This paper studies the use of cash and credit for making transactions when there is asymmetric information in credit markets. For relatively low inflation rates, equilibria are of the pooling variety and low-credit-risk consumers signal their riskiness to lenders only indirectly by establishing a good track record in credit markets. For higher inflation rates there may exist a separating equilibrium in which low-credit-risk consumers directly signal their type to lenders by specializing in cash early in life and specializing in credit later in life. The greater the degree of adverse selection in credit markets, the wider the range of inflation rates for which a separating equilibrium exists. Credit usage is increasing in the inflation rate, but greater adverse selection may increase or decrease credit usage depending on the parameterization. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: E44.

We compare institutional execution costs across the major U.S. exchanges using a sample of institutional equity orders in firms that switch exchanges. Execution costs including commissions are essentially indistinguishable across these exchanges. We also find the fraction of trading volume from momentum traders is greater on the NYSE than either the Nasdaq or AMEX and that orders are more likely to be worked by an institution's trading desk on the NYSE than on the Nasdaq. These results suggest that institutions actively manage execution strategies, taking into account characteristics of the markets in which they trade.

We consider risk-neutral firms that must obtain external finance. They have access to two kinds of stochastic investment opportunities. For one, return realizations are costlessly observed by all agents. For the other, return realizations are costlessly observed only by the investing firm. We examine the optimal allocation of investment between the two projects and the optimal contract used to finance it. The optimal contractual outcome can be supported by appropriate (and determinate) quantities of debt and equity issues. Investments in projects with CSV problems are associated loosely with debt. Investments in projects with observable returns are associated with equity. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G21, E51.

This paper considers a standard monetary economy with indivisible primary assets and transaction costs. When assets are indivisible, if a steady-state equilibrium with positive savings exists, there necessarily exists a very large set of equilibria. The intermediation of indivisible assets substantially reduces the set of competitive equilibria, and enhances the "flexibility" of prices. We state sufficient conditions for intermediaries to form and hold all primary assets directly. We define and analyze various measures of the consumer surplus created by intermediaries. We show that conventional measures of intermediary output bear no obvious relation to the consumer surplus created by intermediation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E40, G20.

We investigate the determinants of multiple-bank relationships using a new data set comprising 1079 firms across 20 European countries. We document large cross-country variation in the average number of bank relationships per firm, uncovering a richness in European financial systems that extends beyond the standard description of being “bank-dominated”. After controlling for a variety of firm-specific characteristics, we find that firms maintain more bank relationships, on average, in countries with inefficient judicial systems and poor enforcement of creditor rights. Firms also maintain more relationships in countries with unconcentrated but stable banking systems and active public bond markets. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G21, C41.

Recent theories of corporate organization hold that mutually owned firms arise to remedy agency problems associated with ownership by a separate class of stockholders. We propose an alternative theory of mutuality, in which mutuals arise endogenously as a self-selection mechanism to cope with adverse selection and systematic risk. This theory makes predictions about the nature of customer contracts and the pattern of dividend payments adopted by mutuals. We do not systematically test this theory against others. But the behavior of the Farm Credit System, a large financial mutual, is shown to be more in accord with our theory.

Opacity fosters price contagion that exacerbates the speculative cycles of bubbles and crashes that create financial instability. We find that banks with larger investments in opaque assets benefitted more from intra-industry revaluations associated with announcements of mergers in the period 2000–2006. The findings are robust to controls for competitive effects, spillover effects from higher likelihood of takeover, changes in real estate prices, and interest rates. Non-merger banks that gained most from merger activities also experienced the largest price declines during the subsequent 2007–2008 financial crisis.

This paper examines the impact of reducing the tick size on market-making behavior on The Toronto Stock Exchange. The results indicate a significant decrease in the percentage of trades of fewer than 10,000 shares involving the upstairs traders and a significant increase in the percentage of trades of fewer than 1,000 share involving the designated market makers. Consistent with this finding, the upstairs traders earn significantly lower returns on non-block trades and the designated market markers earn lower returns on trades smaller than 1,000 shares. We conclude the tick size reduction benefits the trading public.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers, G20, G24.

Credit rationing is a common feature of most developing economies. In response to it, the governments of these countries often operate a number of programs intended to expand the supply of credit to the private sector. Expansionary monetary policy is often seen as a way of reducing the extent of credit rationing. We examine the consequences of a common policy tool in these economies: the use of expansionary monetary policy combined with direct central bank lending to inject credit. In the context of a small open economy we show that such a policy increases long-run production if and only if the economy is in a development trap. Moreover government credit programs often lead to endogenously arising aggregate volatility. Thus the case for government intervention in credit markets relies largely on the notion that output is artificially low because the economy is in a development trap. However, it is the case that the kind of policy we consider can be used to eliminate certain indeterminacies of equilibrium created by endogenous credit market frictions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E44, O16, O42.