I propose a new measure of venture capital (VC) firm reputation and analyze its performance implications on private companies. Controlling for portfolio company quality and other VC-specific factors including experience, connectedness, syndication, industry competition, exit conditions, and investment environment, I find companies backed by more reputable VCs by initial public offering (IPO) capitalization share (based on cumulative market capitalization of IPOs backed by the VC), are more likely to exit successfully, access public markets faster, and have higher asset productivity at IPOs. Further tests suggest VCs’ IPO Capitalization share effectively captures both VC screening and monitoring expertise. My findings have financial implications for limited partners and entrepreneurs regarding their VC-sorting activities.

This paper proposes a new methodology to evaluate the economic effect of state-specific policy changes, using bank-branching deregulations in the US as an example. The new method compares economic performance of pairs of contiguous counties separated by state borders, where on one side restrictions on statewide branching were removed relatively earlier, to create a natural “regression discontinuity” setup. The study uses a total of 285 pairs of contiguous counties along 38 segments of such regulation change borders to estimate treatment effects for 23 separate deregulation events taking place between 1975 and 1990. To distinguish real treatment effects from those created by data-snooping and spatial correlations, fictitious placebo deregulations are randomized (permutated) on another 32 segments of non-event borders to establish empirically a statistical table of critical values for the estimator. The method determines that statistically significant growth accelerations can be established at a extgreater 90% confidence level in five (and none prior to 1985) out of the 23 deregulation events examined. “Hinterland counties” within the still-regulated states, but farther away from the state borders, are used as a second control group to consider and reject the possibility that cross-border spillover of deregulation effects may invalidate the empirical design.

Why do corporate financing events occur in waves? We challenge recent evidence of the importance of valuation cycles in driving financing waves by documenting that the aggregate pattern of stock repurchases mirrors that of equity issuance and mergers, despite repurchases involving an opposite transaction. We then show that trends in financing decisions result from differing responses to the same economic stimulus: growth in GDP. Specifically, economic expansion reduces the cost of equity relative to the cost of debt, inducing firms to issue equity, and increases cash flow and also causes varying degrees of uncertainty, increasing stock repurchases. We document similar trends and provide similar motivation for merger waves.

We investigate issuers withdrawing an IPO (after security regulation filings) that return later for a successful offering. Venture capital backing and reputation of the lead underwriter are key factors in predicting successful return. The possibility of returning has a significant impact on the decision to withdraw and the pricing of offerings that succeed. Our sample of returning IPOs also provides a unique setting to investigate underwriter switching after a withdrawal but before a successful IPO. We find that switching occurs in response to poor bank performance and when switching firms “graduate” to banks that have high industry market shares.

This paper presents a new pattern in the cross-section of expected stock returns. Stocks tend to have relatively high (or low) returns every year in the same calendar month. We recognize the annual cross-sectional autocorrelation pattern documented in Jegadeesh [1990. Evidence of predictable behavior of security returns. Journal of Finance 45, 881–898] at lags of 12, 24, and 36 months as part of a general pattern that lasts up to 20 annual lags, superimposed on the general momentum/reversal patterns. This pattern explains an economically and statistically significant magnitude of the cross-sectional variation in average stock returns. Volume and volatility exhibit similar seasonal patterns but they do not explain the seasonality in returns. The pattern is independent of size, industry, earnings announcements, dividends, and fiscal year. The results are consistent with the existence of a persistent seasonal effect in stock returns.

This paper demonstrates that the cross-sectional variation of liquidity commonality has increased over the period 1963–2005. The divergence of systematic liquidity can be explained by patterns in institutional ownership over the sample period. We document that our findings are associated with similar patterns in systematic risk. Our analysis also indicates that the ability to diversify systematic risk and aggregate liquidity shocks by holding large-cap stocks has declined. The evidence suggests that the fragility of the US equity market to unanticipated events has increased over the past few decades.

What is good for a country may not be good for its big businesses, at least recently. More turnover in top businesses correlates with faster per capita gross domestic product, productivity, and capital growth; supporting Schumpeter's [1942. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, third ed., Harper & Bros., New York, NY] theory of “creative destruction”—innovative firms blooming as stagnant ones wither. These correlations are greater in more developed economies, supporting Aghion and Howitt's [1992. A model of growth through creative destruction. Econometrica 60, 323–351] thesis that creative destruction matters more to economies nearer the technological frontier. More big business turnover also correlates with smaller government, common law, less bank-dependence, stronger shareholder rights, and greater openness.

Models of adverse selection risk generally assume that market makers offset expected losses to informed traders with expected gains from the uninformed. We recognize that the expected loss captures a combination of two effects: (1) the probability that some traders have private information, and (2) the likely magnitude of that information. We use a maximum-likelihood approach to separately estimate the probability and magnitude of private information events for NYSE-listed stocks from 1993 through 2003. The results shed light on the price discovery process and have implications for many areas of finance.

Firms facing significant business risks have incentives to mitigate the costs of these risks by adjusting their capital structures. This paper investigates this link by analyzing the exposures of multinational firms to political risk. The evidence indicates that returns on investment in politically risky countries are more volatile than returns elsewhere. Multinational firms reduce their leverage in response to these political risks: a one standard deviation increase in foreign political risk is associated with 3.5% reduced leverage. The effect of foreign political risks on leverage is most pronounced for firms in industries whose returns are most susceptible to political influence.

We examine the effect of regime change on privatization. In the 2004 Indian election, the pro-reform BJP was unexpectedly defeated by a less reformist coalition. Stock prices of government-controlled companies that had been slated for privatization by the BJP dropped 3.5% relative to private firms. Government-controlled companies that were under study for possible privatization fell 7.5% relative to private firms. This is consistent with investor belief of a “point of no return,” where advanced reforms are more difficult to reverse. Further analysis suggests that layoffs, combined with the privatization announcement, served as a credible commitment to privatize.