A combination of observed and unobserved (latent) factors capture term structure dynamics. Information about these dynamics is extracted from observed factors using restrictions implied by no-arbitrage, without specifying or estimating any of the parameters associated with latent factors. Estimation is equivalent to fitting the moment conditions of a set of regressions, where no-arbitrage imposes cross-equation restrictions on the coefficients. The methodology is applied to the dynamics of inflation and yields. Outside of the disinflationary period of 1979 through 1983, short-term rates move one-for-one with expected inflation, while bond risk premia are insensitive to inflation.

This paper forms investment strategies in US domestic equity mutual funds, incorporating predictability in (i) manager skills, (ii) fund risk loadings, and (iii) benchmark returns. We find predictability in manager skills to be the dominant source of investment profitability—long-only strategies that incorporate such predictability outperform their Fama-French and momentum benchmarks by 2 to 4%/year by timing industries over the business cycle, and by an additional 3 to 6%/year by choosing funds that outperform their industry benchmarks. Our findings indicate that active management adds significant value, and that industries are important in locating outperforming mutual funds.

We analyze the incentives for independent bank regulators with financially integrated jurisdictions to form a regulatory union. Externalities lead competing regulators to choose suboptimally low standards. Centralized regulation, however, entails a loss of flexibility if equal standards must be applied across jurisdictions. We find that, first, centralized regulation will more likely emerge among relatively homogeneous jurisdictions/countries. Second, centralized regulation will be unanimously preferred to independence only if it entails standards higher than those of the country with the highest individual standards. Third, financial integration among more than two jurisdictions may prevent partial unions, which, in turn, may prevent more comprehensive agreements.

In the period 1993 through 2002 examined in this study, quoted and effective spreads declined substantially on Nasdaq and to a lesser degree on the NYSE. At the same time, however, trades outside the quotes increased dramatically on Nasdaq. Because investors would prefer to trade at the quotes rather than outside the quotes, we examine why trades outside the quotes are observed. We focus on how the continuous market mechanism itself influences the outcome of orders and the reporting of trades, and we conclude that slippage exists in the market mechanism. Outside-trades occur on Nasdaq, first, because of delays in reporting trades, second, because the ability of dealers to delay execution of trades creates a look-back option, which when exercised results in outside-trades, and third, because large trades can take place at prices outside the quotes. Outside-trades are rarely observed on the NYSE because the market is more centralized. While the pattern of trading on the NYSE is not inconsistent with the presence of a look-back option, our tests provide no direct evidence that specialists are exercising such an option.

Valuation theory says that expected stock returns are related to three variables: the book-to-market equity ratio (Bt/Mt), expected profitability, and expected investment. Given Bt/Mt and expected profitability, higher expected rates of investment imply lower expected returns. But controlling for the other two variables, more profitable firms have higher expected returns, as do firms with higher Bt/Mt. These predictions are confirmed in our tests.

We gather a unique sample of 44 tax shelter cases to investigate the magnitude of tax shelter activity and whether participating in a shelter is related to corporate debt policy. The average annual deduction produced by the shelters in our sample is very large, equaling approximately nine percent of asset value. These deductions are more than three times as large as interest deductions for comparable companies. The firms in our sample use less debt when they engage in tax sheltering. Compared to companies with similar pre-shelter debt ratios, the debt ratios of firms engaged in tax shelters fall by about 8%. The tax shelter firms in our sample appear underlevered if shelters are ignored but do not appear underlevered once shelters are considered.

This paper examines the empirical question of whether systematic equity risk of US firms as measured by beta from the capital asset pricing model reflects the risk of their pension plans. There are a number of reasons to suspect that it might not. Chief among them is the opaque set of accounting rules used to report pension assets, liabilities, and expenses. Pension plan assets and liabilities are off-balance sheet and are often viewed as segregated from the rest of the firm, with its own trustees. Pension accounting rules are complicated. Furthermore, the role of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation clouds the real relation between pension plan risk and firm equity risk. The empirical findings in this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that equity risk does reflect the risk of the firm's pension plan despite arcane accounting rules for pensions. This finding is consistent with informational efficiency of the capital markets. It also has implications for corporate finance practice in the determination of the cost of capital for capital budgeting. Standard procedure uses de-leveraged equity return betas to infer the cost of capital for operating assets. But the de-leveraged betas are not adjusted for the risk of the pension assets and liabilities. Failure to make this adjustment typically biases upward estimates of the discount rate for capital budgeting. The magnitude of the bias is shown here to be large for a number of well-known US companies. This bias can result in positive net present value projects being rejected.

Consistent with a life-cycle theory of dividends, the fraction of publicly traded industrial firms that pay dividends is high when retained earnings are a large portion of total equity (and of total assets) and falls to near zero when most equity is contributed rather than earned. We observe a highly significant relation between the decision to pay dividends and the earned/contributed capital mix, controlling for profitability, growth, firm size, total equity, cash balances, and dividend history, a relation that also holds for dividend initiations and omissions. In our regressions, the mix of earned/contributed capital has a quantitatively greater impact than measures of profitability and growth opportunities. We document a massive increase in firms with negative retained earnings (from 11.8% of industrials in 1978 to 50.2% in 2002). Controlling for the earned/contributed capital mix, firms with negative retained earnings show virtually no change in their propensity to pay dividends from the mid-1970s to 2002, while those whose earned equity makes them reasonable candidates to pay dividends have a propensity reduction that is twice the overall reduction in Fama and French [2000, Journal of Financial Economics 76, 549–582]. Finally, our simulations show that, if well-established firms had not paid dividends, their cash balances would be enormous and their long-term debt trivial, thus granting extreme discretion to managers of these mature firms.

There are two variance components embedded in the returns constructed using high frequency asset prices: the time-varying variance of the unobservable efficient returns that would prevail in a frictionless economy and the variance of the equally unobservable microstructure noise. Using sample moments of high frequency return data recorded at different frequencies, we provide a simple and robust technique to identify both variance components. In the context of a volatility-timing trading strategy, we show that careful (optimal) separation of the two volatility components of the observed stock returns yields substantial utility gains.