in the aggregate forces a similar equilibrium on the pricing of all tax-exempt and taxable bonds. This paper exploits the institution of Regulation Q and its effects on the banking system to bring evidence to bear on the predictions of these three models.

The paper presents a valuation formula for default free bonds for a certain class of tastes when the instantaneously riskfree rate of interest follows a geometric Wiener process. Properties of the resulting term structure of interest rates are studied, and an application of the analysis to the pricing of Treasury Bills is proposed.

Numerous studies observe abnormal returns after the announcement of quarterly earnings. Ball (1978) suggests those returns are not evidence of market inefficiency, but instead are due to deficiencies in the capital asset-pricing model. This paper tests whether abnormal returns are observed when steps are taken to reduce the effect of deficiencies in the capital asset-pricing model. Significant abnormal returns are observed, but do not cover the transactions costs unless one can avoid direct transactions costs (e.g., a broker). The paper also investigates whether those abnormal returns can be attributed to a deficiency in the capital asset-pricing model. The conclusion is they cannot.

This paper uses the Capital Asset Pricing Model to link the financial policy of the firm with the firm's real decisions including output, input mix, and investment. Whereas the M-M leverage theorems were derived for a given set of real decisions, this paper considers the impact of leverage on firm optimization when interest is tax-deductible. In general, leverage impacts upon factor proportions, capital stock, and output decisions. In the final proposition, the author demonstrates that the ‘cost of capital’ need not decline with leverage even in perfect capital markets and with default-free debt.

Not necessarily: a firm's fundamental value increases with uncertainty about average future profitability, and this uncertainty was unusually high in the late 1990s. After calibrating a stock valuation model that takes this uncertainty into account, we compute the level of uncertainty that is needed to match the observed Nasdaq valuations at their peak. The uncertainty we obtain seems plausible because it matches not only the high level but also the high volatility of Nasdaq stock prices. In general, we argue that the level and volatility of stock prices are positively linked through firm-specific uncertainty about average future profitability.

This paper develops an agency model in which stock-based compensation is a double-edged sword, inducing managers to exert productive effort but also to divert valuable firm resources to misrepresent performance. We examine how the potential for manipulation affects the equilibrium level of pay-for-performance sensitivity and derive several new cross-sectional implications that are consistent with recent empirical studies. In addition, we analyze the impact of recent regulatory changes contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and show how policies intended to increase firm value by reducing misrepresentation can actually reduce firm value or increase the upward bias in manipulated disclosures.

Since prices are constrained to discrete tick multiples while dividends are essentially continuous, ex day price changes will not equal dividends. We argue that the expected price drop is strictly less than the dividend but within one tick of the dividend. The price-drop-to-dividend ratio will (i) be less than one, (ii) increase with dividends generally, and (iii) decline between tick multiples, giving a sawtooth pattern in the data. Since dividends and dividend yields are highly correlated, discreteness will give the impression of tax-induced dividend clienteles even if there are none. Taxable cash dividends and nontaxable stock dividends exhibit similar ex day behavior.

This paper examines the wealth impact of share repurchases that restrict participation to a particular sub-set of a firm's stockholders. Repurchases at a premium from insiders and small shareholders increase the wealth of non-participating stockholders and are therefore consistent with the shareholders' interest hypothesis. However, privately negotiated repurchases of single blocks from stockholders unaffiliated with the firm reduce the wealth of non-participating stockholders. In contrast to the evidence for general repurchases, no positive wealth effect offsets the significant repurchase premium paid to the selling stockholder. Indeed, the wealth loss to non-participating stockholders is significantly greater than the premium paid. This evidence is inconsistent with the shareholders' interest hypothesis and supports the hypothesis that managers in their self-interest use single block repurchases to eliminate threats to their control over the firm's resources.