Knowledge that Transforms

We examine the effect of credit default swaps (CDSs) on debt specialization. We argue that reference firms in CDS contracts, seeking to minimize creditor conflicts and bankruptcy costs, exhibit higher debt concentration than firms on which no CDSs are traded. Our results show that firms engage in greater debt specialization and are more likely to specialize following the inception of CDS trading. Additionally, we find that, while lender concentration in firms increases, the number of bank lenders drops, lead arranger share rises, and the probability that lead arrangers and lenders are repeated increases following the onset of CDS trading. Our results are robust to instrumental variable estimation, propensity-score matching, different model specifications, and different subsamples.

This paper documents the agency costs resulting from the deeper tranching of subprime residential mortgage pools. Mortgage servicers are less likely to renegotiate delinquent loans collateralizing a greater number and variety of tranches. We find that an interquartile increase in tranching reduces mortgage servicers’ probability of loan renegotiation by 14% relative to the mean. This effect is concentrated in mortgages with greater ambiguity surrounding the loan value maximizing action. Overall, our results support the notion that tranching worsens agency frictions by increasing coordination costs among investors and impeding their monitoring of the agent.

We assemble a unique dataset containing population-level information on loan applications in a region hosting two cultural groups to study the role of culture in firm borrowing decisions. We find that firms are more likely to apply for loans from culturally close banks. This effect is stronger for opaque firms, but not for less performing firms, indicating that firms do not expect preferential treatment from same-culture banks. Loan applications to culturally distant banks increase sharply with firms’ size and age, suggesting a role of information asymmetry in firm-bank matching. In contrast, we find no effect of cultural proximity on loan supply. Overall, our results show that demand-side factors play a key role in the formation of same-culture lending relationships.

This paper demonstrates, theoretically and empirically, that firms’ research and development (R&D) efforts and investors’ analyses of their prospects are mutually reinforcing. Entrepreneurs attempt more research when financiers are better informed about projects’ profitability because they expect financiers to provide more funding to successful projects. Conversely, financiers collect more information about projects when entrepreneurs undertake more R&D because the opportunity cost of missing out on successful projects is then higher. Two natural experiments confirm that this interaction occurs and suggest that it contributes to about one third of the total effect of a policy designed to stimulate R&D. Overall, the analysis suggests that policies aimed at promoting R&D – such as research subsidies or tax breaks – have a multiplier effect owing to the induced improvement in capital efficiency. As a result, those policies can be rendered more effective by coupling them with other policies designed to increase capital efficiency. The feedback effect that we document also helps explaining why innovative ecosystems such as that in the Silicon Valley are challenging to set up.

Excessively easy bank credit – visible in unusually small credit risk spreads and rapid loan growth – is often posited as a root cause of unsustainable asset price booms. This paper considers whether an increase in bank risk tolerance drove high loan growth that coincided with Florida's land boom of the mid-1920s, the first Florida housing boom in which buyers from around the nation participated. Estimates suggest that an astounding 20 million lots were offered for sale in Florida at that time. Our detailed narrative and empirical evidence suggest that the facts do not require the assumption of increased risk appetite during the boom. We find that most Florida banks that failed were associated with the Manley-Anthony chain and did not exhibit increases in observable indicators of risk during the boom. Instead, their increases in risk mainly reflected hidden choices either to lend to bank insiders on a preferential basis or to fund other banks that were engaged in such risky and often fraudulent activities. Bank regulators seem to have been complicit in the hidden risk-taking. Even informed investors would have been left in the dark about the amount of risk that was growing in Florida.

In China's credit markets with financial repression, state-controlled non-financial firms (SOEs) are privileged in gaining access to bank credit, while non-SOEs, especially those small- and medium-sized firms, are disadvantaged. Corporate re-lending emerges as a response wherein the former secure bank loans and then re-lend to the latter. We document the characteristics of inter-corporate loans from a sample of legal cases. We employ four empirical strategies to conduct a forensic study of re-lending by detecting abnormal relations between financial accounts of listed firms. State-controlled companies conduct more re-lending, and firms with better growth opportunities, stronger corporate governance, and more financial constraints engage less. We compare re-lending with entrusted loans and find that firms extending nonaffiliated entrusted loans conduct re-lending actively, while firms offering affiliated entrusted loans do not. We also compare inter-corporate loans with micro-credit company loans in a review of legal cases.

Using hand-collected data on corporate bond and stock offerings, we identify the impact of government debt on corporate financing during World War I. The early twentieth century provides a unique opportunity to identify the impact of government debt on private financing because during this period (1) firms announced the amount they wanted to raise before each security offering and (2) the Treasury issued debt in discrete intervals. We identify the impact of Treasury issues by comparing differences in the amount firms offered to the amount they actually raised when the Treasury was borrowing to when the Treasury was not in the market. We find that long-term government bond offerings negatively affect both amount of long-term corporate bonds and dividend paying stocks issued. In contrast, we find no effect on short-term debt issue. Our findings suggest that investors view stable dividend paying stocks a close substitute for relatively safe long-term bonds.

After an unprecedented number of banks suspended operations in the during Panic of 1893, the head regulator of banks chartered by the United States government allowed about 100 banks to reopen after certifying their solvency. We evaluate whether actions by bank owners to change management, contract with depositors to extend liability maturity structure, write off bad assets, and/or inject capital affected bank survival and deposit retention. This historical episode is particularly informative because there was no expectation of government intervention. We find that contracting with depositors provided short-term benefits while dealing with bad assets was key for long-run viability.

We study the effect on credit relationships of the Small and Medium Enterprises Supporting Factor (SME-SF), a regulatory risk weight reduction on small loans to SMEs. Employing a regression discontinuity design and matched bank-firm data from Italy, we find that a 1 percent drop in capital requirements causes an average 13 basis points reduction in the cost of credit. Moreover, with a novel measure of bank regulatory capital scarcity, we show that the drop is larger for banks facing tighter constraints. Furthermore, the drop is larger for firms with low switching costs, while the sharp assignment rule may have led to the rationing of marginal borrowers. Such findings indicate that the entire distribution of firms and banks’ characteristics plays a crucial role in determining the impact of regulatory capital changes.

Can fintech close the gender gap in access to financial services? Using novel survey data for 28 countries, this paper finds a large and ubiquitous ‘fintech gender gap’: while 29% of men use fintech products, only 21% of women do. This difference exceeds the gender gap in bank account ownership at traditional financial institutions. While country characteristics and individual-level controls explain about a third of the fintech gender gap, the residual gap declines by 60% when accounting for gender differences in the willingness to use new financial technology, the suitability of fintech products, and the willingness to use fintech entrants if they offer cheaper products. The paper concludes by discussing drivers of differences in attitudes and implications for policy to foster financial inclusion with new technology.