Knowledge that Transforms

Traditional asset–liability management techniques limit banks’ abilities to structure their balance sheets—but more recently, financial innovations have allowed banks the chance to manage interest rate risk without constraining their asset–liability choices. Using canonical correlation analysis, we examine how the relationships between asset and liability accounts at U.S. commercial banks changed between 1990 and 2005. Importantly, we show that asset–liability linkages are weaker for banks that are intensive users of risk-mitigation strategies such as interest rate swaps and adjustable loans. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that asset–liability linkages are stronger at large banks than at small banks, although these size-based differences have diminished over time, both because of increased asset–liability linkages at small banks and decreased linkages at large banks.

There are numerous aspects concerning financial regulation which the current financial turmoil has high-lighted. These include: (1) the form of deposit insurance; (2) bank solvency regimes, ‘prompt corrective action’; (3) Central Banks’ money market operations; (4) commercial bank liquidity risk management; (5) procyclicality of CARs (and mark-to-market); lack of counter-cyclical instruments; (5) boundaries of regulation, conduits, SIVs and reputational risk; (6) crisis management: (a) within countries, e.g. UK Tripartite Committee; or (b) cross-border, how to allocate the burden of cross-border defaults? This paper describes how the crisis exposed regulatory failings, drawing largely on UK experience, and suggests remedies.

This article empirically tests the hypothesis that credit-screening standards can be first increasing and then decreasing in the quality of the bank's pool of potential borrowers, which in turn may vary through the business cycle or across different segments of the lending markets. A key implication is that banks with lending opportunities toward the middle of the quality spectrum can have loan portfolios that perform better than do the portfolios of banks with loan-origination opportunities that are either too weak or too strong. Using banks’ volume of secondary-market loan sales as a proxy for the richness of lending opportunities, I find an inverse U-shaped relation between the performance of banks’ loan portfolios and their activity in the loan sales market. The pattern deserves scrutiny for its policy implications, as many regulators hold the view that countercyclical variation in credit standards may have a destabilizing effect on business cycles.

A large number of bank failures occurred in transition countries during the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s. These were related to increases in non-performing loans and deteriorated cost efficiency of banks. This paper addresses the question of the causality between non-performing loans and cost efficiency in order to examine whether either of these factors is the deep determinant of bank failures. We extend the Granger-causality model developed by [Berger, A., DeYoung, R., 1997. Problem loans and cost efficiency in commercial banks. J. Banking Finance 21, 849–870] by applying GMM dynamic panel estimators on a panel of Czech banks between 1994 and 2005. Our findings support the bad management hypothesis, according to which deteriorations in cost efficiency precede increases in non-performing loans. Banking supervisors should consequently focus on enhanced cost efficiency of banks in order to reduce the likelihood of bank failures in transition countries.

This paper studies the effect of banking deregulation on credit risk. Its theoretical model shows that a bank is willing to invest more resources in screening borrowers when there is an entry threat, even though loan rates are driven lower. Thus, deregulation may result in improved loan quality and lower credit risk. This result is tested using bank-level balance sheet data and macroeconomic data for the European Union. The data reveal that competition intensified after the completion of the Second Banking Directive, while loan quality improved in most markets. Evidence is found that the loan quality improvement is associated with lower interest margin.

How capital structure, dividend policy, and corporate governance vary across countries has been the focus of recent studies, but how resources are reallocated in response to poor performance has not received as much attention. This paper argues that the market for corporate control and the formal bankruptcy/liquidation processes of a country are two key mechanisms through which corporate assets are reallocated. Ideally, an economy would only allow the best users of economic resources to retain the right to use those assets and any sub-optimal use would result in either a take-over by a more proficient owner or an asset sale. We present evidence that equity market delistings occur more frequently in countries with strong shareholder rights. Furthermore, both strong creditor and shareholder rights increase the use of bankruptcy, relative to acquisitions, as a mechanism to resolve financial distress. We also present some evidence that these mechanisms are not as effective in Japan.

Between 1996 and 2005 the number of central banks that publish a financial stability review (FSR) increased from 1 to 40. A FSR may contribute to financial stability, increase accountability of authorities responsible for financial stability, and strengthen co-operation between the various authorities. The occurrence of a banking crisis in the past, income per capita, and European Union membership increase the likelihood that a FSR is published. The content of FSRs differs widely; on average only 33% of the indicators as suggested by the IMF is actually published. The amount of information provided seems unrelated to the health of the banking system.

We consider an overlapping generations model in the presence of financial intermediation. The paper focuses on the analysis of the consequences of a sudden negative repayments shock on financial intermediation capacity and consequently on the economy as a whole. The model exhibits a property of the ‘chain reaction’ when a single macroeconomic shock can lead to the exhaustion of credit resources and subsequently to the collapse of the banking system. To maintain the capability of the system to recover, a regulatory intervention is needed even in presence of the state guarantees on agents’ deposits in the banks. We compare the results for an intermediated economy with those derived for the market economy and draw some broad conclusions regarding the crisis consequences depending on the financial sector structure. We also compare the model predictions with the stylised facts about the Russian financial crisis of 1998.

Financial deregulation, while beneficial in the long-term, seems to be linked to instability. Intense competition for deposits appears to be an ingredient in instability. We examine the aftermath of deregulation in Croatia, which included rapid growth of both deposits and deposit interest rates, followed by numerous bank failures. Using panel regression techniques, we find evidence of “market-stealing” via high deposit interest rates. We connect high deposit interest rates to bank failure using logit models. High deposit interest rates were a reliable signal of risk-taking. When supervisory capabilities and powers are weak, deposit interest rate regulation may be worth considering.

This paper examines the effects of exchange rate depreciation on commercial bank failures in Indonesia during the period from January 1995 to December 1999. This included the period of the Asian crisis during which the Indonesian currency depreciated by about 75% in nominal terms or 25% in real terms. The estimation results show that due to a higher amount of foreign currency assets relative to the amount of foreign currency liabilities, exchange rate depreciation led to a lower probability of bank failure. Through reduced profit on lending in foreign currency, exchange rate depreciation led to a higher probability of bank failure.