The proliferation of electronic limit order books operating without dealers raises questions regarding the need for intermediaries with affirmative obligations to maintain markets. We develop a simple model of dealer participation and test it using a sample of less liquid firms that trade on the Paris Bourse. The results indicate that firms with designated dealers exhibit better market quality, and that younger firms, smaller firms, and less volatile firms choose a designated dealer. Around the announcement of dealer introduction, stocks experience an average cumulative abnormal return of nearly 5% that is positively correlated with improvements in liquidity. Overall, these findings emphasize the potential benefits of designing better market structures, even within electronic limit order books, and suggest that purely endogenous liquidity provision may not be optimal for all securities.

The traditional valuation framework is unsuited to the task of valuing a growth stock when the capitalization rate is specified in terms of market leverage, simply because it is impossible to maintain a constant ratio of book to market leverage over the growth horizon. This severely limits the usefulness of the traditional model in analyzing the valuation problem. We have proposed a more general form of the model which allows us to show the consistency between M-M's Propositions I and II under growth.

This study shows that individual investors systematically shift their preferences across extreme style portfolios (small vs. large, value vs. growth). These preference shifts are influenced by past style returns and earnings differentials, and advice from investment newsletters, but are unaffected by innovations in macroeconomic variables or shifts in expectations about future cash flows. Furthermore, investors’ dynamic style preferences influence returns along multiple dimensions: i) the contemporaneous relation between style returns and style-level preference shifts is strong, ii) there is weak evidence of style return predictability, and iii) the correlations among stocks within a style increase when investors move into or out of the style with greater intensity. Overall, the results indicate that stock categorization influences investors’ portfolio decisions and stock returns.

This paper uses investor-level data to provide direct evidence for an intuitive but surprisingly untested proposition that investors make larger investment mistakes when valuation uncertainty is higher and stocks are more difficult to value. Using multiple measures of valuation uncertainty and multiple behavioral bias proxies, I show that individual investors exhibit stronger behavioral biases when stocks are harder to value and when market-level uncertainty is higher. I also find that informed trading intensity is higher among stocks where individual investors exhibit stronger behavioral biases. Collectively, these results indicate that uncertainty at both stock and market levels amplifies individual investors’ behavioral biases and that relatively better informed investors attempt to exploit those biases.

In October 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) passed Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) in an effort to reduce selective disclosure of material information by firms to analysts and other investment professionals. We find that the information asymmetry reflected in trading costs at earnings announcements has declined after Regulation FD, with the decrease more pronounced for smaller and less liquid stocks. Return volatility around mandatory announcements is also lower but overall information flow is unchanged when mandatory and voluntary announcements are combined. Thus, the SEC appears to have diminished the advantage of informed investors, without increasing volatility.

William Stein, Roger Pfaffenberger, P. C. Kumar, On the Estimation Risk in First-Order Stochastic Dominance: A Note, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Dec., 1983), pp. 471-476

Using a unique data set with detailed information on the derivative positions of upstream oil and gas firms during 1996–2008, we find that hedging intensity is positively related to factors that amplify chief executive officer (CEO) entrenchment and free cash flow agency costs. There is also robust evidence that hedging is motivated by the reduction of financial distress and borrowing costs, and that it is influenced by both intrinsic cash flow risk and temporary spikes in commodity price volatility. We present a comprehensive perspective on the determinants of corporate hedging, and the results are consistent with the predictions of the risk management and agency costs literatures.

Building on the managerial entrenchment literature, we develop and test a novel perspective on payout policy that integrates the influence of internal governance mechanisms, investment opportunities, management compensation, and monitoring by large shareholders. Our study incorporates both dividend payments and share repurchases, and examines the determinants of the likelihood and the level of payouts. Our model performs well in both in-sample and out-of-sample predictions on a sample of 2,081 firms during 1992–2000. We find that both the likelihood and the level of payouts are significantly and positively (negatively) related to factors that increase (decrease) executive entrenchment levels, even when controlling for size, leverage, and the proportion of tangible to total assets. We identify factors that significantly affect the likelihood but not the level of payouts (or vice versa), and show that entrenchment has an asymmetric influence on dividend vs. shares repurchase policy.

Raman Kumar, Parvez R. Sopariwala, The Effect of Adoption of Long-Term Performance Plans on Stock Prices and Accounting Numbers, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Dec., 1992), pp. 561-573

In this article, we survey the literature that studies fixed-income trading rules and outcomes, including Treasury securities, corporate and municipal bonds, and structured credit products. We compare and contrast the microstructure and regulation of fixed-income markets with equity markets. We highlight the nature of over-the-counter trading in the face of search costs and the associated slow evolution of electronically facilitated intermediation. We discuss the databases available to study fixed-income microstructure, as well as measures and determinants of trading costs, and the important roles dealer networks and limited transparency play. We also highlight unresolved issues.