Despite the devastating worldwide human and economic tolls of the COVID-19 crisis, it has created some positive economic and financial surprises and opportunities for research. This paper highlights two such favorable surprises - the shortest U.S. recession on record and the avoidance of any banking crisis - and a number of research opportunities. The paper ties the "economic surprise" of the short recession to the speed and size of U.S. stimulus programs during COVID-19 - faster and larger than for the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). We connect the "financial surprise" of the resilient banking sector to prudential policies put in place during and after the GFC that fortified U.S. banks prior to COVID-19. These twin "surprises" are also mutually reinforcing - if either the economy or banking system had failed, so would the other. The paper also reviews extant COVID-19 banking research and suggest paths for future research. It recommends that particular attention be paid to research outside of the U.S. - where fewer favorable "surprises" may be present - as the best way to advance knowledge in this area.

This paper examines the interplay among bank liquidity creation (which incorporates all bank on- and off-balance sheet activities), monetary policy, and financial crises. We find that: (1) high liquidity creation (relative to trend) – particularly off-balance sheet liquidity creation – helps predict crises, controlling for other factors; (2) monetary policy has statistically significant, but economically minor effects on liquidity creation by small banks during normal times, and these effects are even weaker during financial crises; (3) monetary policy has very little effects on medium and large bank liquidity creation during both normal times and crises. These findings suggest that authorities may wish to monitor bank liquidity creation closely in order to predict and perhaps lessen the likelihood of financial crises. They might also consider other tools to control bank liquidity creation, such as capital and liquidity requirements.

We formulate and test hypotheses about how lead banks of syndicated loans use private information about loan quality, the Signaling and Sophisticated Syndicate Hypotheses. We measure private information using Shared National Credit (SNC) internal loan ratings made comparable using concordance tables. As outcomes, we use proportions of loans retained by lead banks from SNC and rate spreads on the loans from DealScan. We find favorable private information is associated with higher retention and lower spreads for pure term loans, supporting the Signaling Hypothesis. Only lower spreads occur for pure revolvers, likely because their syndicates more often include large sophisticated banks.

Despite the growth of Islamic banks (IBs), little is known about their liquidity creation performance and financial stability consequences relative to conventional banks (CBs). We address these issues using data from 24 countries over 2000–2014. We find IBs create more liquidity per unit of assets than CBs, primarily on the asset side of the balance sheet. Results are economically significant, econometrically robust, hold in high- and low-income countries, and during the Global Financial Crisis and other times. In addition, CB liquidity creation results in reduced national financial stability, particularly in high-income countries, whereas IB liquidity creation does not.