Knowledge that Transforms

Using global data on syndicated loans, we show that any negative effect of stronger creditor rights on loan spreads, as identified in the prior literature (Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009), disappears once we include a single country characteristic: country size. This finding is robust to several identification methods, both global samples and within-country changes in creditor rights, different panel spans, and hundreds of control variables. We identify that key origins of the effect of country size on loan pricing are ethnic fractionalization and within-country heterogeneity in economic preferences, which create country risk.

This study models the closely held (PE) share of U.S. nonfinancial corporate equity over time. Corporate income tax rates, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, default risk, and the real medium-run Treasury yield significantly affect the PE share, consistent with other studies which separately analyze these factors. The PE share is negatively related to business loan delinquencies and real medium-term Treasury rates. High interest rates discourage PE funds from using leverage to finance buyouts of public companies and fund distributions of interim cash distributions that enhance the relative liquidity of the closely held firms in PE fund portfolios. Interim cash distributions by PE funds help to avoid the double-taxation of dividends, thus causing the appeal of PE to rise with corporate income tax rates, which increases the PE share. The PE share rose during the Enron scandal and after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which increased the costs of continuing as, or becoming, a publicly traded corporation. The PE share is well explained and tracked by key macroeconomic variables as well as tax and regulatory policies. • We model the private equity (PE) share of US nonfinancial corporate equity over time. • Business loan delinquencies and real medium-term Treasury rates lower the PE share. • Sarbanes-Oxley increased the PE share by raising the costs of being a public firm. • The PE share is well modeled by key macroeconomic, tax, and regulatory variables.

We examine the association between country-level sectoral credit dynamics and bank-level systemic risk. Contrary to most studies that only delve into broad-based credit development, we focus on sectoral credit allocation, specifically to households versus firms, and to the tradable versus non-tradable sector. Based on a global sample of 417 banks across 46 countries over the period 2000-2014, we find that lending to households and corporates in the non-tradable sector is positively associated with system-wide distress. Conversely, credit granted to corporations and to the tradable sector negatively correlates with banks’ systemic behavior. Sub-sample analysis shows that risks from household lending are transmitted through small banks, whereas non-tradable lending is transmitted through large banks. Moreover, banks located in emerging market and developing economies exhibit enhanced systemic behavior against the backdrop of higher household and tradable credit growth, whereas credit to non-tradable sector firms tends to increase systemic fragility of banks in advanced economies. By the same token, the results differ for the pre-crisis and crisis/post-crisis periods, with the full sample findings driven by the crisis/post-crisis timespan. The findings emphasize critical policy implications considering sectoral heterogeneity, bank size, country of incorporation of banks, and periods of financial tranquillity/instability. Authorities can intervene in the most systemic economic sectors and limit the accumulation of “bad credit” and preserve systemic resilience, while still benefiting from the positive impact of “good credit” on growth and financial stability.

We extend the Schumpeter meeting Keynes (K+S) agent-based model by introducing an evolving interbank network in the money market. Banks are exposed to counterparty risk and evaluate interbank positions using a network valuation (NEVA) clearing mechanism, which ensures systemic risk minimization with minimal assumptions on banks’ behavior. The model can replicate several stylized facts about the topology of the interbank network and the dynamics of banks’ balance sheets. The model encompasses financial contagion and systemic risk, allowing us to study the interactions between micro- and macro-prudential policies. Our results suggest that the introduction of a micro-prudential regulation also accounting for the network structure can reduce the incidence of systemic risk events. We also find that, in presence of a two-pillar regulatory framework – grounded on a Basel III macro-prudential regulation and a NEVA-based micro-prudential one –, there is no trade-off between financial stability and macroeconomic performance. This points towards the possibility of designing a regulatory framework able to achieve financial stability without overly stringent capital requirements.

Despite the significance of social networks in influencing firm behavior, research on their impact on corporate tax behavior is limited. In this paper, we construct social networks of CFOs from U.S. companies based on their employment history, education, and non-professional activities. We find that firms with more socially connected CFOs have lower effective tax rates (ETR) compared to firms with less socially connected CFOs. This effect is more pronounced when corporate governance is weaker and managers have higher incentives. Furthermore, a firm's ETR decreases as CFO centrality increases. We do not observe similar results regarding the connectedness of boards of directors. Additionally, firm pairs exhibit similar ETRs when their CFOs are socially connected, suggesting an exchange of tax-related information among CFOs through their social networks. We also find that the past ETRs of firms with central CFOs predict the ETRs of firms with non-central CFOs. This indicates that less socially connected CFOs tend to follow the tax planning strategies of their more socially connected counterparts. Overall, our findings indicate that more socially connected CFOs possess more relevant information and resources regarding tax planning, leading to the adoption of more aggressive tax strategies compared to their less socially connected counterparts.

