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Corporate capital structure and the characteristics of suppliers and customers

Journal of Financial Economics 2007 83(2), 321-365 open access
We investigate the link between a firm's leverage and the characteristics of its suppliers and customers. Specifically, we examine whether firms use decreased leverage as a commitment mechanism to induce suppliers/customers to undertake relationship-specific investments. We find that the firm's leverage is negatively related to the R&D intensities of its suppliers and customers. We also find lower debt levels for firms operating in industries in which strategic alliances and joint ventures with firms in supplier and customer industries are more prevalent. Consistent with a bargaining role for debt, we find a positive relation between firm debt level and the degree of concentration in supplier/customer industries.

Disagreement, tastes, and asset prices

Journal of Financial Economics 2007 83(3), 667-689
Standard asset pricing models assume that: (i) there is complete agreement among investors about probability distributions of future payoffs on assets; and (ii) investors choose asset holdings based solely on anticipated payoffs; that is, investment assets are not also consumption goods. Both assumptions are unrealistic. We provide a simple framework for studying how disagreement and tastes for assets as consumption goods can affect asset prices.

Foreign entry and bank competition☆

Journal of Financial Economics 2007 84(2), 502-528
Foreign entry and bank competition are modeled as the interaction between asymmetrically informed principals: The entrant uses collateral as a screening device to contest the incumbent's informational advantage. Both better information ex ante and stronger legal protection ex post are shown to facilitate the entry of low-cost outside competitors into credit markets. The entrant's success in gaining borrowers of higher quality by offering cheaper loans increases with its efficiency (cost) advantage. This paper accounts for evidence suggesting that foreign banks tend to lend more to large firms thereby neglecting small and medium enterprises. The results also explain why this observed bias is stronger in emerging markets.

Credit-spread determinants and interlocking contracts: A study of the Ras Gas project☆

Journal of Financial Economics 2007 86(1), 248-278
This paper provides an in-depth study of the allocation of a firm's residual risks not explicitly managed through interlocking contracts in the context of project finance. Focusing on the Ras Gas project, we relate its credit spreads as a measure of investor risk perceptions to firm-specific risk factors in the context of 25-year supply agreements, debt covenants, and a debt-service guarantee contingent on output prices. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that unmanaged risk factors affecting the supply agreement drive Ras Gas’ credit spreads, whereas managed ones have no effect. Interpreting our findings as evidence for the nexus-of-contracts view of the firm, we discuss some implications for financial design and valuation.

A lender-based theory of collateral☆

Journal of Financial Economics 2007 84(3), 826-859 open access
We consider an imperfectly competitive loan market in which a local relationship lender has an information advantage vis-à-vis distant transaction lenders. Competitive pressure from the transaction lenders prevents the local lender from extracting the full surplus from projects. As a result, the local lender inefficiently rejects marginally profitable projects. Collateral mitigates the inefficiency by increasing the local lender's payoff from precisely those marginally profitable projects that she inefficiently rejects. The model predicts that, controlling for observable borrower risk, collateralized loans are more likely to default ex post, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. The model also predicts that borrowers for whom local lenders have a relatively smaller information advantage face higher collateral requirements, and that technological innovations that narrow the information advantage of local lenders, such as small business credit scoring, lead to a greater use of collateral in lending relationships.

Why do countries matter so much for corporate governance?☆

Journal of Financial Economics 2007 86(1), 1-39 open access
This paper develops and tests a model of how country characteristics, such as legal protections for minority investors and the level of economic and financial development, influence firms’ costs and benefits in implementing measures to improve their own governance and transparency. We find that country characteristics explain much more of the variance in governance ratings (ranging from 39% to 73%) than observable firm characteristics (ranging from 4% to 22%). Further, we show that firm characteristics explain almost none of the variation in governance ratings in less-developed countries and that access to global capital markets sharpens firms’ incentives for better governance.

Is Chapter 11 costly?☆

Journal of Financial Economics 2007 84(3), 772-796
We examine a sample of 459 firms filing for Chapter 11 during the period 1991–1998 and find that our sample firms experience significant improvements in their operating performance during Chapter 11. Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that Chapter 11, if anything, provides net benefits to bankrupt firms. In the cross section, firms with higher debt ratios experience greater improvements in operating performance, and the complexity of the renegotiation process negatively affects the improvement. We find no relationship between Chapter 11 outcome and changes in risk-adjusted firm value in Chapter 11.

Banking crises, financial dependence, and growth☆

Journal of Financial Economics 2007 84(1), 187-228
This paper contributes to the literature that analyzes the mechanisms linking financial shocks and real activity. In particular, we investigate the growth impact of banking crises on industries with different levels of dependence on external finance. If banks are the key institutions allowing credit constraints to be relaxed, then a sudden loss of these intermediaries in a system in which such intermediaries are important should have a disproportionately contractionary impact on the sectors that flourished due to their reliance on banks. Using data from 38 developed and developing countries that experienced financial crises during the last quarter century, we find that those sectors that are highly dependent on external finance tend to experience a substantially greater contraction of value added during a banking crisis in countries with deeper financial systems than in countries with shallower financial systems. Our results do not suggest, however, that on net the externally dependent firms fare worse in deep financial systems.

Affiliated mutual funds and the allocation of initial public offerings

Journal of Financial Economics 2007 86(2), 337-368
We examine how investment banks use initial public offerings (IPOs) in relation to their affiliated mutual funds. The dumping ground hypothesis predicts that the lead underwriter allocates cold IPOs to its affiliated funds so that more deals can be completed when demand for these IPOs is weak. Affiliated funds could also receive more cold IPOs because the lead underwriter uses allocations of hot IPOs to unaffiliated funds to gain trading commission business. The nepotism hypothesis predicts that the lead underwriter allocates hot IPOs to its affiliated funds to boost their performance and thus attract more money. We find little evidence supporting the dumping ground hypothesis, although some evidence supports the nepotism hypothesis, especially during the internet bubble period of 1999–2000.

Do hedge funds deliver alpha? A Bayesian and bootstrap analysis☆

Journal of Financial Economics 2007 84(1), 229-264
Using a robust bootstrap procedure, we find that top hedge fund performance cannot be explained by luck, and hedge fund performance persists at annual horizons. Moreover, we show that Bayesian measures, which help overcome the short-sample problem inherent in hedge fund returns, lead to superior performance predictability. Sorting on Bayesian alphas, relative to OLS alphas, yields a 5.5% per year increase in the alpha of the spread between the top and bottom hedge fund deciles. Our results are robust and relevant to investors as they are neither confined to small funds, nor driven by incubation bias, backfill bias, or serial correlation.