This paper analyzes the impact of remuneration practices on banks’ risk-taking in a model with fire sales externalities. When these externalities are not internalized by a bank's shareholders and executives, borrowing and fire sales are higher than the socially optimal level. Our analysis shows that plain-vanilla equity fails to internalize fire sales externalities. Deferred equity and long-term bonuses unrelated to short-term profits can restore social efficiency. Bail-in bonds can achieve efficiency at a smaller cost since they allow for state-contingent payments. It is not the level but the composition of variable compensation that determines the inefficiency. Excessive regulation may lead to suboptimal levels of risk-taking. Government guarantees reinforce the fire sales externalities and the need for regulation.

We study a model in which leverage and compensation are both choice variables for the firm and borrowing spreads are endogenous. First, we analyze the correlation between leverage and variable compensation. We show that allowing for endogenous compensation and leverage can explain the conflicting findings of the empirical literature. We uncover a new channel of complementarity between effort and leverage that induces a correlation sign opposite to what current theoretical models predict. Second, we study the dynamics of leverage and compensation design after a credit stimulus. We derive a set of new empirical predictions. For outward-shifts in credit supply, variable compensation is increasing in leverage growth. Moreover, variable compensation increases after the credit stimulus, especially for firms with low idiosyncratic risk.