Knowledge that Transforms

We study a model in which leverage and compensation are both choice variables for the firm and borrowing spreads are endogenous. First, we analyze the correlation between leverage and variable compensation. We show that allowing for endogenous compensation and leverage can explain the conflicting findings of the empirical literature. We uncover a new channel of complementarity between effort and leverage that induces a correlation sign opposite to what current theoretical models predict. Second, we study the dynamics of leverage and compensation design after a credit stimulus. We derive a set of new empirical predictions. For outward-shifts in credit supply, variable compensation is increasing in leverage growth. Moreover, variable compensation increases after the credit stimulus, especially for firms with low idiosyncratic risk.

We examine implications of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) for banks using business models particularly dependent on customer deposits. Employing unique customer data hand-collected from German savings and cooperative banks, we generate conversion rates for deposits into a CBDC. Even at moderate conversion rates, most banks would have experienced funding problems and lost profits if a CBDC had been introduced in most years from 2000 onward. Our results are relevant for commercial banks, contributing to better assessments of the impact of CBDCs on liquidity and profitability and help central banks to identify implementation costs for banks within historical and hypothetical interest rate environments.

Using a panel of 496 banks from the G20 nations, the study assesses the role of macroprudential policies in reducing systemic risk. The study further assesses the utility of these policies in conjunction with monetary policy instruments and bank and country-specific characteristics and finds the significant impact of macroprudential policies in curbing systemic risk and promoting economic stability. The study finds this relationship to hold regardless of economic conditions like inflationary pressure and financial distress. The result highlights that easing macroprudential policies during financial distress can help banks cope with systemic losses. We split the macroprudential policies into policies targeting the demand and supply of loans and find complementarity among the policies to reduce systemic risk. Our results demonstrate the heterogenous effect of macroprudential policies in limiting systemic risk, with the effect varying with bank size, leverage, liquidity, and concentration of loans. Finally, we find a moderating role of these policies in limiting the impact of uncertainties on systemic risk.

In this cover paper, we introduce a Special Issue (SI) published after the fourth edition of a series of financial stability conferences organized by Bank of Mexico, CEMLA, Bank of Canada, Zurich University and the Journal of Financial Stability in November 2021. Before providing our perspective on why the research papers included into the SI are of great relevance, we give a brief and personal overview of recent directions in financial stability research in general, esp., related to topics accentuated by the COVID-19 pandemic or post-pandemic economic and financial conditions and their complexity. Papers published in the SI cover four topics of research in the financial stability field, featuring some outstanding and innovative projects presented during the conference. The first topic is on interconnectedness and shock transmission in the financial system, diving deep into asset fire sales, interconnectedness of various segments of the financial system, in addition to banks, on the optimality of systemic risk capital buffers, and on how risks are priced in the interbank market network. The second one touches upon climate change risks looking at investors’ reactions to international climate policy developments, in particular on the Paris Agreement front and how to jointly model physical and transition risk in the banking system, including the important concept of double materiality. The third topic is represented by projects focused on policy analysis for systemic risk mitigation, specifically dealing with macroprudential policy instruments and crisis mitigation policies. Finally, research papers in the last topic on big data and market data focus on the innovative ways to explore the growing body of data sources, such as data collected by regulators, including credit register data, supervisory data and market data on financial transactions, to better understand sources and implications of systemic risk.

Financial regulation has introduced bail-ins (i.e. enforced debt-to-equity swaps) as a tool for orderly bank resolution, and hence it is the authorities’ task to decide when to apply this tool in a resolution. We present a quantitative framework to support this decision by computing the systemic impact of a bail-in. Our model takes into account systemic feedback effects using state-of-the-art multilayer contagion models, which we extend to include liquidation losses. Using real-world data for the Austrian banking system, we perform an empirical assessment of the systemic risk impact of idiosyncratic and systemic shocks. Our results show that bail-ins have the potential to reduce systemic risk compared to insolvencies for the Austrian banking system. They also incur lower social cost than bail-outs, but only for moderate, idiosyncratic crises. Our findings quantitatively corroborate earlier discussions that bail-ins may be an inadequate tool to deal with systemic crises. This suggests that the bail-in mechanism alone may not be sufficient to rule out future bail-outs.

The vacuum caused by the absence of a political leader has a major economic impact. We manually collect data on the absence of a political leader in 247 Chinese cities between 2009 and 2019 and find that firms reduce their investment by an average of 2.326 % for each month that a political office remains vacant. This result holds even after subjecting the data to a series of endogeneity tests, robustness tests, and alternative explanations. We also demonstrate that the absence of a political leader reduces corporate investment through increased uncertainty of economic policy, reduced governmental efficiency, and disrupted political connections. Finally, our results show that this kind of absence has a more pronounced impact on younger firms, firms located in provinces with slower marketization, firms located in provinces with weak media development, non-state-owned enterprises, and firms located in regions under significant promotional pressure.

Utilising climate-related narratives in conference call transcripts to measure firm-level exposure to climate risks, we examine the association between such exposure and the corporate cost of debt financing. Using a sample of 21 European countries from 2001 to 2020, we find that firms exposed to greater climate change experience higher debt costs. The impact is even more extreme when using climate-related opportunity and regulatory exposure measures. We further find critical economic channels through which the higher debt costs occur: financial development and credit supplies. Specifically, our findings hold only for firms in weakly developed financial markets and institutions as measured by the new broad-based multi-dimensional financial development indices. We also find some other conditioning factors. Firstly, the higher the carbon intensity level, the greater the debt cost a firm with more climate change exposure must pay. Secondly, debtholders appear to punish firms with high environmental and social disclosure that are exposed to more climate change. Thirdly, the findings are more pronounced in financially constrained firms.

In this paper, we investigate the real effects of special taxation on banks. We provide evidence that the introduction of a new fiscal levy on banks significantly impairs their performance and has an adverse impact on the real economy through the lending channel. Using micro-level data on lending relationships, we identify the credit supply shock related with a bank tax controlling for loan demand factors. We compute a firm-specific measure of firm exposure to burdened credit institutions. We find a negative impact of the tax shock on investment and output. Our results are important from a policy perspective as they shed light on the economic consequences of double taxation on banks.

Theories of loan contracting in the presence of asymmetric information highlight the key role of collateral in mitigating against credit rationing. However, theory also allows for the use of collateral by ‘bad’ borrowers in order to receive better loan contract offers. In this study, we explore the extent to which collateral can affect the incidence of absolute loan denial and partial rationing associated with smaller loans than requested being offered. Using data from a large survey of UK small- and-medium enterprises, we find significant evidence on the negative effect of collateral. Our results also reveal important distinction between lines of credit and term loans, where the presence of collateral is associated with 3 % less term loan approved compared to overdraft. We argue that even the request (or offer) of collateral for a term loan indicates that either the bank or the firm believes it is a risky bet.