This study uses corporate tax return data to examine the evolution of firms' financial structure and performance after leveraged buyouts (LBOs) for a comprehensive sample of 317 LBOs taking place between 1995 and 2007. We find little evidence of operating improvements subsequent to an LBO, although consistent with prior studies, we do observe operating improvements in the set of LBO firms that have public financial statements. We also find that firms do not reduce leverage after LBOs, even if they generate excess cash flow. Our results suggest that effecting a sustained change in capital structure is a conscious objective of the LBO structure.

We examine whether the decision to participate in the stock market and other related portfolio decisions are influenced by income hedging motives. Economic theory predicts that the market participation propensity should increase as the correlation between income growth and stock market returns decreases. Surprisingly, empirical studies find limited support for the income hedging motive. Using a rich, unique Dutch data set and the National Longitudinal Survey of the Youth (NLSY) from the United States, we show that when the income-return correlation is low, individuals exhibit a greater propensity to participate in the market and allocate a larger proportion of their wealth to risky assets. Even when the income risk is high, individuals exhibit a higher propensity to participate in the market when the hedging potential is high. These findings suggest that income hedging is an important determinant of stock market participation and asset allocation decisions.

We revisit the well-established puzzle that leverage is negatively correlated with measures of profitability. In contrast, we find that at times when firms are at or close to their optimal level of leverage, the cross-sectional correlation between profitability and leverage is positive. At other times, it is negative. These results are consistent with dynamic trade-off models in which infrequent capital structure rebalancing is optimal. The time series of market leverage and profitability in the quarters prior to rebalancing events match the patterns predicted by these models. Our results are not driven by investment layouts, market timing, payout, or mechanical mean reversion of leverage.

Using transactions generally overlooked in the compensation literature—joint ventures, strategic alliances, seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), and spin-offs—we find that, beyond compensation for increases in firm size or complexity, chief executive officers (CEOs) are rewarded for their deal-making activities. Boards pay CEOs for the core motivation of the deal, as well as for deal volume. We find that compensating for volume instead of core value creation occurs under weak board monitoring and that in deal-making firms, neither CEO turnover nor pay-for-performance responds to underperformance. We introduce an input monitoring explanation for these results: boards compensate for deal volume because of their inability to perfectly monitor outputs.