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Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills

Journal of Financial Economics 1994 35(3), 371-390
We find that the average stock-market reaction to announcements of poison pills is positive when the board has a majority of outside directors and negative when it does not. The probability that a subsequent control contest is associated with an auction is also positively related to the fraction of outsiders on the board. These results are largely driven by directors who are retired executives from other companies. The evidence suggests that outside directors serve the interests of shareholders.

Does industrial structure explain the benefits of international diversification?

Journal of Financial Economics 1994 36(1), 3-27
We examine the influence of industrial structure on the cross-sectional volatility and correlation structure of country index returns for 12 European countries between 1978 and 1992. We find that industrial structure explains very little of the cross-sectional difference in country return volatility, and that the low correlation between country indices is almost completely due to country-specific sources of return variation. Diversification across countries within an industry is a much more effective tool for risk reduction than industry diversification within a country.

The costs of inefficient bargaining and financial distress

Journal of Financial Economics 1994 35(2), 221-247
This study provides the first large-sample analysis of the stock-market reactions to interfirm litigation. When a suit is filed, the common stock of the typical defendant declines by about 1%, while the plaintiff experiences no significant gains. For the average pair of firms, the combined drop in value upon filing is $21 million. Much of the loss is regained if the suit is settled. The findings suggest that bargaining among firm claimants sometimes leads to very inefficient outcomes. Part of the leakage is explained by the costs of increased financial distress imposed on the defendant.

Information, trading, and volatility

Journal of Financial Economics 1994 36(1), 127-154 open access
We examine the effects of trading and information flows on the short-run behavior of stock prices by comparing the behavior of stock return volatility during trading and nontrading periods. We define nontrading periods as periods when exchanges and businesses are open but traders endogenously choose not to trade. After correcting for the bid/ask bounce and stickiness in quotes, we find that a large proportion of daily stock return volatility occurs without trades, especially for large firms. Furthermore, we provide new evidence that public (versus private) information is the major source of short-term return volatility.