Political and regulatory uncertainty is strongly negatively associated with merger and acquisition activity at the macro and firm levels. The strongest effects are for uncertainty regarding taxes, government spending, monetary and fiscal policies, and regulation. Consistent with a real options channel, the effect is exacerbated for less reversible deals and for firms whose product demand or stock returns exhibit greater sensitivity to policy uncertainty, but attenuated for deals that cannot be delayed due to competition and for deals that hedge firm-level risk. Contractual mechanisms (deal premiums, termination fees, MAC clauses) unanimously point to policy uncertainty increasing the target’s negotiating power.

We show that the performance of the new factor models of Hou et al. (2015) and Fama and French (2015) depends crucially on how their investment factor is constructed. Both models use growth in total assets to measure investment. Their ability to price the cross-section of returns decreases significantly when the investment factor is constructed using traditional investment measures, or measures that also account for investment in intangibles. In contrast, we find that factors based on growth in inventory and accounts receivable contain the bulk of the pricing information in the asset growth factor. We show evidence that the superior performance of the asset growth factor seems to be attributable to its ability to capture aggregate shocks to equity financing costs.