Empirical research has struggled to show that variation in corporate capital structure arises from variation in estimated corporate income tax rates. We argue that, in previous studies, both the tax rates applied to multinational corporations and the taxable income earned have been mismeasured. Using the Bureau of Economic Analysis annual survey sample combined with each firm's income and country specific tax rate, we find that firms do have higher leverage ratios and lower interest coverage ratios when they operate in countries with higher tax rates, as theory would suggest. The trade-off theory of capital structure continues to have empirical support.

In this paper, we examine whether managers time their debt-equity choices to exploit market mispricing. Controlling for the level of external financing and corporate investment activities, we find evidence consistent with the market timing hypothesis. We find managers issue more equity relative to debt when analysts are relatively optimistic about firms’ long-term growth prospects. Moreover, equity issuers earn lower returns than debt issuers at subsequent earnings announcements. Controlling for research and development (R&D) investment, we find that, consistent with the market timing hypothesis and inconsistent with the extant empirical literature, the debt-equity composition of external financing predicts year-ahead stock return.

We examine institutional demand prior to well-known stock return anomalies and find that institutions have a strong tendency to buy stocks classified as overvalued (short leg of anomaly), and that these stocks have particularly negative ex post abnormal returns. Our results differ from numerous studies documenting a positive relation between institutional demand and future returns. We trace the difference to measurement horizon. We too find a positive relation at a quarterly horizon. However, the relation turns strongly negative at the one-year horizon used in anomaly studies. We consider several explanations for institutions’ tendency to trade contrary to anomaly prescriptions. Our evidence largely rules out explanations based on flow and limits-of-arbitrage, but is more consistent with agency-induced preferences for stock characteristics that relate to poor long-run performance.

The nature of the dependence between discontinuities in prices and contemporaneous discontinuities in volatility (co-jumps) has been reported by many as being elusive, in terms of sign, magnitude, and statistical significance. Using a novel identification strategy in continuous time relying on trade-level information for spot variance estimation, as well as infinitesimal cross-moments, we document that a sizeable proportion of discontinuous changes in prices are associated with strongly anti-correlated, contemporaneous, discontinuous changes in volatility. Assuming a possibly nonmonotonic pricing kernel, we illustrate the equilibrium implications of price and volatility co-jumps for return and variance risk premia.

We model an anxious agent as one who is more risk averse with respect to imminent risks than with respect to distant risks. Based on a utility function that captures individual subjects’ behavior in experiments, we provide a tractable theory relaxing the restriction of constant risk aversion across horizons and show that it generates rich implications. We first apply the model to insurance markets and explain the high premia for short-horizon insurance. Then, we show that costly delegated portfolio management, investment advice, and withdrawal fees emerge as endogenous features and strategies to cope with dynamic inconsistency in intratemporal risk-return trade-offs.

This paper examines heterogeneity in the responsiveness to default options in a large state retirement plan, focusing on individuals’ decision-making approaches as well as their economic and demographic characteristics. Analyses of a survey of plan participants show that procrastination and the need for cognitive closure are important determinants of the likelihood of default. This paper also explores an important implication of defaulting—individuals who default are significantly more likely to subsequently express a desire to enroll in a different plan. The desire to change plans is also correlated with numerous economic and decision-making characteristics, including procrastination.

We examine returns, order flow, and market conditions in the minutes before, during, and after NYSE and Nasdaq short sales. We find two distinct types of short sales: those that provide liquidity, and those that demand it. Liquidity-supplying shorts are strongly contrarian at intraday horizons. They trade when spreads are unusually wide, facing greater adverse selection. Liquidity-demanding shorts trade when spreads are narrow and tend to follow short-term price declines. These results support a competitive rational expectations model where both market-makers and informed traders short, indicating that these two shorting types are integral to both price discovery and liquidity provision.

Cash- and stock-financed takeover bids induce strikingly different target revaluations. We exploit detailed data on unsuccessful takeover bids between 1980 and 2008, and we show that targets of cash offers are revalued on average by +15% after deal failure, whereas stock targets return to their pre-announcement levels. The differences in revaluation do not revert over longer horizons. We find no evidence that future takeover activities or operational changes explain these differences. While the targets of failed cash and stock offers are both more likely to be acquired over the following eight years than matched control firms, no differences exist between cash and stock targets, either in the timing or in the value of future offers. Similarly, we cannot detect differential operational policies following the failed bid. Our results are most consistent with cash bids revealing prior undervaluation of the target. We reconcile our findings with the opposite conclusion in earlier literature (Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1983) by identifying a look-ahead bias built into their sample construction.

This study provides strong evidence of a causal effect of risk-taking incentives provided by option compensation on corporate risk management. We utilize the passage of Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R, which required firms to expense options, to investigate how chief executive officer option compensation affects the hedging behavior of oil and gas firms. Firms that did not expense options before FAS 123R significantly reduced option pay, which resulted in a large increase in their hedging intensity compared with firms that did not use options or expensed their options voluntarily prior to FAS 123R.