“Old Europe” – the developed nations of continental Europe – averages only about 15% foreign bank ownership, whereas “New Europe” – the transition nations of Eastern Europe – averages about 70%. Similar findings hold elsewhere in the world – developed nations tend to have much lower foreign bank ownership shares than developing nations. We examine the causes of the differences within Europe with an eye toward more general conclusions. Our findings suggest that the low foreign bank shares in “Old Europe” – and perhaps developed nations more generally – may primarily result from net comparative disadvantages for foreign banks and relatively high implicit government entry barriers. The high foreign penetration in “New Europe” – and perhaps developing nations more generally – may be due to net comparative advantages for foreign banks and low government entry barriers, particularly in nations that reduced their state bank ownership.

We test a new hypothesis that may help explain the procyclicality of bank lending. The institutional memory hypothesis is driven by deterioration in the ability of loan officers over the bank's lending cycle that results in an easing of credit standards. We test this hypothesis using data from individual US banks over 1980–2000: over 200,000 bank-level observations on commercial loan growth, over 2,000,000 loan-level observations on interest rate premiums, and over 2000 bank-level observations on credit standards and loan spreads from bank management survey responses. The empirical analysis supports the hypothesis, although there are differences by bank size class.

We investigate the effects of technological change, deregulation, and dynamic changes in competition on the performance of US banks. Our most striking result is that during 1991–1997, cost productivity worsened while profit productivity improved substantially, particularly for banks engaging in mergers. The data are consistent with the hypothesis that banks tried to maximize profits by raising revenues as well as reducing costs. Banks appeared to provide additional or higher quality services that raised costs but also raised revenues by more than the cost increases. The results suggest that methods that exclude revenues when assessing performance may be misleading.

Despite the devastating worldwide human and economic tolls of the COVID-19 crisis, it has created some positive economic and financial surprises and opportunities for research. This paper highlights two such favorable surprises - the shortest U.S. recession on record and the avoidance of any banking crisis - and a number of research opportunities. The paper ties the "economic surprise" of the short recession to the speed and size of U.S. stimulus programs during COVID-19 - faster and larger than for the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). We connect the "financial surprise" of the resilient banking sector to prudential policies put in place during and after the GFC that fortified U.S. banks prior to COVID-19. These twin "surprises" are also mutually reinforcing - if either the economy or banking system had failed, so would the other. The paper also reviews extant COVID-19 banking research and suggest paths for future research. It recommends that particular attention be paid to research outside of the U.S. - where fewer favorable "surprises" may be present - as the best way to advance knowledge in this area.

This paper examines the interplay among bank liquidity creation (which incorporates all bank on- and off-balance sheet activities), monetary policy, and financial crises. We find that: (1) high liquidity creation (relative to trend) – particularly off-balance sheet liquidity creation – helps predict crises, controlling for other factors; (2) monetary policy has statistically significant, but economically minor effects on liquidity creation by small banks during normal times, and these effects are even weaker during financial crises; (3) monetary policy has very little effects on medium and large bank liquidity creation during both normal times and crises. These findings suggest that authorities may wish to monitor bank liquidity creation closely in order to predict and perhaps lessen the likelihood of financial crises. They might also consider other tools to control bank liquidity creation, such as capital and liquidity requirements.

Traditional concerns about concentration in product markets have centered on the social loss associated with the mispricing that occurs when market power is exercised. This paper focuses on a potentially greater loss from market power—a reduction in cost efficiency brought about by the lack of market discipline in concentrated markets. We employ data from the commercial banking industry, which produces very homogeneous products in multiple markets with differing degrees of market concentration. We find the estimated efficiency cost of concentration to be several times larger than the social loss from mispricing as traditionally measured by the welfare triangle.

Berger, Allen N., and Timothy H. Hannon, The Price-Concentration Relationship in Banking, this REVIEW 71 (May 1989), 291-299. Demsetz, Harold, Industry Structure, Rivalry, and Public Policy, Journal of Law and Economics 16 (Apr. 1973), 1-9. Jackson, William E. III, Market Structure and Price Adjustments: Evidence from the Banking Industry, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, June 1989. Peltzman, Samuel, The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentration, Journal of Law and Economics 20 (Oct. 1977), 229-263. Salinger, Michael, The Concentration-Margins Relationship Reconsidered, in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, Martin N. Bailey and Clifford Winston, (eds.), Brookings (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990). 5 No formal statistical tests of the differences in the estimated coefficients of CONC across subsamples were conducted. This analysis was concerned more with the sign and significance level of each subsample estimated CONC coefficient.

The commonly observed positive correlation between market concentration and profitability may be explained by noncompetitive pricing behavior, as argued by the structure-performance hypothesis, or by the greater efficiency of firms with dominant market shares, as argued by the efficient-structure hypothesis. By examining the price-concentration relationship instead of the profit-concentration relationship, this paper tests the structure-performance hypothesis in a manner that excludes the efficient-structure hypothesis as an alternative explanation of the results. The results strongly support the structure-performance hypothesis and are robust with respect to model specification, measurement of concentration, and econometric technique.