We provide evidence concerning the effect of managerial risk-taking incentives on merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions and outcomes for different types of mergers: vertical, horizontal, and diversifying. Using chief executive officer (CEO) relative inside leverage to proxy for the incentives of risk-averse managers, we find that CEOs with higher inside leverage are more likely to engage in vertical mergers, and those mergers generate lower announcement returns for shareholders. This effect of CEO relative inside leverage on returns for shareholders in vertical acquisitions is more pronounced when the acquirer has a higher degree of informational opacity, weak governance, and excess cash.

This paper extends the seminal Cox-Ross-Rubinstein ((1979), CRR hereafter) binomial model to multiple assets. It differs from previous models in that it is derived under the complete market environment specified by Duffie and Huang (1985) and He (1990). The complete market assumption requires the number of states to grow linearly with the number of assets. However, the number of correlations grows at a faster rate, causing the CRR model to be indirectly extendable. We solve such a problem by recognizing that the fast growing correlation number is matched by the number of the angles of the edges of a hypercube spanned by the risky assets. As a result, we derive a solution that allows the number of equations to equal the number of risky assets and the riskless bond. The resulting tree structure hence provides the same intuition of pricing and hedging contingent claims as that provided by the CRR model. Finally, the proposed model is not only as easy to implement as the one-dimensional CRR model but also it is more memory efficient than the existing multi-factor lattice models.

In this article, we evaluate the effect of managerial entrenchment on corporate information production using the voting outcomes of shareholder-initiated proposals intended to mitigate managerial entrenchment. We focus on the proposals that are passed or rejected by a small margin of votes, which generate plausibly exogenous variations in managerial entrenchment. We find that a reduction in managerial entrenchment enhances corporate information production. The effects are stronger for firms with greater information asymmetries and severer agency frictions. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the view that reducing managerial entrenchment enhances corporate disclosure by aligning the incentives of managers and shareholders.

Building on the growing literature on interfirm links and limited attention, we find evidence of return predictability across alliance partners. A long–short portfolio sorted on lagged returns of strategic alliance partners provides a return of 89 basis points per month that is robust to a number of specifications. Investor inattention and limits to arbitrage may be the source of the underreaction of a firm’s returns to that of its partners.

We study the role of state controlling shareholders in corporate payout policy. The State Capital Operation Program in China requires parent central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs) to contribute part of their consolidated income to a new fiscal fund. We find that listed CSOEs, partially controlled by parent CSOEs, experience significant reductions in dividend payouts as the income-contribution ratio increases. The dividend reductions are concurrent with increases in intragroup resource transfers— listed CSOEs’ loans to, and commercial trades with, group peers. The program yields adverse consequences for listed CSOEs’ investment and employment, yet being mitigated by group-level dividend reductions.

This article studies how minimum-wage policies affect capital investment using the industrial census of manufacturing firms in China, where minimum-wage policies vary across counties. Exploiting discontinuities in minimum-wage policy at county borders, we find that minimum wages increase capital investment. The investment response to minimum wages is stronger for firms that are labor intensive, that have more room for technological improvement, and that cannot sufficiently pass on labor costs to consumers. A natural experiment based on county jurisdictional changes further assures the causal relationship.