We exploit staggered real estate transaction tax (RETT) hikes across German states to identify the effect on the growth rates of regional house prices and outstanding mortgage loans by all local German banks. The results show that a RETT hike by one percentage point reduces regional house prices by 3%–4%. Furthermore, IV-regressions yield that a 1 percentage point drop in regional house prices induced by a RETT increase leads to a 0.3% decline in regional mortgage lending, particularly among low-capitalized banks in rural regions.

We investigate households’ bank switching exploiting a unique representative dataset from Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth that follows the households and their bank(s) over time. First, we document that bank switching is quite prevalent in our sample, with almost a quarter of households changing their main bank in a biannual horizon. Next, we relate the decision to switch to the features and dynamics of household bank relationship, and to the characteristics of both households and banks. In line with the switching cost theory, we find that using more than a single bank, as well as the intensity (number of services used), and the scope (bank services used) of the relationship with the main bank play a role in shaping the households’ decision to switch. Moreover, bank switching is strongly and positively correlated with both taking out and having paid off a mortgage.

During the 2008 global financial crisis, financial institutions in the United States experienced big losses, and some firms failed. These failures occurred despite the external and internal regulatory mechanisms imposed upon the financial sector aimed at ensuring confidence and stability in the financial system. This study analyzes the impact of macroeconomic and financial stress on the profitability of financial firms. We utilize data from 1980 to 2010 to model firm profitability and stock returns using a panel regression, fixed-effect methodology. Our results show that the profitability of all firms is negatively affected by increases in macroeconomic and financial stress, measured by the National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI) and the Adjusted National Financial Conditions Index (ANFCI), respectively; however financial sector firms have exhibited an increased marginal sensitivity to both stress indexes that began in the 1990s and continued through the financial crisis of 2008. In a further analysis of the financial sector and banks, we show that depository institutions are relatively robust to macroeconomic and financial stress, and financial sector instability is driven by non-depository finance, investment, and real estate firms. Additionally, the largest 33 percent of financial firms and banks exhibit increased sensitivity to macroeconomic stress in the most recent sample. Our results coincide with the risks associated with recent trends in the financial services industry, such as deregulation, global market integration, financial product innovation, and the increasing predominance of non-depository intermediation.

Caught between the end of the National Banking Era and the beginning of the Federal Reserve System, the crisis of 1914 provides an example of a banking panic avoided. We investigate how this outcome was achieved by examining data on the issues of Aldrich-Vreeland emergency currency and clearing house loan certificates to New York City institutions that identify the borrower and the quantity requested for each type of temporary liquidity measure. The extensive provision of temporary credit to a wide array of financial intermediaries was, in our opinion, essential to the successful alleviation of financial distress in 1914. Empirical results indicate an important role for clearing house loan certificates that is distinct from the influence of Aldrich-Vreeland emergency currency issues.

We analyze the impact of the introduction of the French Tobin tax on the turnover and measures of the liquidity and volatility of the affected stocks with nonparametric tests on individual stocks, difference-in-difference tests and other robustness checks controlling for simultaneous month-of-the-year and size effects. Our findings indicate that the tax produces a significant reduction in turnover and volatility (measured in terms of stock price volatility and the high–low price range) and inconclusive effects on liquidity when the latter is evaluated under the two dimensions of the estimated bid–ask spread and the Amihud (2002) price impact ratio.

This paper analyzes the existence of flights from stocks to bonds and vice versa. We propose a definition and a test for flight-to-quality, flight-from-quality and cross-asset contagion and examine their characteristics and effects for the financial system. The empirical analysis for eight developed countries including the US, the UK, Germany and Japan shows that flights exist and are a common feature in many crises episodes. Our findings also reveal that flights are not merely country-specific events but occur simultaneously across countries. This indicates that there is a link between the occurrence of flights and cross-country contagion. Moreover, we show that flights enhance the resiliency of the financial markets by providing diversification benefits in times when they are needed most.

We consider consumer responsiveness to changes in the macroeconomic environment (i.e. product demand sensitivity) to be a systematic industry characteristic useful to studying how industrial diversification adds value. We argue that diversified firms, with the advantages of their internal capital market and the imperfectly correlated cash flows of their segments, will perform better than focused firms when the demand sensitivity of a product increases. Our empirical evidence reveals a significant diversification premium associated with an increase in sensitivity. Moreover, such premium predominantly exists during recessionary periods, disappearing in the presence of low coinsurance and inefficient use of the internal capital market. Our results are robust to alternative measures of sensitivity and performance metrics, different empirical model specifications, and to the concern of possibly biased estimations associated with the sample of diversified and focused firms.

We find that increases in implied market volatility (a proxy for market fear) have a significant impact on returns of bank stocks, above and beyond systematic risk proxied by the expected excess market return during a bad economic regime. Large bank returns are favorably affected by increases in implied market volatility during the crisis, while small banks are adversely affected by increases in implied market volatility. We attribute the different effects among the size-categorized bank portfolios to the perception that large banks are protected by too-big-to-fail policies. Within the sample of small banks, the adverse share price response to increased implied market volatility is more pronounced for banks that rely more heavily on non-traditional sources of funds, use a high proportion of loans in their assets, have a higher level of non-performing assets, and have a relatively low provision for loan losses. The adverse effect of negative innovations in implied market volatility on small bank returns during the crisis is primarily driven by exposure of their loan portfolio to weak economic conditions.

Evidence on central banks’ twin objective, monetary and financial stability, is scarce. We suggest an integrated micro–macro approach with two core virtues. First, we measure financial stability directly at the bank level as the probability of distress. Second, we integrate a microeconomic hazard model for bank distress and a standard macroeconomic model. The advantage of this approach is to incorporate micro information, to allow for non-linearities and to permit general feedback effects between financial distress and the real economy. We base the analysis on German bank and macro data between 1995 and 2004. Our results confirm the existence of a trade-off between monetary and financial stability. An unexpected tightening of monetary policy increases the probability of distress. This effect disappears when neglecting microeffects and non-linearities, underlining their importance. Distress responses are largest for small cooperative banks, weak distress events, and at times when capitalization is low. An important policy implication is that the separation of financial supervision and monetary policy requires close collaboration among members in the European System of Central Banks and national bank supervisors.