Knowledge that Transforms

We study a model in which leverage and compensation are both choice variables for the firm and borrowing spreads are endogenous. First, we analyze the correlation between leverage and variable compensation. We show that allowing for endogenous compensation and leverage can explain the conflicting findings of the empirical literature. We uncover a new channel of complementarity between effort and leverage that induces a correlation sign opposite to what current theoretical models predict. Second, we study the dynamics of leverage and compensation design after a credit stimulus. We derive a set of new empirical predictions. For outward-shifts in credit supply, variable compensation is increasing in leverage growth. Moreover, variable compensation increases after the credit stimulus, especially for firms with low idiosyncratic risk.

We examine implications of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) for banks using business models particularly dependent on customer deposits. Employing unique customer data hand-collected from German savings and cooperative banks, we generate conversion rates for deposits into a CBDC. Even at moderate conversion rates, most banks would have experienced funding problems and lost profits if a CBDC had been introduced in most years from 2000 onward. Our results are relevant for commercial banks, contributing to better assessments of the impact of CBDCs on liquidity and profitability and help central banks to identify implementation costs for banks within historical and hypothetical interest rate environments.

The vacuum caused by the absence of a political leader has a major economic impact. We manually collect data on the absence of a political leader in 247 Chinese cities between 2009 and 2019 and find that firms reduce their investment by an average of 2.326 % for each month that a political office remains vacant. This result holds even after subjecting the data to a series of endogeneity tests, robustness tests, and alternative explanations. We also demonstrate that the absence of a political leader reduces corporate investment through increased uncertainty of economic policy, reduced governmental efficiency, and disrupted political connections. Finally, our results show that this kind of absence has a more pronounced impact on younger firms, firms located in provinces with slower marketization, firms located in provinces with weak media development, non-state-owned enterprises, and firms located in regions under significant promotional pressure.

Utilising climate-related narratives in conference call transcripts to measure firm-level exposure to climate risks, we examine the association between such exposure and the corporate cost of debt financing. Using a sample of 21 European countries from 2001 to 2020, we find that firms exposed to greater climate change experience higher debt costs. The impact is even more extreme when using climate-related opportunity and regulatory exposure measures. We further find critical economic channels through which the higher debt costs occur: financial development and credit supplies. Specifically, our findings hold only for firms in weakly developed financial markets and institutions as measured by the new broad-based multi-dimensional financial development indices. We also find some other conditioning factors. Firstly, the higher the carbon intensity level, the greater the debt cost a firm with more climate change exposure must pay. Secondly, debtholders appear to punish firms with high environmental and social disclosure that are exposed to more climate change. Thirdly, the findings are more pronounced in financially constrained firms.

In this paper, we investigate the real effects of special taxation on banks. We provide evidence that the introduction of a new fiscal levy on banks significantly impairs their performance and has an adverse impact on the real economy through the lending channel. Using micro-level data on lending relationships, we identify the credit supply shock related with a bank tax controlling for loan demand factors. We compute a firm-specific measure of firm exposure to burdened credit institutions. We find a negative impact of the tax shock on investment and output. Our results are important from a policy perspective as they shed light on the economic consequences of double taxation on banks.

Theories of loan contracting in the presence of asymmetric information highlight the key role of collateral in mitigating against credit rationing. However, theory also allows for the use of collateral by ‘bad’ borrowers in order to receive better loan contract offers. In this study, we explore the extent to which collateral can affect the incidence of absolute loan denial and partial rationing associated with smaller loans than requested being offered. Using data from a large survey of UK small- and-medium enterprises, we find significant evidence on the negative effect of collateral. Our results also reveal important distinction between lines of credit and term loans, where the presence of collateral is associated with 3 % less term loan approved compared to overdraft. We argue that even the request (or offer) of collateral for a term loan indicates that either the bank or the firm believes it is a risky bet.

We study the relation between firm financial stability and gender diversity in leadership and highlight its dependence on the initial financial conditions of the firm and the role played by the women leaders. Consistent with the glass cliff and the upper echelon theories, we find that close-to-default firms are more likely to appoint women top executives and that under their leadership, subsequent firms’ risk of default decreases in the short to medium term. In parallel, independent women directors are not associated with firms’ past credit risk, and their presence is more likely to increase the firm’s subsequent default risk, as established by the tokenism and signaling theory. Our results are robust to alternative specifications and endogeneity corrections.

We investigate how a change in regulatory oversight affects bank risk, using the passage of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act of 2018 as a setting. Using a sample of bank holding companies (BHCs) covering the period 2015Q1 through 2020Q1, we find that risk increases for large BHCs affected by a change in regulatory oversight. In addition to increasing bank level risk, affected BHCs increase their respective contribution to the systemic risk. These BHCs also experience higher profitability, increased market valuation and reduced compliance costs.

Prudential bank regulation complicates monetary policy because it has cyclical effects on the growth of bank credit, which can be a channel through which monetary policy is transmitted to the economy. Employing a panel of 36 advanced and developing countries for the period 1973–2015, we find that changes in regulation have been procyclical with respect to credit surges and counter-cyclical with respect to credit stops. As a result, monetary policy risks being too loose over the credit cycle. The economic effects of prudential regulation on credit have been meaningful given the large-scale bank liberalizations undertaken by many countries. The result is robust to dealing with a wide range of sensitivity tests and endogeneity concerns. In designing regulations, policymakers need to consider transmission mechanisms through which they might affect the real economy and undermine the goals of monetary policy.

The aim of this study is to disentangle the effects of introducing an interest-bearing central bank digital currency (CBDC) for financial stability using a Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model in which (i) both CBDC and private bank deposits can be used in exchange and (ii) liquidity is created endogenously. Agents have direct access to a CBDC, which is a claim on the central bank. They use both sight deposits and CBDC to buy goods and commercial banks borrow reserves to cover liquidity needs. The introduction of an interest-bearing CBDC has direct implications for the sight deposit rate and the loan rate of banks. Besides, if the central bank aims to have a positive net worth and the absence of bank runs, a high demand for a CBDC is a necessary condition to achieve both objectives. If this is not the case, financial stability will be endangered.