Knowledge that Transforms

The poor performance of credit ratings of structured finance products in the financial crisis has prompted investigation into the role of credit rating agencies (CRAs) in designing and marketing these products. We analyze a two-period reputation model in which a CRA both designs and rates securities that are sold both to investors who are constrained to purchase highly rated securities and investors who are unconstrained. Assets are pooled and senior and junior tranches are issued with a waterfall structure. When the rating constraint is lax, the CRA will include only risky assets in the securitization pool, serving both types of investors without any rating inflation. Rating inflation is decreasing in the tightness of the rating constraint locally. But rating inflation may be non-monotonic in the rating constraint globally, with no rating inflation when the constraint is lax or tight.

This paper summarises the results of a joint research project by five central banks in Latin America countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) to evaluate the effectiveness of macroprudential tools and their interaction with monetary policy. Using meta-analysis techniques, we summarise the results of a common empirical framework based on confidential bank-loan data. The main conclusions are that (i) macroprudential policies have been quite effective in stabilising credit cycles. The propagation of the effects to credit growth is more rapid for policies aimed at curbing the cycle than for policies aimed at fostering resilience; and (ii) macroprudential tools have a greater effect on credit growth when reinforced by the use of monetary policy.

We investigate the importance of firm-bank relationships for the international transmission of bank distress to the real economy. Using a large panel of matched financial statements of firms of all sizes and their relationship banks in Germany, we find that banks with losses from proprietary trading activities during the 2007/8 financial crisis decreased their lending, and that their firm customers responded by reducing real investment and employment. We document how different types of firms partially offset reduced credit supply by resorting to alternative financing sources.

This paper examines the effect of a regulatory action (the Home Valuation Code of Conduct) that was designed to reduce the incidence of inflated collateral valuations. We identify the impact of the regulation using a difference-in-difference identification strategy. Our baseline results confirm that the regulation reduced inflated valuations in refinance transactions by 16% in the large lender sample, compared to small lenders and a placebo sample. The effect is most significant in low-liquidity and low-distress markets, but not in other markets. We find that the regulation had a significant impact on loan to value ratio and interest rate, and it also led to a significant increase in defaults but a decrease in prepayments.

Traditional theory suggests that higher bank profitability (or franchise value) dissuades bank risk-taking. We highlight an opposite effect: higher profitability loosens bank borrowing constraints. This enables profitable banks to take risk on a larger scale, inducing risk-taking. This effect is more pronounced when bank leverage constraints are looser, or when new investments can be financed with senior funding (such as repos). The model’s predictions are consistent with some notable cross-sectional patterns of bank risk-taking in the run-up to the 2008 crisis.

I document that floating-rate loans from banks, particularly important for bank-dependent firms, drive most variation in firms’ exposure to interest rates. I argue that banks prefer to supply floating-rate loans, due to their finite ability to transform short-duration deposit liabilities into long duration assets. Three key findings support this argument: banks with more floating-rate liabilities make more floating-rate loans, hold more floating-rate securities, and quote lower prices for floating-rate loans. Intermediary funding structures therefore help determine what types of contracts non-financial firms use. Banks transmit rising policy rates to firms by contractually raising interest rates on existing loans, not just by reducing the supply of new loans.

I provide novel evidence on the real costs of political interference in bank lending. Analyzing staggered state elections in India, I show that politically motivated increased bank lending to farmers before elections crowds out lending to manufacturing firms. These lending distortions are larger where farmers have more political weight and where incumbents have more influence over banks. Reduced bank credit forces manufacturing firms to cut production and operate at lower factor utilization. I also provide evidence suggesting politically motivated increased agricultural lending before state elections contributed towards excessive indebtedness of farmers and a subsequent costly bailout in 2008.

We analyze the impact of dealer regulation on price quality (informativeness and volatility) and its implications for the welfare of market participants. We argue that although price informativeness, volatility, and the dealer’s profitability all deteriorate, against conventional wisdom, other market participants are better off due to the dealer’s risk-shifting motive. A static model is used to clarify the main intuition, and the robustness of the welfare results, as well as the fragility of the conventional wisdom about price quality, are discussed by incorporating dynamics and endogenizing information acquisition.

We study the efficiency of banking regulation under financial integration. Banks freely choose the jurisdiction where to locate their activities and have private information about their efficiency level. Regulators non-cooperatively offer any regulatory contract that satisfies information and participation constraints of banks. We show that the unique Nash equilibrium of the regulatory game is a simple pooling contract: financial integration is characterized by the inability for regulators to discriminate between banks with different efficiency levels. This result is driven by the endogenous restriction caused by regulatory arbitrage on the capacity of regulators to use several regulatory instruments.