The crisis is not yet over; the housing market continues to deteriorate and there are spill-overs into other markets. Growth is declining, with potentially self re-enforcing mechanisms between financial markets and the real economy coming into play. A local problem became a global crisis because of poor risk management, lack of transparency and excessive leverage. Not only does the capital base need re-building, but also incentive schemes need reconsideration.

We study the connection between the global liquidity crisis and the severe credit crunch experienced by finance companies (SOFOLES) in Mexico using firm-level data between 2001 and 2011. Our results provide supporting evidence that, as a result of the liquidity shock, SOFOLES faced severely restricted access to their main funding sources (commercial bank loans, loans from other organizations, and public debt markets). After controlling for the potential endogeneity of their funding, we find that the liquidity shock explains 64 percent of SOFOLES’ credit contraction during the recent financial crisis (2008–2009). We use our estimates to disentangle supply from demand factors as determinants of the credit contraction. After controlling for the large decline in loan demand during the financial crisis, our findings suggest that supply factors (such as nonperforming loans and lower liquidity buffers) also played a significant role. Finally, we find that financial deregulation implemented in 2006 may have amplified the effects of the global liquidity shock.

We assess the effects of increased bank competition on macroeconomic and lending dynamics and on the transmission of monetary policy. Applying panel local projections to state-level data, we, in a first step, investigate the dynamic effects of fiercer bank competition induced by deregulation allowing geographical expansion of banks across state borders in the 1980s and early-1990s. We allow for possible adjustments before the new laws became effective due to potential anticipation effects. Our findings suggest that these events were anticipated and that they temporarily increased economic activity as well as business and consumer lending. We also find a permanent increase in real estate lending and house prices. In a second step, we show that the impact of monetary policy on economic activity, house prices and lending tended to become stronger after interstate banking deregulation.

We formulate and test hypotheses about how lead banks of syndicated loans use private information about loan quality, the Signaling and Sophisticated Syndicate Hypotheses. We measure private information using Shared National Credit (SNC) internal loan ratings made comparable using concordance tables. As outcomes, we use proportions of loans retained by lead banks from SNC and rate spreads on the loans from DealScan. We find favorable private information is associated with higher retention and lower spreads for pure term loans, supporting the Signaling Hypothesis. Only lower spreads occur for pure revolvers, likely because their syndicates more often include large sophisticated banks.

We propose a theory of corporate liquidity management in which signaling through illiquidity is cheaper than signaling through “skin in the game.” This causes ex post liquidation of worthy projects even when there are enough aggregate resources available for their continuation. We examine the policy remedies for this distortion and consider their consequences for the supply of liquidity, interest rate policy, and subsidies.

Weak bank supervision could give banks the ability to shift risk from themselves to supervisors. We use cross-border bank mergers as a natural experiment to test changes in risk and the impact of supervision. We examine cross-border bank mergers and find that the supervisory structures of the partners’ countries influence changes in post-merger total risk. An acquirer from a country with strong supervision lowers total risk after a cross-border merger. However, total risk increases when the target bank is located in a country with relatively strong supervision. This result is consistent with strong host regulators limiting the risky activities of their local banks. Foreign-owned competitors could then engage in the risky projects, especially if the foreign banks’ supervisors are not strong. An acquirer entering a country with strong supervision appears to shift risk back to its home country. The results suggest that bank supervisors can reduce total banking risk in their countries by being strong.

How susceptible to contagion are bank deposits associated with financial inclusion? To assess this susceptibility, we analyze the behavior of deposits around three significant events of bank failure in the Philippines. We conduct the event studies with the advantage of a unique dataset that disaggregates deposits by size at the town level. We show that both small and large deposits are withdrawn up to 4–5 quarters before the bank’s closure. We take advantage of this distinction between small and large deposits to test for contagion. Applying difference-in-difference regressions, we find evidence of contagion: the closure of a large bank leads to withdrawals at banks in neighboring towns by depositors both large and small. This is the case for two of the three events, and when the data is taken collectively. That there is a market for information affects deposit insurance as a safety net for depositors and as a disciplining tool for banks. There are also liquidity considerations that banks need to consider. In any case, we consistently find the behavior of small depositors to be no different from that of large depositors. Hence, if financial inclusion is about access to bank deposits, it is not likely to heighten systemic risks nor mitigate them.

This study finds that equity returns in the banking sector in the wake of the Great Recession and the European sovereign debt crisis have been driven mainly by weak growth prospects and heightened sovereign risk; and to a lesser extent by deteriorating funding conditions and investor sentiment. While the equity return performance in the banking sector has been dismal in general, there is some evidence that better capitalized and less leveraged banks have outperformed their peers in times of stress.

We investigate the determinants of sovereign bond holdings of German banks and the implications of such holdings for bank risk. We use granular information on all German banks and all sovereign debt exposures in the years 2005–2013. As regards the determinants of sovereign bond holdings of banks, we find that these are larger for weakly capitalized banks, banks that are active on capital markets, and for large banks. Yet, only around two thirds of all German banks hold sovereign bonds. Macroeconomic fundamentals were significant drivers of sovereign bond holdings only after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. With the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis, German banks reallocated their portfolios toward sovereigns with lower debt ratios and bonds with lower yields. With regard to the implications for bank risk, we find that low-risk government bonds decreased the risk of German banks, especially for savings and cooperative banks. Holdings of high-risk government bonds, in turn, increased the risk of commercial banks during the sovereign debt crisis.