Knowledge that Transforms

What are the causes and consequences of commonality in liquidity? We examine this issue using a model of liquidity trading in which liquidity shocks are decomposed into common (systematic) and idiosyncratic components. We show that common liquidity shocks do not give rise to commonality in trading volume. Indeed, trading volume is independent of systematic liquidity risk, and this risk is always priced irrespective of market liquidity. In contrast, idiosyncratic liquidity shocks create liquidity demand and volume, and investors can diversify their risk by trading. Hence, pricing of the risk of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks depends on market liquidity, with idiosyncratic liquidity risk being fully priced only in perfectly illiquid markets. While trading volume increases with the variance of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, price volatility increases with the variance of both idiosyncratic and systematic liquidity shocks. Surprisingly, our results are largely independent of the number of different securities traded in the market. When asset returns are uncorrelated, there is no transmission of liquidity across assets even when investors experience common liquidity shocks, suggesting that such liquidity shocks may not be the source of commonality in liquidity across assets detected in the literature. However, under limited conditions, more liquid securities can act as substitutes for less liquid securities. Overall, our findings suggest that common factors in liquidity may be the outcome of covariation in investor heterogeneity (e.g., as measured by co-movements in the volatility of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks) rather than of common liquidity shocks. Moreover, we find that different liquidity proxies measure different things, which has implications for future empirical analysis.

When potential bidders for a target firm are heterogeneous, standard auction methods for selling the firm are not optimal, as they treat the bidders symmetrically. In a two-bidder contest, one way to discriminate against the stronger bidder is to impose an order of moves. A simple “matching auction” can achieve this objective, in which the “strong” bidder is asked to make a first and final offer, and the other bidder is asked to match this bid. We consider two sources of bidder heterogeneity in a common-value setting: differences in initial toeholds, and asymmetric effects of the bidders' private signals on value. The matching auction results in a higher expected selling price than the standard auctions when the asymmetry is sufficiently large. Other properties of the matching auction are discussed.

Only recently the debate on bank capital regulation has devoted specific attention to the role that bank loan loss provisions can play as a part of the overall capital regulatory framework. This paper contributes to the ongoing debate by demonstrating empirically that loan loss provisioning needs to be an integral component of capital regulation. We find empirical evidence that many banks around the world delay provisioning for bad loans until too late, when cyclical downturns have already set in, thereby magnifying the impact of the economic cycle on banks' income and capital.

We present an empirical model of firm behavior in the presence of switching costs. Customers' transition probabilities, embedded in firms' value maximization, are used in a multiperiod model to derive estimable equations of a first-order condition, market share (demand), and supply equations. The novelty of the model is in its ability to extract information on both the magnitude and significance of switching costs, as well as on customers' transition probabilities, from conventionally available highly aggregated data which do not contain customer-specific information. As a matter of illustration, the model is applied to a panel data of banks, to assess the switching costs in the market for bank loans. The point estimate of the average switching cost is 4.1%, about one-third of the market average interest rate on loans. More than a quarter of the customer's added value is attributed to the lock-in phenomenon generated by these switching costs. About a third of the average bank's market share is due to its established bank–borrower relationship.

I demonstrate that ratings-based capital rules, including both the current Basel Accord and its proposed revision, can be reconciled with the general class of credit value-at-risk models. Each exposure's contribution to VaR is portfolio-invariant only if (a) dependence across exposures is driven by a single systematic risk factor, and (b) no exposure accounts for more than an arbitrarily small share of total portfolio exposure. Analysis of rates of convergence to asymptotic VaR leads to a simple and accurate portfolio-level add-on charge for undiversified idiosyncratic risk. There is no similarly simple way to address violation of the single factor assumption.

This paper investigates close bank–firm relations (keiretsu) among troubled Japanese firms by examining the type of bankruptcy. In Japan, creditors control the fate of the bankrupt firm, which may be costly if managers destroy firm value to avoid bankruptcy or, alternatively, if creditors liquidate too often. Recently, researchers have argued that keiretsu banks prop up weak firms that should fail. We find that bankrupt firms affiliated with keiretsu banks are neither subject to excessive liquidation by overly powerful banks nor slower to be liquidated. Keiretsu banks liquidate via the courts often, perhaps to avoid political repercussions and organized crime.

As no rational agent would be willing to take part in the last round in a finite economy, it is difficult to design Ponzi schemes that are certain to explode. This paper argues that if agents correctly believe in the possibility of a partial bailout when a gigantic Ponzi scheme collapses, and they recognize that a bailout is tantamount to a redistribution of wealth from non-participants to participants, it may be rational for agents to participate, even if they know that it is the last round. We model a political economy where an unscrupulous profit-maximizing promoter can design gigantic Ponzi schemes to cynically exploit this “too big to fail” doctrine. We point to the fact that some of the spectacular Ponzi schemes in history occurred at times where and when such political economies existed—France (1719), Britain (1720), Russia (1994), and Albania (1997).

We investigate the effects of technological change, deregulation, and dynamic changes in competition on the performance of US banks. Our most striking result is that during 1991–1997, cost productivity worsened while profit productivity improved substantially, particularly for banks engaging in mergers. The data are consistent with the hypothesis that banks tried to maximize profits by raising revenues as well as reducing costs. Banks appeared to provide additional or higher quality services that raised costs but also raised revenues by more than the cost increases. The results suggest that methods that exclude revenues when assessing performance may be misleading.

This paper investigates the hedge ratio dynamics for large US banks with exposure to both interest rate and foreign exchange risks. Using a mean–variance framework, the paper evaluates hedging performance when interest rate and foreign exchange risks are hedged separately versus simultaneously. Optimal hedge ratios for separate and simultaneous hedging strategies are estimated using the multivariate GARCH model. The magnitude of separate hedge ratios is found to consistently overstate that of simultaneous hedge ratios for banks that engage in both domestic loan extensions and foreign exchange operations. Both in-sample and out-of-sample results indicate that a simultaneous hedging strategy outperforms a separate hedging strategy. The mean–variance efficiency test results strongly support statistical significance to this finding.