Knowledge that Transforms

We make use of rich U.S. data to show that debt overhang significantly reduces firm asset-, capex-, and employee-growth. We show these contractions are likely driven by firm decisions as opposed to the result of credit constraints or changes in investment opportunities. Our measure of overhang – liabilities to cash flow — aligns with traditional theory and focuses on the importance of a firm’s debt servicing capacity. It further allows us to capitalize on the COVID-19 shock as a quasi-natural experiment to confirm the impact of overhang on firm investment and growth.

We describe the dimensions along which bank technologies differ from fintech competitors and construct a novel measure of a bank’s technology based upon its overlap with fintech firms in terms of granular product installation data. A one standard deviation increase in our financial technology measure is associated with an 8.3 percentage point increase in Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans in 2020Q2. We show that smaller banks benefited more from marginal technology gains, that technology facilitated out-of-area lending, and that technology complemented small banks’ branch-based in-area lending. In a difference-in-differences analysis, we show an outsized increase in small business lending growth in 2020 for high tech small banks relative to their peers.

This paper provides the first study on how management structure influences hedge fund performance and risk. We document that hedge funds less tied to traditional assets often choose solo management structures. Solo-managed funds outperform team-managed funds, exhibit better skills in market return, volatility, and crisis timing, and demonstrate greater activity in beta management, but have higher idiosyncratic and tail risks. They are also less likely to be liquidated, with fund flows less performance sensitive. Using a sample of switched funds, we find that fund performance, assets, and risk correlate with the management structure switching decision.

Theoretically, one rationale for central clearing counterparties is the mitigation of inefficiencies associated with distressed asset sales. With novel archival data, I empirically study the first event in economic history during which a CCP successfully played this role: the global wool crisis of 1900. In the leading wool futures market in France, an inefficient equilibrium with fire sales and cascading defaults could be avoided due to price support provided by surviving CCP members. Cooperation to achieve price support–which is nowadays the main element of CCP auctions–could arise due to family relationships and cultural proximity between traders.

We develop a model in which there are firms and employees who care about profit-sacrificing higher purpose (HP) and those who do not. Firms and employees search for each other in the labor market. Each firm chooses its HP investment. When there is no social pressure on firms to adopt a purpose, HP dissipates agency frictions, lowers wage costs, yet elicits higher employee effort in firms that intrinsically value the purpose. However, social pressure to invest in HP can distort the HP investments of all firms and reduce welfare by making all agents worse off. Applications of these results to banking are discussed.

This study investigates the role of asymmetric information for the pricing, issuance volume, and design of innovative securities. By analyzing the information that structured product issuers provide to the investors of those products, we can identify specific sources of asymmetric information between the issuers and investors in this market. We show that issuers exploit this information friction to offer products to investors that appear more profitable for the issuer. In addition, we find that the friction induces issuers to design products with higher information asymmetry. Our results suggest that product issuers’ behavior increases information frictions in the financial system.

We present a model in which intermediaries create liquidity by issuing safe debt. Two types of intermediaries emerge: Traditional banks that create liquidity by issuing equity and holding assets to maturity, and market-based intermediaries that create liquidity by selling assets in fire sales in downturns. We show that the reliance on market-based intermediation is necessarily too high, but liquidity creation is not. It can also be too low as the endogenous fire-sale risk can push liquidity creation below its optimum. We argue that standard capital or liquidity regulation are ineffective, and optimal macroprudential regulation should instead target market-based intermediation.

We study restructuring solutions to the debt overhang problem faced by banks with a deteriorated loan portfolio in the presence of asymmetric information on loan quality. Classical liability restructuring solutions fail to work because banks can overstate the severity of their bad loan problem to obtain additional concessions from existing creditors. A sufficiently large loan sale requirement to the restructuring banks discourages such an opportunistic behavior, so a suitably chosen menu of loan sales cum liability restructuring is able to solve the debt overhang. We discuss the implementation of such a solution for banks funded with insured deposits through loan sales to outside investors supported by an asset protection scheme sponsored by the deposit insurance fund.

We review the literature on financial intermediation in the process by which new medical therapeutics are financed, developed, and delivered. We discuss the contributing factors that lead to a key finding in the literature—underinvestment in biomedical R&D—and focus on the role that banks and other intermediaries can play in financing biomedical R&D and potentially closing this funding gap. We conclude with a discussion of the role of financial intermediation in the delivery of healthcare to patients.

Using unique administrative data on firm-to-firm payments and bank-to-firm lending, we investigate how lending to a firm is affected by same-bank lending to the firm's customers and suppliers. We show that the supply of loans to a firm increases when the firm's customers have loans from the same bank. We also find that negative information about a firm's top customer causes banks to tighten the loan supply to the firm, and particularly more so when the firm's sales are concentrated on this customer. These results suggest that lending to firms connected through the supply chain conveys valuable information to banks.