I examine how transparency and interdealer trading affects prices investors pay in municipal bond offerings. Real-time trade reporting for municipal bonds started January 31, 2005. The dispersion of purchase prices fell sharply at that time. There was little impact on average markups for most trades, but they increased for purchases of more than $100,000. Bonds often pass through a series of dealers before being placed with a buy-and-hold investor. As the interdealer trades progress, trade sizes decline and trade prices rise. Markups on investor purchases increase with the amount of interdealer trading before the trade.

Units are bundles of common stock and warrants. By selling initial public offerings (IPOs) of units, firms precommit to sell more stock in the future at the warrant's exercise price. Sequential offerings of this type reduce the agency costs of giving management a potential free cash flow at the IPO. Consistent with this theory, firms that choose unit IPOs are smaller, have less income and assets in relation to their IPO proceeds, and are less likely to survive than firms that issue shares.

Stoll and Whaley (1983) suggest large transaction costs may be responsible for the large risk-adjusted returns earned by small firm stocks. This study, using data from the AMEX as well as the NYSE, shows that investors can earn risk-adjusted excess returns after transaction costs by holding small firms for relatively short holding periods. Other literature that provides evidence that is inconsistent with the transaction costs hypothesis is cited.

Our paper examines the impact of geographic location on liquidity for U.S. rural- and urban-based companies. Even after adjusting for size and other factors, rural firms trade much less, are covered by fewer analysts, and are owned by fewer institutions than urban firms. Trading costs are higher for rural Nasdaq firms, and volume that can be attributed to marketwide factors is lower for rural stocks. The findings add to our understanding of the way that access to information and familiarity affect liquidity.

We study the aftermarket for 72 initial public offerings (IPOs) using comprehensive trade and quote-change data from every market maker for the first three days of trading. Underwriters quote higher bid prices than other market makers for issues that commence trading at or below the offer price. Underwriters repurchase large quantities of stock in the aftermarket without risk by overselling the issue by the amount of the overallotment option. If the IPO is hot, the overallotment option is exercised. If not, the short position is covered with aftermarket selling. We discuss several reasons for underwriter support.

We examine the introduction of mandatory post-trade reporting in the To-Be-Announced mortgage-backed securities market. With post-trade reporting, trading costs fell for institutional investors. Trading costs declined more for investors’ trades with peripheral dealers than for their trades with core dealers. Peripheral dealers’ market share dropped after the introduction of post-trade reporting, suggesting that opacity was protecting inefficient high-cost dealers. Interdealer trades and volume declined as transparency made it easier to find natural counterparties. Relationships between dealers became less important and, after controlling for the number of trades, dealers used more counterparties in interdealer trades.

This is the first paper to examine the microstructure of how mispricing is created and resolved. We study dual-class shares with equal cash flow rights and show that a simple trading strategy exploiting gaps between their prices appears to create abnormal profits after transactions costs. Trade and quote data show that investors shift their trading patterns to take advantage of gaps. Contrary to common perception, long–short arbitrage plays a minor part in eliminating gaps, and one-sided trades correct most of them. We also show that the more liquid share class is usually responsible for the price discrepancies.

SOES bandits are individual investors who use Nasdaq's Small Order Execution System (SOES) for day trading. Their average profit per trade is small, but they trade dozens or hundreds of times per week. Bandits usually establish a position before most market-makers have updated their quotes, and lay off the position at favorable prices through Instinet or SelectNet. It is noteworthy that they trade profitably with market-makers despite having less information. Bandits keep the profits and bear the losses from their trades. Thus they have greater incentives to trade well than the employees of market-making firms.

Nasdaq's Small Order Execution System (SOES) allows orders to be submitted by computer, thereby assuring rapid execution at quoted prices. We examine trading in the 20 largest Nasdaq stocks around the time of a rule change that reduced the largest SOES trades from 1000 to 500 shares. We show that SOES trades contain information about short-term price movements and that SOES trading declined dramatically with the rule change. However, quoted and effective spreads were unaffected by the rule change.