In recognizing the uniqueness of their business model, the FDIC launched a new community bank definition in 2012 (reaffirmed in 2020) that changed its approach to identifying this bank group. This paper examines the impact of this re-defined community bank status on bank performance. Using a quasi-difference-in-differences approach, the study finds that banks that obtain the community bank status exhibit greater financial stability and lower risk, with lending and deposit structures mediating these effects. These findings offer new insights into a "warm glow" effect brought by the re-classification, affecting the performance of these institutions. By assigning the community bank status, the FDIC may have tapped into the social and emotional significance tied to the word "community" for various stakeholders.

Using a large sample of European listed banks, we investigate the relationship between a bank’s business model and systemic risk between 2005 and 2020, a period which includes various episodes of instability. Our findings indicate that, during tranquil periods, banks with different business models exhibit similar sensitivity to systemic risk. However, during periods of instability, the type of business model becomes critical: investment banks contribute more to and are more exposed to systemic risk. Distinguishing between endogenous and exogenous crises, our results reveal that market-oriented banks contribute more to systemic risk when instability is endogenous to the financial sector. Conversely, focused retail banks consistently show lower contributions and exposures to systemic risk. Additionally, our findings highlight the importance of business model migrations in reducing systemic risk. Banks transitioning from diversified to more retail-oriented models reduce their systemic risk, whereas migrations in the opposite direction do not exhibit the same benefit. These findings underscore the importance of maintaining diverse business models in the banking sector to enhance financial stability. • The study investigates the relationship between a bank’s business model and systemic risk. • During tranquil periods, banks with different business models exhibit similar sensitivity to systemic risk. • During periods of instability, investment banks contribute more to and are more exposed to systemic risk. • Market-oriented banks contribute more to systemic risk when instability is endogenous to the financial sector. • Focused retail banks show lower contributions to and exposures to systemic risk across different crisis periods.

In this paper, we propose asset class liquidity risk indicators constructed by aggregating financial, monetary and credit variables. We measure the presence of liquidity in six highly representative markets such as the Equity Europe, Long Term Italian Government Bond, Short Term Euro Government Bond, Equity US, Bond Corporate Investment Grade USD, Short Term US Government Bond markets over the period January 2007–January 2023. Our approach allows for a time-varying measure of the relative contribution of the raw drivers to the asset class indicators. We use endogenous Markov-switching models to identify episodes of financial distress which have characterized the behaviour of assets over the last two decades. Finally, we map the Markov-switching regimes with bubble episodes identified via recursive testing procedures.

Recent financial crises have once again underscored the critical role of credit booms in driving systemic risk and financial instability in both advanced and developing countries. In this study, I examine whether macroprudential policies can attenuate systemic risk by mitigating the effects of booms in credit. The robust results show that macroprudential instruments are effective in curbing the build-up of systemic risk during household credit booms, which pose significant concerns for financial stability , though not for booms in credit to firms. Moreover, the findings suggest that limits on banks’ sectoral exposures are particularly effective in reducing systemic risk during booms in credit to the household sector. I further discover that leverage is a key transmission channel through which household credit booms contribute to systemic risk.

We examine the impact of the ECB’s asset purchase programmes on euro area non-financial firms’ cost of borrowing and their choice between corporate bonds and syndicated loans. Our findings indicate that the Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP) reduced spreads for both eligible and non-eligible corporate bonds, and that ECB purchases of covered bonds positively affected corporate bond spreads. The CSPP also compressed spreads across all syndicated loans, irrespective of eligibility. We find evidence supporting a “cost of borrowing channel” for covered bonds under the first programme and asset-backed securities, indicating that syndicated loan spreads reflect banks’ borrowing costs in the bond market. Additionally, our results reveal that the CSPP significantly influenced firms’ debt financing choices, with these effects being more pronounced for non-switchers.