Knowledge that Transforms

Traditional theory suggests that higher bank profitability (or franchise value) dissuades bank risk-taking. We highlight an opposite effect: higher profitability loosens bank borrowing constraints. This enables profitable banks to take risk on a larger scale, inducing risk-taking. This effect is more pronounced when bank leverage constraints are looser, or when new investments can be financed with senior funding (such as repos). The model’s predictions are consistent with some notable cross-sectional patterns of bank risk-taking in the run-up to the 2008 crisis.

I document that floating-rate loans from banks, particularly important for bank-dependent firms, drive most variation in firms’ exposure to interest rates. I argue that banks prefer to supply floating-rate loans, due to their finite ability to transform short-duration deposit liabilities into long duration assets. Three key findings support this argument: banks with more floating-rate liabilities make more floating-rate loans, hold more floating-rate securities, and quote lower prices for floating-rate loans. Intermediary funding structures therefore help determine what types of contracts non-financial firms use. Banks transmit rising policy rates to firms by contractually raising interest rates on existing loans, not just by reducing the supply of new loans.

I provide novel evidence on the real costs of political interference in bank lending. Analyzing staggered state elections in India, I show that politically motivated increased bank lending to farmers before elections crowds out lending to manufacturing firms. These lending distortions are larger where farmers have more political weight and where incumbents have more influence over banks. Reduced bank credit forces manufacturing firms to cut production and operate at lower factor utilization. I also provide evidence suggesting politically motivated increased agricultural lending before state elections contributed towards excessive indebtedness of farmers and a subsequent costly bailout in 2008.

We analyze the impact of dealer regulation on price quality (informativeness and volatility) and its implications for the welfare of market participants. We argue that although price informativeness, volatility, and the dealer’s profitability all deteriorate, against conventional wisdom, other market participants are better off due to the dealer’s risk-shifting motive. A static model is used to clarify the main intuition, and the robustness of the welfare results, as well as the fragility of the conventional wisdom about price quality, are discussed by incorporating dynamics and endogenizing information acquisition.

We study how a bank allocates capital across its business units when facing multiple constraints over several periods. If a constraint tightens – be it because of stricter regulation or higher risk – capital flows to the more efficient unit, i.e. the unit offering a higher marginal return on required capital. Relative efficiency helps explain how a policy measure targeting a specific business unit – e.g. imposing requirements for market risk, or ring-fencing lending – spills over to another, seemingly unrelated unit. It also helps explain the bank’s response to the tightening of a constraint that is contemporaneously slack but likely to bind later on.

We show that local banks provide corporate recovery lending to firms affected by adverse regional macro shocks. Banks that reside in counties unaffected by the natural disaster that we specify as macro shock increase lending to firms inside affected counties by 3%. Firms domiciled in flooded counties, in turn, increase corporate borrowing by 16% if they are connected to banks in unaffected counties. We find no indication that recovery lending entails excessive risk-taking or rent-seeking. However, within the group of shock-exposed banks, those without access to geographically more diversified interbank markets exhibit more credit risk and less equity capital.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effectiveness of two macroprudential policies in Colombia: marginal reserve requirements and dynamic provisions. The first measure was implemented to control excessive credit growth, while the latter was designed to increase systemic resilience by establishing a countercyclical buffer through loan loss provision requirements. To perform this analysis, a rich dataset based on loan-by-loan information for Colombian banks during the 2006–2009 period is used. Our identification strategy closely follows Khwaja & Mian (2008), so that only those observations with multiple banking relations are considered. Estimations are performed applying firm and firm-time fixed effects to control for demand factors, thus appropriately isolating loan demand from credit supply. Results from the econometric model suggest that dynamic provisions, the countercyclical reserve requirement and an aggregate measure of the macroprudential policy stance had a negative effect on credit growth, which varies according to bank and debtor-specific characteristics. Particularly, effects are intensified for riskier debtors, suggesting that the aggregate macroprudential policy stance in Colombia has worked effectively to stabilize credit cycles and reduce risk-taking.

This paper investigates the information spillover effect of government bailouts. Analyzing money market funds’ dynamic enrollment status in the U.S. Treasury Temporary Guarantee Program in 2008, this paper finds that enrolled funds had overall positive fund flows, implying that the stability effect of bailouts outweighed the negative stigma effect. However, the already-enrolled funds experienced a relative reduction in fund flows after investors learned their funds had enrolled earlier than other peer funds (i.e., stigma effect). I address the endogeneity issue of funds’ enrollment status based on an instrumental variable approach. Overall, results show that investors extract useful information about financial institutions’ underlying stability from their demand for bailouts.

Theory suggests that government aid to banks may either reduce or increase systemic risk. We are the first to address this issue empirically, analyzing the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). Analysis suggests that TARP significantly reduced contributions to systemic risk, particularly for larger and safer banks, and those in better local economies. This occurred primarily through a capital cushion channel that reduced market leverage by increasing the value of common equity. Results are robust to endogeneity and selection bias checks. Findings yield policy conclusions about whether to aid banks, the best targets for future assistance, and short-term versus long-term effects.