Knowledge that Transforms

A fair level of provisions on bad and doubtful loans is an essential input in mark-to-market accounting, and in the calculation of bank profitability, capital and solvency. Loan-loss provisioning is directly related to estimates of loan-loss given default (LGD). A literature on LGD on bank loans is developing but, surprisingly, it has not been exploited to address, at the micro level, the issue of provisioning at the time of default, and after the default date. For example, in Portugal, the central bank imposes a mandatory provisioning schedule based on the time period since a loan is declared ‘non-performing’. The dynamic schedule is ‘ad hoc’, not based on empirical studies. The purpose of the paper is to present an empirical methodology to calculate a fair level of loan-loss provisions, at the time of default and after the default date. To illustrate, a dynamic provisioning schedule is estimated with micro-data provided by a Portuguese bank on recoveries on non-performing loans. This schedule is then compared to the regulatory provisioning schedule imposed by the central bank.

Despite the extensive literature on prediction of banking crises by Early Warning Systems (EWSs), their practical use by policy makers is limited, even in the international financial institutions. This is a paradox since the changing nature of banking risks as more economies liberalise and develop their financial systems, as well as ongoing innovation, makes the use of EWS for informing policies aimed at preventing crises more necessary than ever. In this context, we assess the logit and signal extraction EWS for banking crises on a comprehensive common dataset. We suggest that logit is the most appropriate approach for global EWS and signal extraction for country-specific EWS. Furthermore, it is important to consider the policy maker's objectives when designing predictive models and setting related thresholds since there is a sharp trade-off between correctly calling crises and false alarms.

The IIF's Committee on Market Best Practices has been working on five subjects: (1) Risk management, realignment of incentives is necessary; (2) Ratings, an SRO for CRAs is proposed; (3) Valuations, more dialogue on processes; (4) Disclosure, some new initiatives; (5) Liquidity risk, a review is in hand. Regulation's enforcement intensity is not a good measure of effectiveness; instead a more supervisory, risk-based approach is desirable. There is a need for a framework of mutual recognition in the context of cross-border regulation, with greater use of colleges of supervisors. Within Europe a start would involve putting the Level 3 Committees onto a stronger legal basis.

This paper analyzes the effect of the toughness of bankruptcy law on the number of liquidations in a simple model of borrowing and lending with asymmetric information, where the creditor cannot credibly commit to liquidate the firm if the default occurs. In our setting we consider a bankruptcy law to be a one-dimensional variable that influences creditor's expectation value of collateral. We find that there is an interval of the bankruptcy law, where the number of liquidations decreases in the toughness of the bankruptcy law. We also find that if the liquidation costs are high, softer bankruptcy law is preferred.

We need to beware of over-reaction, for example not to revise the UK tripartite MOU to indicate excessive future support for banks, nor to rush to rearrange regulatory structures. On pay and incentive structures, shareholders should play a greater role. On securitisation, in the short run market discipline will suffice; in the longer term, all the players, risk managers, regulators, accountants, etc., will just have to be tougher and more savvy.

Confidence in both financial institutions and markets must be re-built; this requires (1) better (model-based) valuation processes; (2) a more robust capital basis, including clarification and strengthening of the Basel II securitization framework; (3) improving the liquidity regime; (4) greater transparency; notably relating to structured products and off-balance sheet vehicles; (5) improved information from CRAs. The need is to find a balance that still fosters innovation, without leaving the system vulnerable to excesses.

Evidence on central banks’ twin objective, monetary and financial stability, is scarce. We suggest an integrated micro–macro approach with two core virtues. First, we measure financial stability directly at the bank level as the probability of distress. Second, we integrate a microeconomic hazard model for bank distress and a standard macroeconomic model. The advantage of this approach is to incorporate micro information, to allow for non-linearities and to permit general feedback effects between financial distress and the real economy. We base the analysis on German bank and macro data between 1995 and 2004. Our results confirm the existence of a trade-off between monetary and financial stability. An unexpected tightening of monetary policy increases the probability of distress. This effect disappears when neglecting microeffects and non-linearities, underlining their importance. Distress responses are largest for small cooperative banks, weak distress events, and at times when capitalization is low. An important policy implication is that the separation of financial supervision and monetary policy requires close collaboration among members in the European System of Central Banks and national bank supervisors.

Recent episodes of financial crisis have revived interest in developing models able to signal their occurrence in timely manner. The literature has developed both parametric and non-parametric models, the so-called Early Warning Systems, to predict these crises. Using data related to sovereign debt crises which occurred in developing countries from 1980 to 2004, this paper shows that further progress can be achieved by applying a less developed non-parametric method based on artificial neural networks (ANN). Thanks to the high flexibility of neural networks and their ability to approximate non-linear relationship, an ANN-based early warning system can, under certain conditions, outperform more consolidated methods.

This paper examines the implications that alternative regulatory structures may have for resolving failed banking institutions. Emphasis on the European Union (EU), which is both economically and financially large and has several features relating to cross-border banking in the form of direct investment that may heighten the problems we consider. To ensure the efficient resolution of bank failures with minimum, if any, credit and liquidity losses a four step program should be followed. This includes prompt legal closure of institutions before they become economically insolvent, prompt identification of claims and assignment of losses, prompt reopening of failed institutions, and prompt re-capitalizing and re-privatization of failed institutions. These policies together with a prompt corrective action system could be voluntarily adopted through the use of deposit insurance premium discounts as an incentive.

We employ a theoretical model to interpret the liquidity and moral hazard effects of IMF support during a financial crisis. We then estimate the response of forward exchange markets to IMF-related announcements, using data on the 3-, 9-, and 12-month forward exchange rates. Our results indicate that the announcement of IMF negotiations is associated with a premium on the baht and the rupiah, where the premium is much larger on the latter. This result is largely consistent with the responses of stock and bond markets, especially when country-specific data are employed.