Using data from Securities and Exchange Commission filings, I show that the typical bank loan is renegotiated five times, or every nine months. The pricing, maturity, amount, and covenants are all significantly modified during each renegotiation, whose timing is governed by the financial health of the contracting parties and uncertainty regarding the borrowers’ credit quality. The relative importance of these factors depends on the duration of the lending relationship. I interpret these results in light of financial contracting theories and emphasize that renegotiation is an important mechanism for dynamically completing contracts and for allocating control rights ex post.

We use a unique data set that contains information on more than 1,000 Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) around the world to investigate the degree to which executives delegate financial decisions and the circumstances that drive variation in delegation. Delegation does not appear to be monolithic; instead, our results show that it varies across corporate policies and also varies with the personal characteristics of the CEO. We find that CEOs delegate financial decisions for which they need the most input, when they are overloaded, and when they are distracted by recent acquisitions. CEOs delegate less when they are knowledgeable (long-tenured or with a finance background). Capital is allocated based on “gut feel” and the personal reputation of the manager running a given division. Finally, corporate politics and corporate socialism affect capital allocation in European and Asian firms.

Unregulated US corporations dramatically increased their debt usage over the past century. Aggregate leverage—low and stable before 1945—more than tripled between 1945 and 1970 from 11% to 35%, eventually reaching 47% by the early 1990s. The median firm in 1946 had no debt, but by 1970 had a leverage ratio of 31%. This increase occurred in all unregulated industries and affected firms of all sizes. Changing firm characteristics are unable to account for this increase. Rather, changes in government borrowing, macroeconomic uncertainty, and financial sector development play a more prominent role. Despite this increase among unregulated firms, a combination of stable debt usage among regulated firms and a decrease in the fraction of aggregate assets held by regulated firms over this period resulted in a relatively stable economy-wide leverage ratio during the 20th century.

A five-factor model directed at capturing the size, value, profitability, and investment patterns in average stock returns performs better than the three-factor model of Fama and French (FF, 1993). The five-factor model׳s main problem is its failure to capture the low average returns on small stocks whose returns behave like those of firms that invest a lot despite low profitability. The model׳s performance is not sensitive to the way its factors are defined. With the addition of profitability and investment factors, the value factor of the FF three-factor model becomes redundant for describing average returns in the sample we examine.

Variables with strong marginal explanatory power in cross-section asset pricing regressions typically show less power to produce increments to average portfolio returns, for two reasons. (1) Adding an explanatory variable can attenuate the slopes in a regression. (2) Adding a variable with marginal explanatory power always attenuates the values of other explanatory variables in the extremes of a regression’s fitted values. Without a restriction on portfolio weights, the maximum Sharpe ratios in the GRS statistic of Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989) provide little information about an incremental variable’s impact on the portfolio opportunity set.

We provide new evidence on the empirical determinants of intertemporal financial decisions. We use an exogenously imposed choice affecting nearly all Croatian retirees to study characteristics associated with choosing a larger, deferred stream of payments over a smaller, more immediate payment. Individuals are more willing to defer if they have higher incomes and are not liquidity constrained, have a longer time horizon because of better health and longer life expectancy, and have stronger bequest motives. Individuals who expect currency devaluation or political risk to reduce the value of future income are more likely to take the earlier income stream.

We find strong evidence that three key dimensions of national culture (trust, hierarchy, and individualism) affect merger volume and synergy gains. The volume of cross-border mergers is lower when countries are more culturally distant. In addition, greater cultural distance in trust and individualism leads to lower combined announcement returns. These findings are robust to year and country-level fixed effects, time-varying country-pair and deal-level variables, as well as instrumental variables for cultural differences based on genetic and somatic differences. The results are the first large-scale evidence that cultural differences have substantial impacts on multiple aspects of cross-border mergers.

We provide a tractable model of firm-level expected holding period returns using two firm fundamentals—book-to-market ratio and return on equity—and study the cross-sectional properties of the model-implied expected returns. We find that firm-level expected returns and expected profitability are time-varying but highly persistent and that forecasts of holding period returns strongly predict the cross section of future returns up to three years ahead. We show a highly significant predictive pooled regression slope for future quarterly returns of 0.86. The popular factor-based expected return models have either an insignificant or a significantly negative association with future returns. In supplemental analyses, we show that these forecasts are also informative of the time series variation in aggregate conditions. For a representative firm, the slope of the conditional expected return curve is more positive in good times, when expected short-run returns are relatively low, and the model-implied forecaster of aggregate returns exhibits modest predictive ability. Collectively, we provide a simple, theoretically motivated, and practically useful approach to estimating multi-period-ahead expected returns.