Using a news-based index of policy uncertainty, we document a strong negative relationship between firm-level capital investment and the aggregate level of uncertainty associated with future policy and regulatory outcomes. More importantly, we find evidence that the relation between policy uncertainty and capital investment is not uniform in the cross-section, being significantly stronger for firms with a higher degree of investment irreversibility and for firms that are more dependent on government spending. Our results lend empirical support to the notion that policy uncertainty can depress corporate investment by inducing precautionary delays due to investment irreversibility.

Using a news-based index of policy uncertainty, we document a strong negative relationship between firm-level capital investment and the aggregate level of uncertainty associated with future policy and regulatory outcomes. More importantly, we find evidence that the relation between policy uncertainty and capital investment is not uniform in the cross-section, being significantly stronger for firms with a higher degree of investment irreversibility and for firms that are more dependent on government spending. Our results lend empirical support to the notion that policy uncertainty can depress corporate investment by inducing precautionary delays due to investment irreversibility.

Political and regulatory uncertainty is strongly negatively associated with merger and acquisition activity at the macro and firm levels. The strongest effects are for uncertainty regarding taxes, government spending, monetary and fiscal policies, and regulation. Consistent with a real options channel, the effect is exacerbated for less reversible deals and for firms whose product demand or stock returns exhibit greater sensitivity to policy uncertainty, but attenuated for deals that cannot be delayed due to competition and for deals that hedge firm-level risk. Contractual mechanisms (deal premiums, termination fees, MAC clauses) unanimously point to policy uncertainty increasing the target’s negotiating power.

We show that the performance of the new factor models of Hou et al. (2015) and Fama and French (2015) depends crucially on how their investment factor is constructed. Both models use growth in total assets to measure investment. Their ability to price the cross-section of returns decreases significantly when the investment factor is constructed using traditional investment measures, or measures that also account for investment in intangibles. In contrast, we find that factors based on growth in inventory and accounts receivable contain the bulk of the pricing information in the asset growth factor. We show evidence that the superior performance of the asset growth factor seems to be attributable to its ability to capture aggregate shocks to equity financing costs.

We provide a systematic empirical assessment of the Minsky hypothesis that business fluctuations stem from irrational swings in expectations. Using predictable firm-level forecast errors, we build an aggregate index of irrational expectations and use it to provide three sets of results. First, we show that our index predicts aggregate credit cycles. Next, we show that these predictable credit cycles drive cycles in firm-level debt issuance and investment and similar cycles between financially constrained and unconstrained firms, as Minsky predicts. Finally, we show more pronounced cycles in firm-level financing and investment for firms with ex ante more optimistic expectations.