Knowledge that Transforms

Using unique administrative data on firm-to-firm payments and bank-to-firm lending, we investigate how lending to a firm is affected by same-bank lending to the firm's customers and suppliers. We show that the supply of loans to a firm increases when the firm's customers have loans from the same bank. We also find that negative information about a firm's top customer causes banks to tighten the loan supply to the firm, and particularly more so when the firm's sales are concentrated on this customer. These results suggest that lending to firms connected through the supply chain conveys valuable information to banks.

In 1936–37, the Federal Reserve doubled member banks’ reserve requirements. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) famously argued that the doubling increased reserve demand and forced the money supply to contract, which they argued caused the recession of 1937–38. Using a new database on individual banks, we find that higher reserve requirements did not generally increase banks’ reserve demand or contract lending because reserve requirements were not binding for most banks. Aggregate effects on credit supply from reserve requirement increases were therefore economically small and statistically zero.

We address whether politics played important roles in allocating Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) bailout funds, and whether PPP allocations effectively bailed out small businesses vs. banks. Our econometric evidence suggests that politicians/other government agents at national and local levels effectively steered PPP funds toward small businesses and banks based on their locations to try to influence election outcomes. We also uncover evidence that some PPP funds were effectively allocated by lobbying efforts of certain banks. Findings are confirmed by a novel mediation analysis and numerous robustness checks. We also find banks profited from PPP through multiple channels, adding to extant findings, and suggesting that PPP may have effectively bailed out banks as well as small businesses, but through different political influences.

The Jobs Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 cut the top dividend tax rate in the U.S. by more than half, yet numerous studies of nonfinancial firms have failed to detect the expected supply-side stimulus to capital investment. We test the impact of this tax cut on U.S. commercial banks and find that bank lending responded differently, conditional on banks’ access to external capital as well as their reliance on internal liquidity. Our heterogeneous results include support for all three branches of dividend tax theory. Loan growth increased the most at publicly traded banks with relatively illiquid balance sheets and increased by the least (or not at all) at untraded banks with relatively liquid balance sheets. Consistent with previous studies, we find increased dividend payouts at all subsets of banks. We conjecture that the effectively short maturities of bank loan contracts made banks better able to respond positively to this tax cut and provide some suggestive evidence in support of this conjecture.

Increasing the cost associated with gathering information can hamper the monitoring activity of the market even when information remains public. Using the 2015 US money market funds (MMFs) reform as a quasi-natural experiment, I find a positive effect of removing information requirements over credit ratings on the allocation by MMFs toward securities rated as second tier. The effect is driven by monitored MMFs catering to retail investors and by monitored MMFs that do not voluntarily report credit ratings after the reform. The verfied increase in the relative demand by MMFs for second tier securities is associated with a decrease in the spread paid at issuance by second tier commercial paper.

We document several gender differences in reward-based crowdfunding by analyzing a large sample of Kickstarter campaigns. We argue that these differences are most plausibly explained by male entrepreneurs’ relative over-optimism. Suggesting a tendency to overestimate the demand for their products, we find that male entrepreneurs set higher goal amounts, resulting in more frequent campaign failures. In successive campaigns, male entrepreneurs’ goal amounts and success rates converge toward those of female entrepreneurs, consistent with entrepreneurial experience mitigating the behavioral bias. Our findings suggest that entrepreneurs learn from experience, and that female first-time entrepreneurs may have more realistic expectations of the demand for their products, increasing their success rates in crowdfunding. Moreover, although serial entrepreneurs exhibit better performance already in their first campaigns, they still improve over successive campaigns, further highlighting the importance of entrepreneurial learning.

Relying on confidential supervisory data related to the 2016 EU-wide stress test, this paper presents novel empirical evidence that supervisory scrutiny associated to stress testing has a disciplining effect on bank risk. We find that banks that participated in the 2016 EU-wide stress test subsequently reduced their credit risk relative to banks that were not part of this exercise. Relying on new metrics for supervisory scrutiny that measure the quantity, potential impact, and duration of interactions between banks and supervisors during the stress test, we find that the disciplining effect is stronger for banks subject to more intrusive supervisory scrutiny during the exercise. We also find that a strong risk management culture is a prerequisite for the supervisory scrutiny to be effective. Finally, we show that a similar disciplining effect is not exerted neither by higher capital charges nor by more transparency and related market discipline induced by the stress test.

Prime brokers play an important role in intermediating arbitrage capital to hedge funds. A fund’s peer-group ranking, relative to funds that share the same prime broker, significantly affects how investors respond to its past performance. I decompose the standard performance-flow relationship into two components: (1) flows that respond to overall performance rank, and (2) flows that respond to relative (within prime broker) performance rank. Strong relative rank drives fund in-flows, while poor overall rank drives out-flows. These results suggest that prime brokers intermediate about 40% of the standard performance-flow relationship.

Banks engage in maturity transformation and the term premium compensates them for bearing the associated interest rate risk. Consistent with this view, I show that banks’ net interest margins and term premia have comoved in the United States over the last decades. On monetary policy announcement days, bank equity falls more sharply than nonbank equity following an increase in expected future short-term rates, but also responds more positively if term premia increase. These effects are reflected in bank cash-flows and amplified for banks with a larger maturity mismatch. The results reveal that banks are not immune to interest rate risk.

We use Call Report data to examine the effects of the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) and the PPP Liquidity Facility (PPPLF) on small business and farm lending by individual commercial banks. As program participation was associated with small business lending, we adopt an instrumental variables approach to identify causal implications based on historical bank relationships with the Small Business Administration and the Federal Reserve’s discount window. Our results indicate that both programs encouraged lending growth over the first half of 2020. However, while the PPP encouraged greater lending across all banks, only small and medium-sized bank lending growth was significantly related to participation in the PPPLF.