Knowledge that Transforms

Following the Supreme Court decision in the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission case of 2010, which removed restrictions in relation to firms’ political spending, and building on the growing debate over whether voluntary political spending disclosure (VPSD) provides valuable information, we examine the effect of political spending on the cost of public debt and the role of VPSD on this effect. Based on a measure of VPSD that became available in 2012 and a large dataset on US firms’ actual political spending, manually extracted from different filings, we provide novel evidence that, in the post-Supreme Court decision period, political spending increases the cost of public debt. This is consistent with the uncertainty associated with political spending. Moreover, we find that the level of voluntary disclosure weakens the positive association between political spending and the cost of public debt. These results hold across multiple specifications as well as when we use a sudden release of firms’ political spending as an exogenous shock to political spending.

Credit standards reported in the Bank Lending Surveys (BLS) of the European Central Bank (ECB) summarize banks’ sentiment about credit market tightness, and they strongly comove with credit growth. This paper introduces a new external instrument that captures an exogenous source of variation in credit standards, allowing us to identify a structural shock that negatively affects the credit supply. The instrument accounts for mandatory rotations of external auditors within credit institutions of nine euro-area countries. By estimating local projections, this paper finds that an unexpected supervisory measure at the banking-system level features significant dynamic causal effects at the macroeconomic level, which are also state-dependent.

We investigate whether the European regulatory reforms of the credit rating industry have been successful in improving the quality of financial institutions’ credit ratings. A shift to more conservative rating behaviour rather than rating quality improvement is identified, which is attributable to increased regulatory scrutiny. This change leads to a reduction in rating inflation and an increase in the number of unwarranted downgrades and false rating warnings in the post-regulatory period. A significant decrease (increase) in the informativeness of rating downgrades (upgrades) is evident. Our findings contrast with prior evidence for US corporates where reputational effects dominated.

We empirically test competing theoretical arguments about the impact of common ownership on bank stability: the common ownership hypothesis, where banks decrease risk-taking by internalizing risk externalities on commonly held banks, and the diversification hypothesis, where banks increase risk-taking influenced by common owners who hold diversified portfolios and are less risk averse. Using data from the U.S. banking industry from 1991 to 2016, we find that banks with more common ownership linkages undertake lower risk, as predicted by the common ownership hypothesis. This relation is statistically significant and economically sizable, which is consistent across alternative measures of common ownership and bank risk and robust to potential endogeneity. Our study adds the financial stability perspective to the ongoing discussions on common ownership and antitrust regulations.

We derive the default cascade model and the fire-sale spillover model in a unified interdependent framework. The interactions among banks include not only direct cross-holding, but also indirect dependency by holding mutual assets outside the banking system. Using data extracted from the European Banking Authority, we present the interdependency network composed of 48 banks and 21 asset classes. For the robustness, we employ three methods, called Anan, Hała and Maxe, to reconstruct the asset/liability cross-holding network. Then we combine the external portfolio holdings of each bank to compute the interdependency matrix. The interdependency network is much denser than the direct cross-holding network, showing the complex latent interaction among banks. Finally, we perform macroprudential stress tests for the European banking system, using the adverse scenario in EBA stress test as the initial shock. For different reconstructed networks, we illustrate the hierarchical cascades and show that the failure hierarchies are roughly the same except for a few banks, reflecting the overlapping portfolio holding accounts for the majority of defaults. We also calculate systemic vulnerability and individual vulnerability, which provide important information for supervision and relevant management actions.

This study develops an early warning system for financial crises with a focus on small open economies. We contribute to the literature by developing macro-financial dynamic factor models that extract useful information from a rich but unbalanced mixed frequency data set that includes a range of global and domestic economic and financial indicators. The framework is applied to several Asian countries—Thailand, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. Logit regression models that use the extracted factors and other leading indicators have significant power in predicting systemic events. In-sample and out-of-sample test results indicate that the extracted factors help to improve the predictive power over a model that uses only sufficiently long history indicators. Importantly, models that include the dynamic factors yield consistently better out-of-sample crisis prediction results for key performance measures such as a usefulness index, the noise to signal ratio, and AUROC.

Employing representative data from the U.S. Survey of Consumer Payment Choice, we find no evidence that cryptocurrency investors are motivated by distrust in fiat currencies or regulated finance. Compared with the general population, investors show no differences in their level of security concerns with either cash or commercial banking services. We find that cryptocurrency investors tend to be educated, young and digital natives. In recent years, a gap in ownership of cryptocurrencies across genders has emerged. We examine how investor characteristics vary across cryptocurrencies and show that owners of cryptocurrencies increasingly tend to hold their investment for longer periods.

This study analyses the effect of political money contributions on U.S. banks’ IPOs. We employ unbalanced panel data of 367 U.S. banks’ IPOs for the period January 1998 to December 2019. Our findings reveal that investors perceive Political Money Contributions (PMC) by U.S. banks as a proxy for political reach and connectedness. We document an inverse relationship between total PMC and the level of underpricing, which implies that both lobbying and PAC expenditure pay off on issue day as donors incur less underpricing. Initial returns decrease with PAC contributions to House of Representatives candidates, whereas the returns relate to the partisan identity of the candidates receiving PAC contributions. We document that those individual contributions by directors bring significant benefits to the IPO banks. Finally, we show that the political contributions of board members, particularly those of CEOs and founders, are associated with better returns in the long term.

The performance of alternative institutional mandates in achieving macroeconomic and financial stability is studied in a model with financial frictions and reserve requirements as the main instrument of macroprudential regulation. The analysis shows that under a policy loss evaluation approach, coordination leads to a substantial gain in stability in response to various shocks, with the policy interest rate and the required reserve ratio exhibiting a high degree of complementarity. The latter is also more efficient than the former in promoting financial stability. In addition, it is optimal to delegate the financial stability goal also to the monetary authority when the financial regulator only operates a credit-based reserve requirements rule. These results hold under a utility-based welfare evaluation approach as well, as long as the central bank’s institutional mandate focuses mainly on macroeconomic stability. Thus, when the mandate bestowed to policymakers by society accounts for financial stability, evaluating the performance of policy regimes based solely on a welfare criterion could be inappropriate.

This study provides the first empirical evidence of the relationship between firm-level political risk and distance-to-default. Based on our examination of a quarterly dataset of 2727 U.S. firms covering a period from January 2002 to April 2019, we conclude that firm-level political risk is negatively associated with distance-to-default. We document three economic mechanisms through which political risk increases default risk: information asymmetry, organizational capital, and investment growth. The evidence indicates that the association is more pronounced for firms with low analysts’ forecast accuracy, organizational capital, and investment growth. Employing hand-collected data, we also reveal that firms are able to exploit their corporate lobbying to immunize themselves against default risk. Our findings are robust to different endogeneity identifications, including a natural experiment, alternative distance-to-default proxies, and different sub-samples. Overall, we present novel evidence of an adverse impact of firm-level political risk on distance-to-default and how such a negative effect can be mitigated.